

I. Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) Summer School

by the Department of Political Science at the Corvinus University of Budapest

August 28 – September 1, 2024.

“Hegyalja” Guesthouse, Abaujszántó, Hungary

2024, Hungary

The first “Summer School of Philosophy, Politics and Economics” offers a unique opportunity to study and relax in the town of Abaújszántó in the *Tokaj Wine Region Historic Cultural Landscape*. The four-day program offers lectures, seminars, and presentation sessions on core issues in PPE, as well as excursions and cultural events. The lectures and seminars will be given by faculty members of Corvinus University of Budapest (see program below).

The program is generously supported by the Corvinus University (<https://www.uni-corvinus.hu/?lang=en>).

More on the place:

“Hegyalja” Guesthouse, Abaújszántó, Arany János utca (street) 47.

<https://hegyaljapanzio.hu/>

Presenters and topics:

(Day 1) Réka Várnagy *Political Communication*

(Day 2) Zoltán Balázs *Power: What is it?*

(Day 3) Bulcsú Hoppál *Person and Dignity*

Program:

Wednesday (28th August)

late afternoon: arrival, dinner (around 19.30), opening program

Thursday (29th) – Friday (30th) – Saturday (31st)

8.00 Breakfast

9.00-10.00 Lecture

break

10.30-12.00 Seminar (discussing the core problems of the text; formulating questions/problems for the afternoon presentations)

12.30 Lunch

13.30-15.30 Presentation seminar (groups preparing presentation on a topic assigned in the morning session; supervised by the lecturer)

break

16.30-18.00 Presentation session (mini conference, Q&A session)

18.30 Dinner

Sunday (1st September)

8.00 Breakfast

9.00-10.00 Feedback session (World Café on the first year of the PPE)

Excursion, farewell

Full board (three meals a day), double-triple rooms, learning materials will be provided in advance.

Contact information:

bulcsu.hoppal@uni-corvinus.hu (in case of emergency +36309733379)

First Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) Summer School suggested readings:

(day 1) Várnagy *Political Communication*

reading: Benjamin Wofford: *Meet the Lobbyist Next Door*
<https://www.wired.com/story/meet-the-lobbyist-next-door/>

pages 1-10.

(day 2) Balázs *Power: What is it?*

reading: Steven Lukes: *Power: A Radical View* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005

pages 14-60. (First chapter)

(day 3) Hoppál *Person and Dignity*

reading: Karol Wojtyła: *Love and Responsibility* Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2013

pages 29-47.

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Philosophy

Benjamin Wofford: Meet the Lobbyist Next Door

source: <https://www.wired.com/story/meet-the-lobbyist-next-door/>

What do a Real Housewife, an Olympic athlete, and a doula have in common? They're all being paid by an ad-tech startup as influencers—peddling not products but ideologies. An illustration with lots of emoji and political imagery

AT FIRST GLANCE, the posts appeared to have nothing in common. A Philadelphia-area attorney who proffers financial advice urged her 1,700 Twitter followers to sign up for a credit union. A 23-year-old climate activist in Texas rallied her 49,000 fans on TikTok and Instagram to join a mailing list promoting Democrats in statewide offices. A physical therapist for the elderly in Florida prodded her 3,900 Instagram followers to sign a petition demanding that Congress pass paid medical leave, sharing the story of her grandmother's battle with dementia. Each of these posts was funded by a well-heeled advocacy organization: the Credit Union National Association, the Democratic Association of Secretaries of State, and UsAgainstAlzheimer's Action.

Even though none of the people reading these posts knew it, however, they were all made possible by the same company: Urban Legend, a small ad-tech startup operating out of a loft in Alexandria, Virginia.

Launched in 2020 by a pair of former Trump administration staffers, Urban Legend pledges on its website to “help brands run accountable and impactful influencer campaigns.” Its more comprehensive mission, one rarely articulated in public, is slightly more ambitious.

Staffed by a plucky 14-person team, Urban Legend keeps its largest asset carefully hidden away inside its servers: an army of 700 social media influencers who command varying degrees of allegiance from audiences that collectively number in the tens of millions. The company has painstakingly cultivated this roster to reflect every conceivable niche of society reflected on the internet: makeup artists, Nascar drivers, home improvement gurus, teachers, doulas, Real Housewives stars, mommy bloggers, NFL quarterbacks, Olympians, and the occasional Fox News pundit.

These influencers are paired with clients on Urban Legend's private platform, the Exchange, where buyers spell out the parameters of the message they want to push to the public and set a budget. Influencers snatch the best available offers from a menu and are then free to craft the campaign's message, molding it to the rhythms and vernacular of their followers. Clients only pay for each “conversion” an influencer nets—\$1.25, say, for every follower who joins a newsletter. In two years, Urban Legend's influencers have run more than 400 campaigns, connecting people to its clients millions of times. Henri Makembe, a veteran Democratic campaign strategist in Washington who has worked with Urban Legend several times, compared the concept to “unboxing” videos—when an influencer unwraps and showcases a product sent to them by a brand. Such product influencers are a \$15 billion marketing industry. “Now we're realizing, ‘Oh: We can do that with an idea,’” Makembe says.

This model is the brainchild of Urban Legend's 35-year-old founder and CEO, Ory Rinat. Rinat spent the early part of his career working in Washington's media circles before becoming director of digital strategy for the Trump White House. The idea for Urban Legend arose from many currents in American public life, including "the rise of influencer marketing, the increase in trust in those people, and also the rise of individuals to be their own media brand," he says. In both retail and influencer politics, he says, small is big: "Our creators range from 3,000 to 14 million followers," Rinat tells me, but the majority are "micro-influencers" (those with 100,000 or fewer followers) and "nano-influencers" (fewer than 10,000).

Like baseball, selling influence is a pastime that rarely gets reinvented. There are only so many ways to get a person to do the thing you want. In politics, the more solicitous methods include robocalls and email spam with increasingly audacious subject lines ("Hey, it's Barack"). "The most impactful messaging strategies have always been the most personalized," says Anat Shenker-Osorio, a progressive campaign consultant based in California. Peer-to-peer outreach has long proven the most effective at persuading or mobilizing—appeals that create "the feeling like this is a real person talking to me." Urban Legend's approach reflects this insight, embracing influencers less as celebrity spokespeople than as peers for hire. If an influencer's financial advice helped you save for a vacation or their fashion tips earned you compliments, maybe their view on the minimum wage, or critical race theory, is worth considering too. "To then have that person give you information about politics? That's potentially an incredibly potent and powerful messenger," says Shenker-Osorio.

But the rise of this new messenger has disquieted some. For one, it's unclear whether influencers are following federal disclosure rules. And as at similar firms, the names of Urban Legend's influencers and clients are a closely held secret—or were, until recently—creating the prospect of an internet flush with untraceable money, in which Americans can no longer tell an earnest opinion from a paid one. Initially, Rinat told me that the firm's clients included a Fortune 50 tech company, a "major labor union," an "environmental advocacy group," and one "LGBTQ+ advocacy group."

In Washington, there's been a swell of interest in the influencer business, across the political spectrum. It bears the signs of an incipient arms race, much like the advent of super PACs a decade ago. Hany Farid, a professor of computer science at UC Berkeley who has briefed the Biden administration on social media regulation, predicted that Urban Legend's model will be recapitulated widely before the 2024 presidential election. "This is the future," Farid told me.

Tellingly, both Urban Legend's boosters and its detractors agree on the presence of a black hole at the center of the internet that's pulled society into alignment with its goals. "To understand what Urban Legend is doing, you have to look at where we are as a society," says Makembe. "There's a lack of trust"—in institutions, in media, in each other—a worsening problem that he says Urban Legend is solving. Others are less sanguine. "You're getting paid to manipulate your followers," Farid says flatly. "Somebody with 3,000 followers is now, essentially, a lobbyist."

RAISED IN QUEENS, New York, Rinat launched his first business at age 10. He pasted together several mail-order catalogs from rival home goods sellers and then enlisted preteen influencers—his elementary school peers—to peddle them to their parents. Young Ory managed the orders and took a cut of the sales (“a couple hundred dollars,” he estimates). The concept is not so different from Urban Legend, knitting sellers together within one convenient ecosystem.

After graduating from Columbia University in 2009 with a degree in political science and history, Rinat moved to Washington, DC. He attended the night program at Georgetown’s law school while working on the business team of Atlantic Media, the parent company of magazines like *The Atlantic* and *National Journal*. Rinat and his colleagues were experimenting with how to keep magazines profitable after the internet had torpedoed their ad revenues. His team became a pioneer of sponsored content, consulting with big-name companies to create multimedia versions of magazine-style stories.

From a business perspective, however, Rinat found aspects of this model to be a bad deal for corporate clients. It had what he calls an “authenticity problem,” in that few people raced to read an “article” written by suits at Exxon. There was also an “accountability problem.” Corporate advertisers paid one lump sum up front, then simply hoped people would see their ad. Rinat recalled one DC trade association that paid a marketing agency \$300,000 to place ads on Facebook urging users to email their congressperson. In the end, the group netted 600 emails—\$500 per email.

Rinat speaks the savvy language of internet marketing; in layman’s vocabulary, “accountability” means “getting clients their money’s worth,” and “authenticity” means “making people believe your message is genuine, even though someone paid for it.” Nevertheless, Rinat sensed these challenges had implications beyond journalism. Around Washington, he began asking strange questions—such as the price corporate buyers were willing to pay for, say, a citizen’s heartfelt letter to Congress. (One client’s answer: \$48.) He wondered whether some new development would bridge these problems. “What was left,” he reasoned, was “finding the mechanism.”

Rinat kept these ideas alive when he began directing digital strategy for the conservative Heritage Foundation in 2015. After Trump’s election, Rinat took an appointment in the State Department for a program combating violent extremism and terrorism online. Two weeks into the job, the incoming White House director of digital strategy reportedly failed an FBI background check, and Rinat was appointed interim director. Eventually, he stayed on. From his office in the Eisenhower Building, he helped redesign the White House website, build a web portal for the response to the opioid crisis, and launch [Coronavirus.gov](https://www.coronavirus.gov).

Rinat situated the company along a spectrum of persuasion. “What’s the highest possible thing on that spectrum? It’s probably a one-to-one communication—somebody you trust,” he says. “We’re just below that.”

By then, social media influencers had gained a tighter grip on politics, particularly in Trump’s brand of movement conservatism. Rinat explored ways to unlock their power. In 2019, alongside Sondra Clark, the administration’s director of marketing and campaigns, Rinat

helped organize the first White House Social Media Summit. At the event, Trump gathered in the East Room with about 200 online “digital leaders” in conservative politics—activists and rabble-rousers including Project Veritas founder James O’Keefe, Turning Point USA’s Charlie Kirk, and Bill Mitchell, a spreader of the then incipient QAnon conspiracy. “The crap you think of,” Trump told the crowd, “is unbelievable.” The event, according to an administration official who attended, was in keeping with a larger strategy in which social media mavens were given “an exclusive-access look at what the administration was doing, and then reaping the benefits” as they posted enthusiastically about their time at the White House. “Sondra and Ory,” the person continued, “were really the architects of that.”

Influencers had become “the mechanism” Rinat was searching for—the ultimate gig labor force, capable of delivering what he called “cost-per-action marketing, with client-set rates.” He began floating his business idea to mentors. (One was Atlantic Media chair David Bradley.) In June 2020, Rinat left the White House. Less than a month later he launched Urban Legend, and Clark came on board as president. One of their first clients was their former boss. In the second half of 2020, according to the Federal Election Commission, the Trump campaign paid Rinat’s firm more than \$1 million for “online advertising.”

RINAT WAS UNSPOOLING this history from the corner of Urban Legend’s brick-and-cedar office when I visited on a warm morning this past spring. The firm occupies the top floor of a townhouse in Alexandria’s colonial-style downtown, wedged between a boutique pizzeria and a clothing store. By turns charming and withdrawn, Rinat has a clean-shaven head and a taciturn, solemn air, except for amused eyes that turn up cheerily at the corners when he is considering some proposition. “The technology we’re talking about is not revolutionary,” he clarifies at the outset. “We just integrated it.”

He led me into the team’s small conference room, which had chic-ish furniture and a small library. (Books included *Confrontational Politics*, by a gun-rights activist, and *Rules for Revolutionaries*, by two Bernie Sanders consultants.) Hanging on the wall was a large television monitor, where Rinat spun through a tour of the Exchange, using me as a hypothetical influencer (or “creator,” as he prefers). We set up my creator account, then clicked on a tab labeled “My Campaigns.” On prim, eggshell-colored menu panes, I was presented with campaigns from a series of eager advertisers. One dummy client, called Shipmates, was a sustainable packaging company that wanted my followers to sign up for its newsletter. The company offered me \$1.90 as the “revenue per conversion,” with a limit of 3,000 sign-ups. I checked a box, agreeing to the terms and conditions, and clicked “Join Campaign.”

“Here’s the irony of this whole thing. Urban legend is relying on precisely the same thing—trust—that it is arguably destroying.”

Now I was officially influencing for cash. Shipmates offered me a “campaign brief”—suggesting rhetoric for getting my followers to “join our sustainability conversation.” But how I crafted this appeal was up to me. I was given a menu of custom links, each traceable just to me, and each designated to a different platform: Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube. Rinat had an employee click one of my links, sending their browser to Shipmates’ newsletter page, where they promptly signed up. On my dashboard, a ticker labeled “Your Conversions” flipped from 0 to 1. “And look at that,” Rinat said gamely. “You just made a

dollar ninety.” Among other tricks, Urban Legend can also track visits to an advertiser’s website, books on Amazon, op-eds in The New York Times, and form emails to Congress.

At a cramped desk a few feet away sat Sophia Schreiber, a 26-year-old “creator success coordinator.” Schreiber scours the internet for social media personas who have a loyal following and post in areas that advertisers might want to reach. (Fast-growing verticals are parenting and wellness—and, lately, cryptocurrency educators, Rinat says.) Sitting inside a white-paneled phone booth was James Hong, the company’s 30-year-old vice president. After Schreiber flags the influencers, Hong and others call them to vet their demeanor and professionalism—and to suss out any untapped advertising potential. Urban Legend’s influencers “are incredibly multi-faceted,” Rinat explains. “We might be onboarding a blogger who has cooking tips” but come to learn they also care about climate change or religion—“issues they’re passionate about, but not always posting about,” Rinat says.

After a team lunch, Urban Legend’s president, Sondra Clark, joined us at the conference table and explained the delicate art of influencer management. Chosen influencers are classified within a large, meticulously maintained database. To an extent, Urban Legend can curate the messengers for its corporate clients by sending push notifications that nudge them toward campaigns based on the creators’ profile of causes. Set against Rinat’s more austere mode, Clark seemed congenitally sunny, exuding a breezy charm. She framed the Exchange as empowering for influencers. “I want to talk about human trafficking,” she says, mimicking an influencer. “That’s awesome! And they get a text from us—hey, there’s a campaign in your account on this issue.”

In conversation, Rinat and Clark like to emphasize causes with a liberal bent, like climate change, or no bent, like Alzheimer’s awareness, but they left their more conservative campaigns a mystery. When our conversation neared the subject of partisan influence on the Exchange, Rinat evinced a tactful froideur. His vision for the platform was one that can “work with everybody,” he said, somewhat elliptically. Urban Legend’s staff is almost evenly split between Democrats and Republicans, he said, and most come from the world of marketing. “When you’re talking about hospital price transparency or prenatal health care or Alzheimer’s, it’s not left-right. It’s beyond politics,” Rinat said.

It would all become clear, supposedly, when I met Rinat’s selected influencers. One was Zahra Biabani, the 23-year-old creator behind the Instagram and TikTok accounts Soulful Seeds, who was recruited by Urban Legend last fall. “I didn’t know that you could be paid for sharing a petition!” she says, laughing. Biabani has around 30,000 followers on Instagram and 19,000 on TikTok and posts what she calls “climate optimism”—sharing motivating news about climate change, occasionally while grooving to a pop soundtrack. (Instagram’s official account, with 500 million followers, featured one of her dances on Earth Day.) From Biabani’s point of view, Urban Legend wasn’t asking her to do anything unusual. “You could get paid for promoting things that I would already promote,” she says. To her, the Exchange “is a very low-effort and noncontroversial way of leveraging the values-aligned audience that I built as an influencer.”

Leah O'Rourke, a 31-year-old physical therapist for older adults, posts geriatric care advice on her Instagram account, Love to Care For. "I guess I'm an influencer, which feels weird to say," she says. With 3,900 followers, O'Rourke estimates she made about \$500 last year on the Exchange, posting for four campaigns. She seized on one about Alzheimer's, telling followers how dementia had tormented her grandmother and urging them to sign a petition asking Congress to fund paid medical leave for elder care. Then there was LaRese Purnell, a tax accountant from Ohio who has built his brand advising Black families (and recently, several NFL athletes) about financial planning. Purnell—who sits on multiple nonprofit boards, owns a small restaurant chain, and has hosted a Friday morning radio show in Cleveland—estimates that he has about 100,000 followers across various platforms. Staff from Urban Legend "directed me into campaigns that fit my image," Purnell says. He shot a few videos talking about the benefits of credit unions while walking his dog. "If I told people in this community, 'These are the best shoestrings to put in your shoes,' they would believe me," says Purnell, who sensed the cleverness in Urban Legend's business model. "Because I build trust."

Clients who purchased these ads are generally pleased. Rinat introduced me to two. Chris Lorence, a veteran marketing executive who placed the credit union ad, said the users who came from Purnell and other influencers were 11 times more likely to take action than their typical traffic. Another client, Sean Clifford, runs a technology company called Canopy that blocks pornography from family devices. To Clifford's surprise, Canopy's campaign attracted a wide array of spokespeople, and the Exchange "brought new influencers to the table that I never would have dreamed of approaching." One was a firebrand political commentator in his twenties—"very political, very controversial," is all Clifford would say—while others were news media personalities who attract large followings on Instagram and TikTok.

Clifford, who attended the great books program at St. John's University, says Urban Legend's model—while undeniably effective—raised deeper questions. He cited Plato's ancient dialog *Phaedrus*, in which two gods, Thamus and Theuth, argue fiercely about the invention of writing. Far from enhancing truth, Thamus warned, humanity's "trust in writings" by outsiders would degrade their critical faculties.

Before the afternoon at Urban Legend headquarters ended, Rinat convened an all-hands meeting to discuss the Exchange's forthcoming mobile app—for when influencers have a "sitting-at-a-red-light moment," Rinat explains. Throughout the day, the most salient refrains were words like "authentic" and "trust"—a reminder, if nothing else, of what Urban Legend is really selling. Rinat situated the company along a spectrum of persuasion. "What's the highest possible thing on that spectrum? It's probably a one-to-one communication—somebody you trust," he says. "We're just below that." This is why it was key, Clark explains, that influencers craft the message. The Exchange, she says, "lets the creators' voices sing."

LAST SUMMER, THEN White House press secretary Jen Psaki filmed a series of clips with TikTok star Benny Drama to tout the coronavirus vaccine. Earlier this year, Biden administration officials gave a special briefing on the war in Ukraine to 30 TikTok influencers. And when Congress was advancing an antitrust bill to regulate Amazon, Google, and Apple, The Washington Post reported that activist groups and their Big Tech opponents each hired TikTok personalities to duke it out with a flurry of videos—some supporting the "historic

bipartisan legislation to #ReinInBigTech,” others decrying the proposal as “dumb and bad economically.”

Washington’s political power brokers are quietly inching toward a full embrace of influencers. If not handled with care, however, that can be hazardous—particularly when the arrangement is unmasked. During the Democratic presidential primary of 2020, BuzzFeed News reported that a super PAC for Senator Cory Booker had tried to entice influencers with cash, giving Booker an aura of desperation. Later in the race, Mike Bloomberg found himself in trouble when a surge of meme creators began aggressively pushing his candidacy—but some left it unclear whether the posts, which garnered \$150 a pop, had been sponsored.

“Relying on financially motivated influencers to be ethical is naive.”

The Federal Trade Commission requires people to disclose if they’ve been paid to endorse something online, using terms like “#Ad” or “Sponsored.” Around the time of the Bloomberg revelation, Rohit Chopra, an FTC commissioner, issued a statement clarifying that “paying an influencer to pretend that their endorsement or review is untainted by a financial relationship” is “illegal payola.” (Although one brand has been penalized by the FTC for misleading influencer marketing, no influencer, broker, or platform has yet faced penalties for failure to disclose.)

Urban Legend’s approach to disclosure is, effectively, the honor system. Formally, influencers are required to make disclosures when they agree to the terms and conditions, and they are reminded during their onboarding. But Rinat doesn’t enforce the provision; that’s the FTC’s job, and Rinat says it’s on the influencers to follow the agency’s guidelines.

Researchers who spoke to WIRED found this posture unconvincing. “Relying on financially motivated influencers to be ethical is naive,” says Renée DiResta, who studies narrative manipulation at the Stanford Internet Observatory. She called influencer disclosure “yet another area in which law hasn’t caught up to digital infrastructure.” Many suspect that the lack of disclosure enforcement has bulldozed political money toward influencers, whose campaigns are not logged in Facebook’s political advertising archive. The Federal Elections Commission, too, has scant rules governing social media, leaving the entire field open, potentially, to anonymous money.

The click-per-payment model, DiResta says, may also change influencers’ behavior—creating the “incentive to produce and amplify content in the most inflammatory way possible in order to drive the audience to take an action.” But at the most fundamental level, researchers voiced a concern about the potential for deception in civic discourse. DiResta said, “I don’t think the public really understands the extent to which the people making these posts are, in fact, potentially becoming enriched personally by them.”

The ramifications of not disclosing these ties can touch anyone, from your credulous grandmother all the way up to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. A knowledgeable person with insight into an Urban Legend campaign described one client’s effort to apply pressure on the FCC. According to the person, one of the influencers enlisted was Eric Bolling, a disgraced former Fox News host and one of just 51 people President Trump followed on Twitter.

Bolling's post involved a "telecoms issue," with a goal "to apply as much pressure" as possible on the FCC. There were "thousands of engagements overnight" from Bolling's tweet, the person said, which "the FCC commissioner, Ajit Pai, and the president followed and saw."

Today, Bolling's tweet does not appear to be on his feed. Most social media marketing campaigns get deleted when they've run their course, and I found Urban Legend's campaigns to be no exception. Rinat said influencers always know the identity of a client—and followers will know, too, because the link generally takes them to a campaign page, where the sponsor can be identified. Later, he said transparency is "a very important thing to influencer marketing, and particularly for our model. Without it, audience trust drops, and the resulting engagement drops." He also called for clearer rules from enforcement agencies.

While lionizing transparency, Urban Legend continues to shield the identities of its influencers and the clients who pay them.

While lionizing transparency, Urban Legend continues to shield the identities of its influencers and the clients who pay them. The company's tactfully hands-off approach to disclosure, Farid said, makes the Exchange "a system that is—by design—ripe for abuse."

"At best, the appearance is bad," he continued. "At worst, it's hiding something nefarious."

THE SATIRIST AND critic H. L. Mencken once wrote that "whenever you hear a man speak of his love for his country, it is a sign that he expects to be paid for it." The bone-dry notion that Americans would happily sell anything—even their patriotism—must have seemed like an amusing hypothetical at the time. But perhaps Mencken simply didn't live long enough to see Americans offered the chance.

Last September, HuffPost reporter Jesselyn Cook noted a wave of Instagram posts that seemed to correspond with the timing of a large payment to Urban Legend for "advertising," according to FEC filings, through a partner firm called Legendary Campaigns. The purchase was made by the National Republican Senatorial Committee, which fundraises for Senate campaigns. The posts had headlines like "End to Mask Mandates, Endless Lockdowns and Vaccine Passports!" and demanded "a full investigation into Biden-tech collusion." Each post linked to NRSC petitions, which harvested names and emails.

When I asked Rinat about the posts, he initially said he didn't think the campaigns came from Urban Legend. A few weeks later, however, an Urban Legend client shared with WIRED several backdated screenshots of their influencers' posts. Each of these posts redirected users to a petition by using a highly unusual URL construction, which began "exc.to." According to computer science researchers who examined the string, the top-level domain ".to" is registered to the country of Tonga and has a registration history that cannot be seen. The domain "exc" was registered with the URL-shortening service Bit.ly, which works with private business clients to turn their registered domains into redirect links (such as "es.pn" for the sports network). Since Urban Legend's founding in 2020, "exc.to" could not be found

elsewhere on the internet, except in one place: the HuffPost story, in which a 16-year-old's Instagram post for the NRSC bore the telltale URL "END MASK MANDATES: exc.to/3zLvUFB."

When WIRED used third-party search tools to scan Facebook and Twitter for the URL string, it found 726 posts from between July and November 2021. Not long after Cook's report, the use of "exc.to" abruptly stopped. (Since then, Urban Legend's links have used a standard Bit.ly format identical to billions of others on the internet, making them effectively untraceable.) The posts closely matched what Rinat had shared about his creators and clients. Each linked to op-eds, petitions, or websites of advocacy organizations, including the NRSC, UsAgainst-Alzheimer's Action, Canopy, and the Credit Union National Association. But the vast majority of them were about politics, with many sharing identical language in their appeals.

And there were other, more striking posts, which Rinat had not described. Empowered to connect with their value-aligned audiences and elevate causes that made them passionate, the influencers-for-hire let their voices sing.

"The radicals in the left thinks parents who stand up to WOKENESS in our schools are domestic terrorists!" wrote one influencer to their 8 million followers. Another posted: "Thousands upon thousands of unvetted, illegal immigrants are standing by & waiting to rush our border as soon as Democrats pass their 'infrastructure' bill." There were posts from podcasters ("Freedom Over Fauci!"), activists ("The Left is coming for religious freedom AGAIN"), and talking heads ("Democrats want to steal \$3.5 TRILLION of our taxpayer dollars"). Creators were also linked to conservative institutions such as Turning Point USA and the America First Policy Institute, and conservative media like Breitbart and Newsmax. Others were unaffiliated, such as the former contestant from The Bachelorette who filmed his video appeal without a shirt: "The border's a wreck! I'm getting Amber alerts every day! This is ridiculous!"

In most cases, campaigns led to a page for harvesting emails. But others drove traffic: to conservative publishers like the Patriot Post; to an online course by Hillsdale College; to the Kids Guide to Media Bias; or to pages that appeared to be run by PragerU, the Second Amendment Foundation, and Americans for Prosperity. Occasionally, posters levied more banal appeals ("Take the #Prolife pledge!"). More frequently, rallying cries invoked critical race theory, immigration, and vaccine policies.

Among the creators were several mega-influencers. Donald Trump Jr. posted at least 10 times on Twitter. "Mask Mandates, Endless Lockdowns, and Vaccine Passports. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH," he wrote in July 2021, sharing an NRSC petition. Laura Ingraham, the Fox host, posted twice to Facebook ("Woke teachers are injecting toxic critical race theory into America's schools. We must fight back!") and linked to Heritage Action. So did Dan Scavino, former social media adviser to President Trump; former Trump campaign spokesperson Katrina Pierson; and streaming duo Diamond and Silk.

Almost two-thirds of the posts were conservative. But liberals pushed campaigns too: The comedian Walter Masterson was the top contributor on Twitter, posting in support of a \$20 minimum wage, while popular travel writer BrokeAssStuart boosted legislation addressing

unexpected medical bills. Compared to their conservative counterparts, these posts focused more on policy, not culture wars, and appeared to be sponsored by groups like the Service Employees International Union and the Business Council for Sustainable Energy. There were occasional nonpartisan campaigns, too, such as one by IBM.

The 726 posts do not capture campaigns that were deleted, and they did not cover Instagram or TikTok. WIRED reached out to several creators and clients implicated on the list. None responded to deny their affiliation, and several—Masterson, BrokeAssStuart, the Business Council, and IBM—confirmed that they'd contracted with Urban Legend. When WIRED provided a list of these and other creators and companies, Rinat indicated by email that some do and have worked with Urban Legend, but that others had not, declining to specify further.

Virtually no one—just five influencers—disclosed their payments. Collectively, these posts had some 250,000 engagements. Yet few of the earnest followers who retweeted, say, Trump Jr.—not the grandmother from Alabama, the retired mother from West Virginia, or the Florida small business owner whose bio vows to “expose the DC swamp”—evinced any recognition that what they'd presumed was the dispensation of civic duty was, in reality, just another method for enriching someone in Washington.

Researchers think the major platforms, the FTC, and marketing firms themselves all have a role to play in taming what DiResta calls “a Wild West.” Until then, the march of influencers will proceed deeper into politics. In February and March of this year, the NRSC again paid a large sum—more than \$500,000—to Urban Legend through a partner firm. “Does this become normal?” DiResta asks. “I think it probably does.”

“Here’s the irony of this whole thing,” says Anat Shenker-Osorio, the progressive consultant. “Urban Legend is relying upon precisely the same thing”—trust—“that it is arguably destroying.” Yet if Rinat’s model became the norm, even she concedes that “progressive groups would use this thing.” She paused. “Because you don’t want to unilaterally disarm.”

One view of Urban Legend, then, was as a reclamation project—pumping a dwindling supply of trust through a blanched and beleaguered body politic. From another vantage, though, the model resembled something else: an excavation, like the mining of a rare mineral. What happens in a country where trust is a scarce and fading resource, as prized as diamonds? As Mencken would tell you, it gets put up for sale.

Additional reporting by Samantha Spengler (@samspeng).

Updated 7/16/2022 2:00 pm ET: This story has been updated to clarify that Katrina Pierson is a former spokesperson for the Trump campaign.

POWER
A RADICAL VIEW

SECOND EDITION

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Introduction

see, captures an important aspect of everyday covert and coded resistance (explored, for instance, in the work of James Scott¹) but it is highly unlikely (contrary to what Scott suggests) ever to be the whole story. (2) is (as Przeworski's materialist interpretation of Gramsci suggests) a major part of the explanation of the persistence of capitalism, but also, one should add, of every socio-economic system. (2) and (3) together point to the importance of focusing on actors' multiple, interacting and conflicting interests. They also raise the contentious and fundamental question of materialist versus culturalist explanation: of whether, and if so when, material interests are basic to the explanation of individual behaviour and of collective outcomes, rather than, for instance, interests in 'esteem' or 'identity'. But it is (4), (5) and (6) that relate specifically to power and the modes of its exercise. As Tilly remarks, (5) emphasizes coercion and (6) scant resources. It is, however, (4) that pinpoints the so-called 'third dimension' of power – the power 'to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things'. It is for the recognition of this that *PRV* argues and it is this that Chapter 3 of this volume seeks to articulate further. It was and remains the present author's conviction that no view of power can be adequate unless it can offer an account of this kind of power.

PRV was a *very* small book, yet it generated a surprisingly large amount of comment, much of it critical, from a great many quarters, both academic and political. It continues to do so, and that is one reason that has persuaded me to yield to its publisher's repeated requests to republish it together with a reconsideration of its argument and, more widely, of the rather large topic it takes on. A second reason is that its mistakes and inadequacies are, I believe, rather instructive, and rendered the more so in prose that makes them clearly visible (for, as the seventeenth-century naturalist John Ray observed, 'He that uses many words for explaining any subject, doth, like the cuttlefish, hide himself for the most part, in his own ink'). So I have

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decided to reproduce the original text virtually unaltered, alongside this introduction, which sets it in context.

There are two subsequent chapters. The first of these (Chapter 2) broadens the discussion by situating the reprinted text and its claims on a map of the conceptual terrain that power occupies. The chapter begins by asking whether, in the face of unending disagreements about how to define it and study it, we need the concept of power at all and, if we do, what we need it for – what role it plays in our lives. I argue that these disagreements matter because how much power you see in the social world and where you locate it depends on how you conceive of it, and these disagreements are in part moral and political, and inescapably so. But the topic of *PRV*, and much writing and thinking about power, is more specific: it concerns power *over* another or others and, more specifically still, power as domination. *PRV* focuses on this and asks: how do the powerful secure the compliance of those they dominate – and, more specifically, how do they secure their *willing* compliance? The rest of the chapter considers the ultra-radical answer offered to this question by Michel Foucault, whose massively influential writings about power have been taken to imply that there is no escaping domination, that it is ‘everywhere’ and there is no freedom from it or reasoning independent of it. But, I argue, there is no need to accept this ultra-radicalism, which derives from the rhetoric rather than the substance of Foucault’s work – work which has generated major new insights and much valuable research into modern forms of domination.

Chapter 3 defends and elaborates *PRV*’s answer to the question, but only after indicating some of its mistakes and inadequacies. It was a mistake to define power by ‘saying that *A* exercises power over *B* when *A* affects *B* in a manner contrary to *B*’s interests’. Power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never need to be, exercised); and you can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others’ interests: *PRV*’s topic, power as domination, is only one species of power. Moreover, it was inadequate in confining the discussion to binary relations between actors assumed to have unitary

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interests, failing to consider the ways in which everyone's interests are multiple, conflicting and of different kinds. The defence consists in making the case for the existence of power as the imposition of internal constraints. Those subject to it are led to acquire beliefs and form desires that result in their consenting or adapting to being dominated, in coercive and non-coercive settings. I consider and rebut two kinds of objection: first, James Scott's argument that such power is non-existent or extremely rare, because the dominated are always and everywhere resisting, covertly or overtly; and second, Jon Elster's idea that willing compliance to domination simply *cannot* be brought about by such power. Both John Stuart Mill's account of the subjection of Victorian women and the work of Pierre Bourdieu on the acquisition and maintenance of 'habitus' appeal to the workings of power, leading those subject to it to see their condition as 'natural' and even to value it, and to fail to recognize the sources of their desires and beliefs. These and other mechanisms constitute power's third dimension when it works against people's interests by misleading them, thereby distorting their judgment. To say that such power involves the concealment of people's 'real interests' by 'false consciousness' evokes bad historical memories and can appear both patronizing and presumptuous, but there is, I argue, nothing inherently illiberal or paternalist about these notions, which, suitably refined, remain crucial to understanding the third dimension of power.

1

POWER: A RADICAL VIEW

1 Introduction

This chapter presents a conceptual analysis of power. In it I shall argue for a view of power (that is, a way of identifying it) which is radical in both the theoretical and political senses (and I take these senses in this context to be intimately related). The view I shall defend is, I shall suggest, inradicably evaluative and ‘essentially contested’ (Gallie 1955–6)¹ on the one hand; and empirically applicable on the other. I shall try to show why this view is superior to alternative views. I shall further defend its evaluative and contested character as no defect, and I shall argue that it is ‘operational’, that is, empirically useful in that hypotheses can be framed in terms of it that are in principle verifiable and falsifiable (despite currently canvassed arguments to the contrary). And I shall even give examples of such hypotheses – some of which I shall go so far as to claim to be true.

In the course of my argument, I shall touch on a number of issues – methodological, theoretical and political. Among the methodological issues are the limits of behaviourism, the role of values in explanation, and methodological individualism. Among the theoretical issues are questions about the limits or bias of pluralism, about false consciousness and about real

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interests. Among the political issues are the famous three key issue areas studied by Robert Dahl (Dahl 1961) in New Haven (urban redevelopment, public education and political nominations), poverty and race relations in Baltimore, and air pollution. These matters will not be discussed in their own right, but merely alluded to at relevant points in the argument. That argument is, of its very nature, controversial. And indeed, that it is so is an essential part of my case.

The argument starts by considering a view of power and related concepts which has deep historical roots (notably in the thought of Max Weber) and achieved great influence among American political scientists in the 1960s through the work of Dahl and his fellow pluralists. That view was criticized as superficial and restrictive, and as leading to an unjustified celebration of American pluralism, which it portrayed as meeting the requirements of democracy, notably by Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz in a famous and influential article, 'The Two Faces of Power' (1962) and a second article (Bachrach and Baratz 1963), which were later incorporated (in modified form) in their book *Power and Poverty* (1970). Their argument was in turn subjected to vigorous counter-attack by the pluralists, especially Nelson Polsby (1968), Raymond Wolfinger (1971a, 1971b) and Richard Merelman (1968a, 1968b); but it has also attracted some very interesting defences, such as that by Frederick Frey (1971) and at least one extremely interesting empirical application, in Matthew Crenson's book *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution* (Crenson 1971). My argument will be that the pluralists' view was indeed inadequate for the reasons Bachrach and Baratz advance, and that their view gets further, but that it in turn does not get far enough and is in need of radical toughening. My strategy will be to sketch three conceptual maps, which will, I hope, reveal the distinguishing features of these three views of power: that is, the view of the pluralists (which I shall call the one-dimensional view); the view of their critics (which I shall call the two-dimensional view); and a third view of power (which I shall call the three-dimensional view). I shall then discuss the respective strengths and weaknesses of these three views,

and I shall try to show, with examples, that the third view allows one to give a deeper and more satisfactory analysis of power relations than either of the other two.

2 The One-Dimensional View

This is often called the ‘pluralist’ view of power, but that label is already misleading, since it is the aim of Dahl, Polsby, Wolfinger and others to demonstrate that power (as they identify it) is, in fact, distributed pluralistically in, for instance, New Haven and, more generally, in the United States’ political system as a whole. To speak, as these writers do, of a ‘pluralist view’ of, or ‘pluralist approach’ to, power, or of a ‘pluralist methodology’, is to imply that the pluralists’ conclusions are already built into their concepts, approach and method. I do not, in fact, think that this is so. I think that these are capable of generating non-pluralist conclusions in certain cases. Their view yields elitist conclusions when applied to elitist decision-making structures, and pluralist conclusions when applied to pluralist decision-making structures (and also, as I shall argue, pluralist conclusions when applied to structures which it identifies as pluralist, but other views of power do not). So, in attempting to characterize it, I shall identify its distinguishing features independently of the pluralist conclusions it has been used to reach.

In his early article ‘The Concept of Power’, Dahl describes his ‘intuitive idea of power’ as ‘something like this: *A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do’ (Dahl 1957, in Bell, Edwards and Harrison Wagner (eds) 1969: 80). A little later in the same article he describes his ‘intuitive view of the power relation’ slightly differently: it seemed, he writes, ‘to involve a successful attempt by *A* to get *a* to do something he would not otherwise do’ (ibid., p. 82). Note that the first statement refers to *A*’s capacity (‘... to the extent that he can get *B* to do something ...’), while the second specifies a successful attempt – this, of course, being the difference

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between potential and actual power, between its possession and its exercise. It is the latter – the exercise of power – which is central to this view of power (in reaction to the so-called ‘elitists’ focus on power reputations). Dahl’s central method in *Who Governs?* is to ‘determine for each decision which participants had initiated alternatives that were finally adopted, had vetoed alternatives initiated by others, or had proposed alternatives that were turned down. These actions were then tabulated as individual “successes” or “defeats”. The participants with the greatest proportion of successes out of the total number of successes were then considered to be the most influential’ (Dahl 1961: 336).² In short, as Polsby writes, ‘In the pluralist approach ... an attempt is made to study specific outcomes in order to determine who actually prevails in community decision-making’ (Polsby 1963: 113). The stress here is on the study of concrete, observable *behaviour*. The researcher, according to Polsby, ‘should study actual behavior, either at first hand or by reconstructing behavior from documents, informants, newspapers, and other appropriate sources’ (ibid., p. 121). Thus the pluralist methodology, in Merelman’s words, ‘studied actual behavior, stressed operational definitions, and turned up evidence. Most important, it seemed to produce reliable conclusions which met the canons of science’ (Merelman 1968a: 451).

(It should be noted that among pluralists, ‘power’, ‘influence’, etc., tend to be used interchangeably, on the assumption that there is a ‘primitive notion that seems to lie behind *all* of these concepts’ (Dahl 1957, in Bell, Edwards and Harrison Wagner (eds) 1969: 80). *Who Governs?* speaks mainly of ‘influence’, while Polsby speaks mainly of ‘power’.)

The focus on observable behaviour in identifying power involves the pluralists in studying *decision-making* as their central task. Thus for Dahl power can be analysed only after ‘careful examination of a series of concrete decisions’ (1958: 466); and Polsby writes

one can conceive of ‘power’ – ‘influence’ and ‘control’ are serviceable synonyms – as the capacity of one actor to do

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something affecting another actor, which changes the probable pattern of specified future events. This can be envisaged most easily in a decision-making situation. (1963: 3–4)

and he argues that identifying ‘who prevails in decision-making’ seems ‘the best way to determine which individuals and groups have “more” power in social life, because direct conflict between actors presents a situation most closely approximating an experimental test of their capacities to affect outcomes’ (p. 4). As this last quotation shows, it is assumed that the ‘decisions’ involve ‘direct’, i.e. actual and observable, *conflict*. Thus Dahl maintains that one can only strictly test the hypothesis of a ruling class if there are ‘... cases involving key political decisions in which the preferences of the hypothetical ruling elite run counter to those of any other likely group that might be suggested’, and ‘... in such cases, the preferences of the elite regularly prevail’ (Dahl 1958: 466). The pluralists speak of the decisions being about *issues* in selected [key] ‘issue-areas’ – the assumption again being that such issues are controversial and involve actual conflict. As Dahl writes, it is ‘a necessary though possibly not a sufficient condition that the key issue should involve actual disagreement in preferences among two or more groups’ (p. 467).

So we have seen that the pluralists see their focus on behaviour in the making of decisions over key or important issues as involving actual, observable conflict. Note that this implication is not required by either Dahl’s or Polsby’s definition of power, which merely require that *A* can or does succeed in affecting what *B* does. And indeed in *Who Governs?* Dahl is quite sensitive to the operation of power or influence in the absence of conflict: indeed he even writes that a ‘rough test of a person’s overt or covert influence is the frequency with which he successfully initiates an important policy over the opposition of others, or vetoes policies initiated by others, or *initiates a policy where no opposition appears [sic]*’ (Dahl 1961: 66).³ This, however, is just one among a number of examples of how the text of *Who Governs?* is more subtle and profound than the general conceptual and

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methodological pronouncements of its author and his colleagues;⁴ it is in contradiction with their conceptual framework and their methodology. In other words, it represents an insight which this one-dimensional view of power is unable to exploit.

Conflict, according to that view, is assumed to be crucial in providing an experimental test of power attributions: without it the exercise of power will, it seems to be thought, fail to show up. What is the conflict between? The answer is: between preferences, that are assumed to be consciously made, exhibited in actions, and thus to be discovered by observing people's behaviour. Furthermore, the pluralists assume that *interests* are to be understood as policy preferences – so that a conflict of interests is equivalent to a conflict of preferences. They are opposed to any suggestion that interests might be unarticulated or unobservable, and above all, to the idea that people might actually be mistaken about, or unaware of, their own interests. As Polsby writes

rejecting this presumption of 'objectivity of interests', we may view instances of intraclass disagreement as intraclass conflict of interests, and interclass agreement as interclass harmony of interests. To maintain the opposite seems perverse. If information about the actual behavior of groups in the community is not considered relevant when it is different from the researcher's expectations, then it is impossible ever to disprove the empirical propositions of the stratification theory [which postulate class interests], and they will then have to be regarded as metaphysical rather than empirical statements. The presumption that the 'real' interests of a class can be assigned to them by an analyst allows the analyst to charge 'false class consciousness' when the class in question disagrees with the analyst. (Polsby 1963: 22–3)⁵

Thus I conclude that this first, one-dimensional, view of power involves a focus on *behaviour* in the making of *decisions* on *issues* over which there is an observable *conflict* of (subjective) *interests*, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation.

3 The Two-Dimensional View

In their critique of this view, Bachrach and Baratz argue that it is restrictive and, in virtue of that fact, gives a misleadingly sanguine pluralist picture of American politics. Power, they claim, has two faces. The first face is that already considered, according to which 'power is totally embodied and fully reflected in "concrete decisions" or in activity bearing directly upon their making' (1970: 7). As they write

Of course power is exercised when *A* participates in the making of decisions that affect *B*. Power is also exercised when *A* devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to *A*. To the extent that *A* succeeds in doing this, *B* is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to *A*'s set of preferences. (p. 7)

Their 'central point' is this: 'to the extent that a person or group – consciously or unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power' (p. 8), and they cite Schattschneider's famous and often-quoted words:

All forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because *organization is the mobilization of bias*. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out. (Schattschneider 1960: 71)

The importance of Bachrach and Baratz's work is that they bring this crucially important idea of the 'mobilization of bias' into the discussion of power. It is, in their words,

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a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures ('rules of the game') that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others. Those who benefit are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests. More often than not, the 'status quo defenders' are a minority or elite group within the population in question. Elitism, however, is neither foreordained nor omnipresent: as opponents of the war in Viet Nam can readily attest, the mobilization of bias can and frequently does benefit a clear majority. (1970: 43-4)

What, then, does this second, two-dimensional view of power amount to? What does its conceptual map look like? Answering this question poses a difficulty because Bachrach and Baratz use the term 'power' in two distinct senses. On the one hand, they use it in a general way to refer to all forms of successful control by *A* over *B* – that is, of *A*'s securing *B*'s compliance. Indeed, they develop a whole typology (which is of great interest) of forms of such control – forms that they see as types of power in either of its two faces. On the other hand, they label one of these types 'power' – namely, the securing of compliance through the threat of sanctions. In expounding their position, we can, however, easily eliminate this confusion by continuing to speak of the first sense as 'power', and by speaking of the second as 'coercion'.

Their typology of 'power', then, embraces coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation. *Coercion*, as we have seen, exists where *A* secures *B*'s compliance by the threat of deprivation where there is 'a conflict over values or course of action between *A* and *B*' (p. 24).⁶ *Influence* exists where *A*, 'without resorting to either a tacit or an overt threat of severe deprivation, causes [*B*] to change his course of action' (p. 30). In a situation involving *authority*, '*B* complies because he recognises that [*A*'s] command is reasonable in terms of his own values' – either because its content is legitimate and reasonable or because

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it has been arrived at through a legitimate and reasonable procedure (pp. 34, 37). In the case of *force*, *A* achieves his objectives in the face of *B*'s noncompliance by stripping him of the choice between compliance and noncompliance. And *manipulation* is, thus, an 'aspect' or sub-concept of force (and distinct from coercion, influence and authority), since here 'compliance is forthcoming in the absence of recognition on the complier's part either of the source or the exact nature of the demand upon him' (p. 28).

The central thrust of Bachrach and Baratz's critique of the pluralists' one-dimensional view of power is, up to a point, *anti-behavioural*: that is, they claim that it 'unduly emphasises the importance of initiating, deciding, and vetoing' and, as a result, takes 'no account of the fact that power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively "safe" issues' (p. 6). On the other hand, they do insist (at least in their book – in response to critics who maintained that if *B* fails to act because he anticipates *A*'s reaction, nothing has occurred and one has a 'non-event', incapable of empirical verification) that their so-called nondecisions which confine the scope of decision-making are themselves (observable) *decisions*. These, however, may not be overt or specific to a given issue or even consciously taken to exclude potential challengers, of whom the status quo defenders may well be unaware. Such unawareness 'does not mean, however, that the dominant group will refrain from making nondecisions that protect or promote their dominance. Simply supporting the established political process tends to have this effect' (p. 50).

A satisfactory analysis, then, of two-dimensional power involves examining both *decision-making* and *nondecision-making*. A decision is 'a choice among alternative modes of action' (p. 39); a nondecision is 'a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker' (p. 44). Thus, nondecision-making is 'a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they

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gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process' (p. 44).

In part, Bachrach and Baratz are, in effect, redefining the boundaries of what is to count as a political issue. For the pluralists those boundaries are set by the political system being observed, or rather by the elites within it: as Dahl writes, 'a political issue can hardly be said to exist unless and until it commands the attention of a significant segment of the political stratum' (Dahl 1961:92). The observer then picks out certain of these issues as obviously important or 'key' and analyses decision-making with respect to them. For Bachrach and Baratz, by contrast, it is crucially important to identify *potential issues* which nondecision-making prevents from being actual. In their view, therefore, 'important' or 'key' issues may be actual or, most probably, potential – a key issue being 'one that involves a genuine challenge to the resources of power or authority of those who currently dominate the process by which policy outputs in the system are determined', that is, 'a demand for enduring transformation in both the manner in which values are allocated in the polity . . . and the value allocation itself' (Bachrach and Baratz 1970: 47–8).

Despite this crucial difference with the pluralists, Bachrach and Baratz's analysis has one significant feature in common with theirs: namely, the stress on actual, observable *conflict*, overt or covert. Just as the pluralists hold that power in decision-making only shows up where there is conflict, Bachrach and Baratz assume the same to be true in cases of nondecision-making. Thus they write that if 'there is no conflict, overt or covert, the presumption must be that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation of values, in which case nondecision-making is impossible' (p. 49). In the absence of such conflict, they argue, 'there is no way accurately to judge whether the thrust of a decision really is to thwart or prevent serious consideration of a demand for change that is potentially threatening to the decision-maker' (p. 50). If 'there appears to be universal acquiescence in the status quo', then it will not be possible 'to determine empirically

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whether the consensus is genuine or instead has been enforced through nondecision-making' – and they rather quaintly add that 'analysis of this problem is beyond the reach of a political analyst and perhaps can only be fruitfully analysed by a philosopher' (p. 49).

This last remark seems to suggest that Bachrach and Baratz are unsure whether they mean that nondecision-making power cannot be exercised in the absence of observable conflict or that we could never know if it was. However that may be, the conflict they hold to be necessary is between the *interests* of those engaged in nondecision-making and the interests of those they exclude from a hearing within the political system. How are the latter interests to be identified? Bachrach and Baratz answer thus: the observer

must determine if those persons and groups apparently disfavored by the mobilization of bias have grievances, overt or covert . . . overt grievances are those that have already been expressed and have generated an issue within the political system, whereas covert ones are still *outside* the system.

The latter have 'not been recognized as "worthy" of public attention and controversy', but they are 'observable in their aborted form to the investigator' (p. 49). In other words, Bachrach and Baratz have a wider concept of 'interests' than the pluralists – though it remains a concept of subjective rather than objective interests. Whereas the pluralist considers as interests the policy preferences exhibited by the behaviour of all citizens who are assumed to be within the political system, Bachrach and Baratz also consider the preferences exhibited by the behaviour of those who are partly or wholly excluded from the political system, in the form of overt or covert grievances. In both cases the assumption is that the interests are consciously articulated and observable.

So I conclude that the two-dimensional view of power involves a *qualified critique* of the *behavioural focus* of the first view

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(I say qualified because it is still assumed that nondecision-making is a form of decision-making) and it allows for consideration of the ways in which *decisions* are prevented from being taken on *potential issues* over which there is an observable *conflict* of (subjective) *interests*, seen as embodied in express policy preferences and sub-political grievances.

4 The Three-Dimensional View

There is no doubt that the two-dimensional view of power represents a major advance over the one-dimensional view: it incorporates into the analysis of power relations the question of the control over the agenda of politics and of the ways in which potential issues are kept out of the political process. None the less, it is, in my view, inadequate on three counts.

In the first place, its critique of behaviourism is too qualified, or, to put it another way, it is still too committed to behaviourism – that is, to the study of overt, ‘actual behaviour’, of which ‘concrete decisions’ in situations of conflict are seen as paradigmatic. In trying to assimilate all cases of exclusion of potential issues from the political agenda to the paradigm of a decision, it gives a misleading picture of the ways in which individuals and, above all, groups and institutions succeed in excluding potential issues from the political process. Decisions are choices consciously and intentionally made by individuals between alternatives, whereas the bias of the system can be mobilized, recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular individuals’ choices. As Bachrach and Baratz themselves maintain, the domination of defenders of the status quo may be so secure and pervasive that they are unaware of any potential challengers to their position and thus of any alternatives to the existing political process, whose bias they work to maintain. As ‘students of power and its consequences’, they write, ‘our main concern is not whether the defenders of the status quo use their power consciously, but

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rather if and how they exercise it and what effects it has on the political process and other actors within the system' (Bachrach and Baratz 1970: 50).

Moreover, the bias of the system is not sustained simply by a series of individually chosen acts, but also, most importantly, by the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of institutions, which may indeed be manifested by individuals' inaction. Bachrach and Baratz follow the pluralists in adopting too methodologically individualist a view of power. In this both parties follow in the steps of Max Weber, for whom power was the probability of *individuals realizing their wills* despite the resistance of others, whereas the power to control the agenda of politics and exclude potential issues cannot be adequately analysed unless it is seen as a function of collective forces and social arrangements.⁷ There are, in fact, two separable cases here. First, there is the phenomenon of collective action, where the policy or action of a collectivity (whether a group, e.g. a class, or an institution, e.g. a political party or an industrial corporation) is manifest, but not attributable to particular individuals' decisions or behaviour. Second, there is the phenomenon of 'systemic' or organizational effects, where the mobilization of bias results, as Schattschneider put it, from the form of organization. Of course, such collectivities and organizations are made up of individuals – but the power they exercise cannot be simply conceptualized in terms of individuals' decisions or behaviour. As Marx succinctly put it, 'Men make their own history but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.'⁸

The second count on which the two-dimensional view of power is inadequate is in its association of power with actual, observable conflict. In this respect also the pluralists' critics follow their adversaries too closely⁹ (and both in turn again follow Weber, who, as we have seen, stressed the realization of one's will, *despite the resistance of others*). This insistence on actual conflict as essential to power will not do, for at least two reasons.

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The first is that, on Bachrach and Baratz's own analysis, two of the types of power may not involve such conflict: namely, manipulation and authority – which they conceive as 'agreement based upon reason' (Bachrach and Baratz 1970: 20), though elsewhere they speak of it as involving a 'possible conflict of values' (p. 37).

The second reason why the insistence on actual and observable conflict will not do is simply that it is highly unsatisfactory to suppose that power is only exercised in situations of such conflict. To put the matter sharply, *A* may exercise power over *B* by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? One does not have to go to the lengths of talking about *Brave New World*, or the world of B. F. Skinner, to see this: thought control takes many less total and more mundane forms, through the control of information, through the mass media and through the processes of socialization. Indeed, ironically, there are some excellent descriptions of this phenomenon in *Who Governs?* Consider the picture of the rule of the 'patricians' in the early nineteenth century: 'The elite seems to have possessed that most indispensable of all characteristics in a dominant group – the sense, shared not only by themselves but by the populace, that their claim to govern was legitimate' (Dahl 1961: 17). And Dahl also sees this phenomenon at work under modern 'pluralist' conditions: leaders, he says, 'do not merely *respond* to the preferences of constituents; leaders also *shape* preferences' (p. 164), and, again, 'almost the entire adult population has been subjected to *some* degree of indoctrination through the schools' (p. 317), etc. The trouble seems to be that both Bachrach and Baratz and the pluralists suppose that because power, as they conceptualize it, only shows up in cases of actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place.

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The third count on which the two-dimensional view of power is inadequate is closely linked to the second: namely, its insistence that nondecision-making power only exists where there are grievances which are denied entry into the political process in the form of issues. If the observer can uncover no grievances, then he must assume there is a 'genuine' consensus on the prevailing allocation of values. To put this another way, it is here assumed that if people feel no grievances, then they have no interests that are harmed by the use of power. But this is also highly unsatisfactory. In the first place, what, in any case, is a grievance – an articulated demand, based on political knowledge, an undirected complaint arising out of everyday experience, a vague feeling of unease or sense of deprivation? (See Lipsitz 1970.) Second, and more important, is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? To assume that the absence of grievance equals genuine consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by definitional fiat.

In summary, the three-dimensional view of power involves a *thoroughgoing critique of the behavioural focus*¹⁰ of the first two views as too individualistic and allows for consideration of the many ways in which *potential issues* are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals' decisions. This, moreover, can occur in the absence of actual, observable conflict, which may have been successfully averted – though there remains here an implicit reference to potential conflict. This potential, however, may never in fact be actualized. What one may have here is a *latent conflict*, which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the *real interests* of those they exclude.¹¹ These latter may not express or even be conscious of their interests, but, as I shall argue, the identification of those

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interests ultimately always rests on empirically supportable and refutable hypotheses.

The distinctive features of the three views of power presented above are summarized below.

One-Dimensional View of Power

- Focus on (a) behaviour
(b) decision-making
(c) (key) issues
(d) observable (overt) conflict
(e) (subjective) interests, seen as policy preferences revealed by political participation

Two-Dimensional View of Power

- (Qualified) critique of behavioural focus
Focus on (a) decision-making and nondecision-making
(b) issues and potential issues
(c) observable (overt or covert) conflict
(d) (subjective) interests, seen as policy preferences or grievances

Three-Dimensional View of Power

- Critique of behavioural focus
Focus on (a) decision-making and control over political agenda (not necessarily through decisions)
(b) issues and potential issues
(c) observable (overt or covert), and latent conflict
(d) subjective and real interests

5 The Underlying Concept of Power

One feature which these three views of power share is their evaluative character: each arises out of and operates within a

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particular moral and political perspective. Indeed, I maintain that power is one of those concepts which is ineradicably value-dependent. By this I mean that both its very definition and any given use of it, once defined, are inextricably tied to a given set of (probably unacknowledged) value-assumptions which predetermine the range of its empirical application – and I shall maintain below that some such uses permit that range to extend further and deeper than others. Moreover, the concept of power is, in consequence, what has been called an ‘essentially contested concept’ – one of those concepts which ‘inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’ (Gallie 1955–6: 169). Indeed, to engage in such disputes is itself to engage in politics.

The absolutely basic common core to, or primitive notion lying behind, all talk of power is the notion that *A* in some way affects *B*. But, in applying that primitive (causal) notion to the analysis of social life, something further is needed – namely, the notion that *A* does so in a non-trivial or significant manner (see White 1972). Clearly, we all affect each other in countless ways all the time: the concept of power, and the related concepts of coercion, influence, authority, etc., pick out ranges of such affecting as being significant in specific ways. A way of conceiving power (or a way of defining the concept of power) that will be useful in the analysis of social relationships must imply an answer to the question: ‘what counts as a significant manner?’, ‘what makes *A*’s affecting *B* significant?’ Now, the *concept* of power, thus defined, when interpreted and put to work, yields one or more *views* of power – that is, ways of identifying cases of power in the real world. The three views we have been considering can be seen as alternative interpretations and applications of one and the same underlying concept of power, according to which *A* exercises power over *B* when *A* affects *B* in a manner contrary to *B*’s interests.¹² There are, however, alternative (no less contestable) ways of conceptualizing power, involving alternative criteria of significance. Let us look at two of them.

Consider, first, the concept of power elaborated by Talcott Parsons (1957, 1963a, 1963b, 1967). Parsons seeks to ‘treat

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power as a *specific* mechanism operating to bring about changes in the action of other units, individual or collective, in the processes of social interaction' (1967: 299). What is it, in his view, that is specific about this mechanism, which distinguishes it as 'power'? In other words, what criteria of significance does Parsons use to identify a particular range of affecting as 'power'? The answer is, in a nutshell, the use of authoritative decisions to further collective goals. He defines power thus:

Power then is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions – whatever the actual agency of that enforcement. (p. 308)

The 'power of *A* over *B* is, in its legitimized form, the "right" of *A*, as a decision-making unit involved in collective process, to make decisions which take precedence over those of *B*, in the interest of the effectiveness of the collective operation as a whole' (p. 318).

Parsons's conceptualization of power ties it to authority, consensus and the pursuit of collective goals, and dissociates it from conflicts of interest and, in particular, from coercion and force. Thus power depends on 'the institutionalization of authority' (p. 331) and is 'conceived as a generalized medium of mobilizing commitments or obligation for effective collective action' (p. 331). By contrast, 'the threat of coercive measures, or of compulsion, without legitimation or justification, should not properly be called the use of power at all. . . .' (p. 331). Thus Parsons criticized Wright Mills for interpreting power 'exclusively as a facility for getting what one group, the holders of power, wants by preventing another group, the "outs", from getting what it wants', rather than seeing it as 'a facility for the performance of function in and on behalf of the society as a system' (Parsons 1957: 139).

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Consider, secondly, the concept of power as defined by Hannah Arendt. 'Power', she writes,

corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to begin with (*potestas in populo*, without a people or group there is no power), disappears, 'his power' also vanishes. (Arendt 1970: 44)

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the people's support that lends power to the institutions of a country, and this support is but the continuation of the consent that brought the laws into existence to begin with. Under conditions of representative government the people are supposed to rule those who govern them. All political institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them. This is what Madison meant when he said 'all governments rest on opinion', a word no less true for the various forms of monarchy than for democracies. (p. 41)

Arendt's way of conceiving power ties it to a tradition and a vocabulary which she traces back to Athens and Rome, according to which the republic is based on the rule of law, which rests on 'the power of the people' (p. 40). In this perspective power is dissociated from 'the command-obedience relationship' (p. 40) and 'the business of dominion' (p. 44). Power is consensual: it 'needs no justification, being inherent in the very existence of political communities; what it does need is legitimacy. . . . Power springs up whenever people get together and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than from any action that then may follow' (p. 52). *Violence*, by

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contrast, is instrumental, a means to an end, but 'never will be legitimate' (p. 52). Power, 'far from being the means to an end, is actually the very condition enabling a group of people to think and act in terms of the means-end category' (p. 51).

The *point* of these rather similar definitions of power by Parsons and Arendt is to lend persuasive support to the general theoretical frameworks of their authors. In Parsons's case the linking of power to authoritative decisions and collective goals serves to reinforce his theory of social integration as based on value consensus by concealing from view the whole range of problems that have concerned so-called 'coercion' theorists, precisely under the rubric of 'power'. By definitional fiat, phenomena of coercion, exploitation, manipulation and so on cease to be phenomena of power – and in consequence disappear from the theoretical landscape. Anthony Giddens has put this point very well:

Two obvious facts, that authoritative decisions very often do serve sectional interests and that the most radical conflicts in society stem from struggles for power, are defined out of consideration – at least as phenomena connected with 'power'. The conceptualisation of power which Parsons offers allows him to shift the entire weight of his analysis away from power as expressing a relation *between* individuals or groups, toward seeing power as a 'system property'. That collective 'goals', or even the values which lie behind them, may be the outcome of a 'negotiated order' built on conflicts between parties holding differential power is ignored, since for Parsons 'power' assumes the prior existence of collective goals. (Giddens 1968: 265)

In the case of Arendt, similarly, the conceptualization of power plays a persuasive role, in defence of her conception of 'the *res publica*, the public thing' to which people consent and 'behave nonviolently and argue rationally', and in opposition to the reduction of 'public affairs to the business of dominion' and to the conceptual linkage of power with force and violence. To 'speak of non-violent power', she writes, 'is actually redundant'

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(Arendt 1970: 56). These distinctions enable Arendt to make statements such as the following: 'tyranny, as Montesquieu discovered, is therefore the most violent and least powerful of forms of government' (p. 41); 'Where power has disintegrated, revolutions are possible but not necessary' (p. 49); 'Even the most despotic domination we know of, the rule of master over slaves, who always outnumbered him, did not rest on superior means of coercion as such, but on a superior organization of power – that is, on the organized solidarity of the masters' (p. 50); 'Violence can always destroy power; out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience. What can never grow out of it is power' (p. 53); 'Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance' (p. 56).

These conceptualizations of power are rationally defensible. It is, however, the contention of this book that they are of less value than that advanced here for two reasons.

In the first place, they are revisionary persuasive redefinitions of power which are out of line with the central meanings of 'power' as traditionally understood and with the concerns that have always centrally preoccupied students of power. They focus on the locution 'power to', ignoring 'power over'. Thus power indicates a 'capacity', a 'facility', an 'ability', not a relationship. Accordingly, the conflictual aspect of power – the fact that it is exercised *over* people – disappears altogether from view.¹³ And along with it there disappears the central interest of studying power relations in the first place – an interest in the (attempted or successful) securing of people's compliance by overcoming or averting their opposition.

In the second place, the point of these definitions is, as we have seen, to reinforce certain theoretical positions; but everything that can be said by their means can be said with greater clarity by means of the conceptual scheme here proposed, without thereby concealing from view the (central) aspects of power which they define out of existence. Thus, for instance, Parsons

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objects to seeing power as a 'zero-sum' phenomenon and appeals to the analogy of credit creation in the economy, arguing that the use of power, as when the ruled have justified confidence in their rulers, may achieve objectives which all desire and from which all benefit. It has been argued in defence of this view that 'in any type of group, the existence of defined "leadership" positions does "generate" power which may be used to achieve aims desired by the majority of the members of the group' (Giddens 1968: 263). Similarly, Arendt wants to say that members of a group acting in concert are exercising power. According to the conceptual scheme here advanced, all such cases of co-operative activity, where individuals or groups significantly affect one another in the absence of a conflict of interests between them, will be identifiable, as cases of 'influence' but not of 'power'. All that Parsons and Arendt wish to say about consensual behaviour remains sayable, but so also does all that they wish to remove from the language of power.

It may be useful if at this point I set out a conceptual map (Figure 1) of power and its cognates (all modes of 'significant affecting') – a map which broadly follows Bachrach and Baratz's typology, referred to above. Needless to say, this map is itself essentially contestable – and, in particular, although it is meant to analyse and situate the concept of power which underlies the one-, two- and three-dimensional views of power, I do not claim that it would necessarily be acceptable to all the proponents of those respective views. One reason for that, of course, is that it is developed from the perspective of the three-dimensional view, which incorporates and therefore goes further than the other two.

It will be seen that in this scheme power may or may not be a form of influence – depending on whether sanctions are involved: while influence and authority may or may not be a form of power – depending on whether a conflict of interests is involved. Consensual authority, with no conflict of interests, is not, therefore, a form of power.

The question of whether rational persuasion is a form of power and influence cannot be adequately treated here. For what it is

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


Figure 1

worth, my inclination is to say both yes and no. Yes, because it is a form of significant affecting: *A* gets (causes) *B* to do or think what he would not otherwise do or think. No, because *B* autonomously accepts *A*'s reasons, so that one is inclined to say that it is not *A* but *A*'s reasons, or *B*'s acceptance of them, that is responsible for *B*'s change of course. I suspect that we are here in the presence of a fundamental (Kantian) antinomy between causality, on the one hand, and autonomy and reason, on the other. I see no way of resolving this antinomy: there are simply contradictory conceptual pressures at work.

It may further be asked whether power can be exercised by *A* over *B* in *B*'s real interests. That is, suppose there is a conflict now between the preferences of *A* and *B*, but that *A*'s preferences are in *B*'s real interests. To this there are two possible responses: (1) that *A* might exercise 'short-term power' over *B* (with an

observable conflict of subjective interests), but that if and when *B* recognizes his real interests, the power relation ends: it is self-annihilating; or (2) that all or most forms of attempted or successful control by *A* over *B*, when *B* objects or resists, constitute a violation of *B*'s autonomy; that *B* has a real interest in his own autonomy; so that such an exercise of power cannot be in *B*'s real interests. Clearly the first of these responses is open to misuse by seeming to provide a paternalist licence for tyranny; while the second furnishes an anarchist defence against it, collapsing all or most cases of influence into power. Though attracted by the second, I am inclined to adopt the first, the dangers of which may be obviated by insisting on the empirical basis for identifying real interests. The identification of these is not up to *A*, but to *B*, exercising choice under conditions of relative autonomy and, in particular, independently of *A*'s power (e.g. through democratic participation).¹⁴

6 Power and Interests

I have defined the concept of power by saying that *A* exercises power over *B* when *A* affects *B* in a manner contrary to *B*'s interests. Now the notion of 'interests' is an irreducibly evaluative notion (Balbus 1971, Connolly 1972): if I say that something is in your interests, I imply that you have a prima facie claim to it, and if I say that 'policy *x* is in *A*'s interest' this constitutes a prima facie justification for that policy. In general, talk of interests provides a licence for the making of normative judgments of a moral and political character. So it is not surprising that different conceptions of what interests *are* are associated with different moral and political positions. Extremely crudely, one might say that the liberal takes people as they are and applies want-regarding principles to them, relating their interests to what they actually want or prefer, to their policy preferences as manifested by their political participation.¹⁵ The reformist, seeing and deploring that not everyone's wants are given equal weight by the political system, also relates their interests to what they want or prefer,

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but allows that this may be revealed in more indirect and sub-political ways – in the form of deflected, submerged or concealed wants and preferences. The radical, however, maintains that people's wants may themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests, and, in such cases, relates the latter to what they would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice.¹⁶ Each of these three picks out a certain range of the entire class of actual and potential wants as the relevant object of moral appraisal. In brief, my suggestion is that the one-dimensional view of power presupposes a liberal conception of interests, the two-dimensional view a reformist conception, and the three-dimensional view a radical conception. (And I would maintain that any view of power rests on some normatively specific conception of interests.)

7 The Three Views Compared

I now turn to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of the three views of power I have outlined.

The virtues of the decision-making or one-dimensional view are obvious and have often been stressed: by means of it, to cite Merelman again, the pluralists 'studied actual behavior, stressed operational definitions, and turned up evidence' (Merelman 1968a: 451). However, the trouble is that, by doing this, by studying the making of important decisions within the community, they were simply taking over and reproducing the bias of the system they were studying. By analysing the decisions on urban redevelopment, public education and political nominations, Dahl tells us a good deal about the *diversity* of decision-making power in New Haven. He shows that these issue areas are independent of one another, and that, by and large, different individuals exercise power in different areas and therefore no set of individuals and thus no single elite has decision-making power ranging across different issue areas. He further argues that the decision-making process is responsive to the preferences of citizens because the elected politicians and officials engaged in it

anticipate the results of future elections. It would, he writes, 'be unwise to underestimate the extent to which voters may exert *indirect* influence on the decisions of leaders by means of elections (Dahl 1961: 101): no issue of importance to the former is likely to be ignored for long by the latter. Thus Dahl pictures pluralist politics as both diverse and open: he writes, '[T]he independence, penetrability, and heterogeneity of the various segments of the political stratum all but guarantee that any dissatisfied group will find spokesmen in the political stratum' (p. 93). But the diversity and openness Dahl sees may be highly misleading if power is being exercised within the system to limit decision-making to acceptable issues. Individuals and elites may act separately in making acceptable decisions, but they may act in concert – or even fail to act at all – in such a way as to keep unacceptable issues out of politics, thereby preventing the system from becoming any more diverse than it is. 'A polity', it has been suggested, 'that is pluralistic in its decision-making can be unified in its non-decision-making' (Crenson 1971: 179). The decision-making method prevents this possibility from being considered. Dahl concludes that the system is penetrable by any dissatisfied group, but he does so only by studying cases of successful penetration, and never examines failed attempts at such penetration. Moreover, the thesis that indirect influence gives the electorate control over leaders can be turned on its head. Indirect influence can equally operate to prevent politicians, officials or others from raising issues or proposals known to be unacceptable to some group or institution in the community. It can serve the interests of an elite, not only that of the electorate. In brief, the one-dimensional view of power cannot reveal the less visible ways in which a pluralist system may be biased in favour of certain groups and against others.

The two-dimensional view goes some way to revealing this which is a considerable advance in itself – but it confines itself to studying situations where the mobilization of bias can be attributed to individuals' decisions that have the effect of preventing currently observable grievances (overt or covert) from becoming issues within the political process. This, I think, largely accounts

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for the very thin and inadequate character of Bachrach and Baratz's study of poverty, race and politics in Baltimore. All that study really amounts to is an account of various decisions by the mayor and various business leaders to deflect the inchoate demands of Baltimore's blacks from becoming politically threatening issues – by such devices as making certain appointments, establishing task forces to defuse the poverty issue, by supporting certain kinds of welfare measures, etc. – together with an account of how the blacks gained political access through overt struggle involving riots. The analysis remains superficial precisely because it confines itself to studying individual decisions made to avert potentially threatening demands from becoming politically dangerous. A deeper analysis would also concern itself with all the complex and subtle ways in which the *inactivity* of leaders and the sheer weight of institutions – political, industrial and educational – served for so long to keep the blacks out of Baltimore politics; and indeed for a long period kept them from even trying to get into it.

The three-dimensional view offers the possibility of such an analysis. It offers, in other words, the prospect of a serious sociological and not merely personalized explanation of how political systems prevent demands from becoming political issues or even from being made. Now the classical objection to doing this has often been stated by pluralists: how can one study, let alone explain, what does not happen? Polsby writes:

it has been suggested that non-events make more significant policy than do policy-making events. This is the kind of statement that has a certain plausibility and attractiveness but that presents truly insuperable obstacles to research. We can sound the depth of the abyss very quickly by agreeing that non-events are much more important than events, and inquiring precisely *which* non-events are to be regarded as most significant in the community. Surely not *all* of them. For every event (no matter how defined) that occurs there must be an infinity of alternatives. Then which non-events are to be regarded as significant? One satisfactory answer might be: those outcomes

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desired by a significant number of actors in the community but not achieved. Insofar as these goals are in some way explicitly pursued by people in the community, the method of study used in New Haven has a reasonable chance of capturing them. A wholly unsatisfactory answer would be: certain non-events stipulated by outside observers without reference to the desires or activities of community residents. The answer is unsatisfactory because it is obviously inappropriate for outsiders to pick among all the possible outcomes that did not take place a set which they regard as important but which community citizens do not. This approach is likely to prejudice the outcomes of research. . . . (Polsby 1963: 96–7)

Similarly, Wolfinger argues that the ‘infinite variety of possible nondecisions . . . reveals the idea’s adaptability to various ideological perspectives’ (Wolfinger 1971a: 1078). Moreover, suppose we advance ‘a theory of political interests and rational behavior’ specifying how people would behave in certain situations if left to themselves, and use it to support the claim that their failure so to behave is due to the exercise of power. In this case, Wolfinger argues, we have no means of deciding between two possibilities: either that there was an exercise of power, or that the theory was wrong (p. 1078).

The first point to be made against these apparently powerful arguments is that they move from a methodological difficulty to a substantive assertion. It does not follow that, just because it is difficult or even impossible to show that power has been exercised in a given situation, we can conclude that it has not. But, more importantly, I do not believe that it is impossible to identify an exercise of power of this type.

What is an exercise of power? What is it to exercise power? On close inspection it turns out that the locution ‘exercise of power’ and ‘exercising power’ is problematic in at least two ways.

In the first place, it carries, in everyday usage, a doubly unfortunate connotation: it is sometimes assumed to be both individualistic and intentional, that is, it seems to carry the suggestion that the exercise of power is a matter of individuals

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consciously acting to affect others. Some appear to feel discomfort in speaking either of groups, institutions, or collectivities 'exercising' power, or of individuals or collectivities doing so unconsciously. This is an interesting case of individualistic and intentional assumptions being built into our language – but that in itself provides no reason for adopting such assumptions. In what follows I propose to abandon these assumptions and to speak of the exercise of power whether by individuals or by groups, institutions, etc., and whether consciously or not. A negative justification for this revisionary usage is that there is no other available word that meets the bill (thus 'exerting' power is little different from 'exercising' it); I shall offer a positive justification below.

The second way in which the phrase 'exercising power' is problematic is that it conceals an interesting and important ambiguity. I referred above to Dahl's definition of the exercise of power in terms of *A* getting *B* to do something he would not otherwise do. However, this is, as it stands, too simple.

Suppose that *A* can *normally* affect *B*. This is to suppose that, against the background of (what is assumed to be) a normally ongoing situation, if *A* does *x*, he gets *B* to do what he would not otherwise do. Here *A*'s action, *x*, is *sufficient* to get *B* to do what he would not otherwise do. Suppose, however, that exactly the same is true of *A*₁. He can also normally affect *B*: his action, *y*, is also sufficient to get *B* to do what he would not otherwise do, in just the same way. Now, suppose that *A* and *A*₁ both act in relation to *B* simultaneously and *B* changes his action accordingly. Here, it is clear, *B*'s action or change of course is overdetermined: both *A* and *A*₁ have affected *B* by 'exercising power', but the result is the same as that which would have occurred had either affected him singly. In this case it is a pointless question to ask which of them produced the change of course, that is, which of them made a difference to the result: they both did. They both 'exercised power', in a sense – that is, a power *sufficient* to produce the result, yet one cannot say that *either* of them made a difference to the result. Let us call this sense of 'exercising power' the *operative* sense.

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Contrast this case with the case where *A* *does* make a difference to the result: that is, against the background of a normally ongoing situation, *A*, by doing *x*, actually gets *B* to do what *B* would not otherwise do. Here *x* is an intervening cause which distorts the normal course of events – by contrast with the first, overdetermined case, where there are, *ex hypothesi*, *two* intervening sufficient conditions, so that neither can be said to have ‘made a difference’, just because of the presence of the other: there the normal course of events is itself distorted by the presence of the other intervening sufficient condition. Here, by contrast, *A*’s intervention can be said to make a difference to the result. Let us call this sense of ‘exercising power’ the *effective* sense.

(It is worth adding a further distinction, which turns on *what* difference *A* makes to the result. *A* wishes *B* to do some particular thing, but, in exercising effective power over him, he may succeed in changing *B*’s course in a wide variety of ways. Only in the case where *B*’s change of course corresponds to *A*’s wishes, that is, where *A* secures *B*’s compliance, can we speak properly of a *successful* exercise of power: here ‘affecting’ becomes ‘control’. It is, incidentally, this case of the successful exercise of power, or the securing of compliance, on which Bachrach and Baratz exclusively concentrate. The successful exercise of power can be seen as a sub-species of the effective exercise of power – though one could maintain that, where the operative exercise of power issues in compliance, this also is an [indeterminate] form of its successful exercise.)

We can now turn to the analysis of what exactly is involved in identifying an exercise of power. An attribution of the exercise of power involves, among other things, the double claim that *A* acts (or fails to act) in a certain way and that *B* does what he would not otherwise do (I use the term ‘do’ here in a very wide sense, to include ‘think’, ‘want’, ‘feel’, etc.). In the case of an effective exercise of power, *A* gets *B* to do what he would not otherwise do; in the case of an operative exercise of power, *A*, together with another or other sufficient conditions, gets *B* to do what he would not otherwise do. Hence, in general, any attribution of the exercise of power (including, of course, those by Dahl and

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his colleagues) always implies a relevant counterfactual, to the effect that (but for A , or but for A together with any other sufficient conditions) B would otherwise have done, let us say, b . This is one reason why so many thinkers (mistakenly) insist on actual, observable conflict as essential to power (though there are doubtless other theoretical and, indeed, ideological reasons). For such conflict provides the relevant counterfactual, so to speak, ready-made. If A and B are in conflict with one another, A wanting a and B wanting b , then if A prevails over B , we can assume that B would otherwise have done b . Where there is no observable conflict between A and B , then we must provide other grounds for asserting the relevant counterfactual. That is, we must provide other, indirect, grounds for asserting that if A had not acted (or failed to act) in a certain way – and, in the case of operative power, if other sufficient conditions had not been operative – then B would have thought and acted differently from the way he does actually think and act. In brief, we need to justify our expectation that B would have thought or acted differently; and we also need to specify the means or mechanism by which A has prevented, or else acted (or abstained from acting) in a manner sufficient to prevent B from doing so.

I can see no reason to suppose that either of these claims cannot in principle be supported – though I do not claim it is easy. Doing so certainly requires one to go much deeper than most analyses of power in contemporary political science and sociology. Fortunately, Matthew Crenson's book *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities* (Crenson 1971) provides a good example of how the task can be approached. The theoretical framework of this book can be seen as lying on the borderline of the two-dimensional and the three-dimensional views of power: I see it as a serious attempt empirically to apply the former, together with certain elements of the latter. For that reason, it marks a real theoretical advance in the empirical study of power relations.

It explicitly attempts to find a way to explain 'things that do not happen', on the assumption that 'the proper object of

investigation is not political activity but political inactivity' (pp. vii, 26). Why, he asks, was the issue of air pollution not raised as early or as effectively in some American cities as it was in others? His object, in other words, is to 'discover . . . why many cities and towns in the United States failed to make a political issue of their air pollution problems' (p. vii), thereby illuminating the character of local political systems – particularly with respect to their 'penetrability'. He first shows that differences in the treatment of pollution cannot be attributed solely to differences in the actual pollution level or to social characteristics of the populations in question. He then provides a detailed study of two neighbouring cities in Indiana, both equally polluted and with similar populations, one of which, East Chicago, took action to clear its air in 1949, while the other, Gary, held its breath until 1962. Briefly, his explanation of the difference is that Gary is a one-company town dominated by US Steel, with a strong party organization, whereas East Chicago had a number of steel companies and no strong party organization when it passed its air pollution control ordinance.

His case (which he documents with convincing detail) is that US Steel, which had built Gary and was responsible for its prosperity, for a long time effectively prevented the issue from even being raised, through its power reputation operating on anticipated reactions, then for a number of years thwarted attempts to raise the issue, and decisively influenced the content of the anti-pollution ordinance finally enacted. Moreover, it did all this without acting or entering into the political arena. Its 'mere reputation for power, unsupported by acts of power' was 'sufficient to inhibit the emergence of the dirty air issue' (p. 124); and, when it eventually did emerge (largely because of the threat of Federal or State action), 'US Steel . . . influenced the content of the pollution ordinance without taking any action on it, and thus defied the pluralist dictum that political power belongs to political actors' (pp. 69–70). US Steel, Crenson argues, exercised influence 'from points outside the range of observable political behaviour. . . . Though the corporation seldom intervened directly in the deliberations of the town's air pollution

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policymakers, it was nevertheless able to affect their scope and direction' (p. 107). He writes:

Gary's anti-pollution activists were long unable to get US Steel to take a clear stand. One of them, looking back on the bleak days of the dirty air debate, cited the evasiveness of the town's largest industrial corporation as a decisive factor in frustrating early efforts to enact a pollution control ordinance. The company executives, he said, would just nod sympathetically 'and agree that air pollution was terrible, and pat you on the head. But they never *did* anything one way or the other. If only there had been a fight, then something might have been accomplished!' What US Steel did not do was probably more important to the career of Gary's air pollution issue than what it did do. (pp. 76-7)

He then moves from these two detailed case studies to a comparative analysis of interview data with political leaders taken from 51 cities, aimed at testing the hypotheses arising out of the two case studies. Briefly, his conclusions are that 'the air pollution issue tends not to flourish in cities where industry enjoys a reputation for power' (p. 145) – and that 'where industry remains silent about dirty air, the life chances of the pollution issue are likely to be diminished' (p. 124). Again, a strong and influential party organization will also inhibit the growth of the pollution issue, since demands for clean air are unlikely to yield the kind of specific benefits that American party machines seek – though where industry has a high power reputation, a strong party will increase the pollution issue's life chances, since it will seek to purchase industrial influence. In general Crenson plausibly argues that pollution control is a good example of a collective good, whose specific costs are concentrated on industry: thus the latter's opposition will be strong, while the support for it will be relatively weak, since its benefits are diffuse and likely to have little appeal to party leaders engaged in influence brokerage. Moreover, and very interestingly, Crenson argues, against the pluralists, that political issues tend to be interconnected; and

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thus collective issues tend to promote other collective issues, and vice versa. Thus by 'promoting one political agenda item, civic activists may succeed in driving other issues away' (p. 170):

where business and industrial development is a topic of local concern, the dirty air problem tends to be ignored. The prominence of one issue appears to be connected with the subordination of the other, and the existence of this connection calls into question the pluralist view that different political issues tend to rise and subside independently. (p. 165)

Crenson's general case is that there are 'politically imposed limitations upon the scope of decision-making', such that 'decision-making activity is channelled and directed by the process of non-decision-making' (p. 178). Pluralism, in other words, is 'no guarantee of political openness or popular sovereignty'; and neither the study of decision-making nor the existence of 'visible diversity' will tell us anything about 'those groups and issues which may have been shut out of a town's political life' (p. 181).

I suggested above that the theoretical framework of Crenson's analysis lies on the borderline of the two-dimensional and the three-dimensional views of power. It is, on the face of it, a two-dimensional study of nondecision-making *à la* Bachrach and Baratz. On the other hand, it begins to advance beyond their position (as presented in their book) in three ways. First, it does not interpret nondecision-making behaviourally, as exhibited only in decisions (hence the stress on inaction – 'What US Steel did not do . . .'); second, it is non-individualistic and considers institutional power;¹⁷ and third, it considers ways in which demands are prevented, through the exercise of such power, from being raised: thus,

Local political forms and practices may even inhibit citizens' ability to transform some diffuse discontent into an explicit demand. In short, there is something like an inarticulate ideology in political institutions, even in those that appear to be most open-minded, flexible and disjointed – an ideology in

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the sense that it promotes the selective perception and articulation of social problems and conflicts. . . . (p. 23)

In this way, 'local political institutions and political leaders may . . . exercise considerable control over what people choose to care about and how forcefully they articulate their cares' (p. 27): restrictions on the scope of decision-making may 'stunt the political consciousness of the local public' by confining minority opinions to minorities and denying 'minorities the opportunity to grow to majorities' (pp. 180–1).

Crenson's analysis is impressive because it fulfils the double requirement mentioned above: there is good reason to expect that, other things being equal, people would rather not be poisoned (assuming, in particular, that pollution control does not necessarily mean unemployment) – even where they may not even articulate this preference; and hard evidence is given of the ways in which institutions, specifically US Steel, largely through inaction, prevented the citizens' interest in not being poisoned from being acted on (though other factors, institutional and ideological, would need to enter a fuller explanation). Thus both the relevant counterfactual and the identification of a power mechanism are justified.

8 Difficulties

I wish, however, to conclude on a problematic note, by alluding to the difficulties, peculiar to the three-dimensional view of power, first, of justifying the relevant counterfactual, and second, of identifying the mechanism or process of an alleged exercise of power.

In the first place, justifying the relevant counterfactual is not always as easy or as clearcut as in the case of air pollution in Gary, Indiana. There are a number of features of that case that may not be present in others. First, the value judgement implicit in the specification of Gary's citizens' interest in not being

poisoned is scarcely disputable – resting, as Crenson says, on ‘the opinion of the observer concerning the value of human life’ (p.3). Second, the empirical hypothesis that those citizens, if they had the choice and fuller information, would prefer not to be poisoned is more than plausible (on the assumption that such an alternative did not entail increased unemployment). And third, Crenson’s study provides comparative data to support the claim that, under different conditions where the alleged nondecisional power was not operative, or operative to a lesser degree, people with comparable social characteristics did make and enforce that choice, or did so with less difficulty.¹⁸

Sometimes, however, it is extraordinarily difficult to justify the relevant counterfactual. Can we always assume that the victims of injustice and inequality would, but for the exercise of power, strive for justice and equality? What about the cultural relativity of values? Is not such an assumption a form of ethnocentrism? Why not say that acquiescence in a value system ‘we’ reject, such as orthodox communism or the caste system, is a case of genuine consensus over different values? But even here empirical support is not beyond our reach. It is not impossible to adduce evidence – which must, by nature of the case, be indirect – to support the claim that an apparent case of consensus is not genuine but imposed (though there will be mixed cases, with respect to different groups and different components of the value system).

Where is such evidence to be found? There is a most interesting passage in Antonio Gramsci’s *Prison Notebooks* which bears on this question, where Gramsci draws a contrast between ‘thought and action, i.e. the co-existence of two conceptions of the world, one affirmed in words and the other displayed in effective action’ (Gramsci 1971[1926–37]: 326). Where this contrast occurs ‘in the life of great masses’, Gramsci writes, it

cannot but be the expression of profounder contrasts of a social historical order. It signifies that the social group in question may indeed have its own conception of the world, even if only embryonic; a conception which manifests itself in action, but

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occasionally and in flashes – when, that is, the group is acting as an organic totality. But this same group has, for reasons of submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception which is not its own but is borrowed from another group; and it affirms this conception verbally and believes itself to be following it, because this is the conception which it follows in ‘normal times’ – that is when its conduct is not independent and autonomous, but submissive and subordinate. (p. 327)¹⁹

Although one may not accept Gramsci’s attribution of ‘its own conception of the world’ to a social group, it can be highly instructive (though not conclusive) to observe how people behave in ‘abnormal times’ – when (*ex hypothesi*) ‘submission and intellectual subordination’ are absent or diminished, when the apparatus of power is removed or relaxed. Gramsci himself gives the example of ‘the fortunes of religions and churches’:

Religion, or a particular church, maintains its community of faithful (within the limits imposed by the necessities of general historical development) in so far as it nourishes its faith permanently and in an organized fashion, indefatigably repeating its apologetics, struggling at all times and always with the same kind of arguments, and maintaining a hierarchy of intellectuals who give to the faith, in appearance at least, the dignity of thought. Whenever the continuity of relations between the Church and the faithful has been violently interrupted, for political reasons, as happened during the French Revolution, the losses suffered by the Church have been incalculable. (p. 340)

As a contemporary example, consider the reactions of Czechs to the relaxation of the apparatus of power in 1968.

But evidence can also be sought in ‘normal times’. We are concerned to find out what the exercise of power prevents people from doing, and sometimes even thinking. Hence we should examine how people react to opportunities – or, more precisely, perceived opportunities – when these occur, to escape from subordinate positions in hierarchical systems. In this connection

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data about rates of social mobility can acquire a new and striking theoretical significance. The caste system is often thought of as a plausible candidate for 'a case of genuine consensus over different values'. But the whole recent debate over 'Sanskritization' suggests otherwise. The caste system, according to Srinivas,

is far from a rigid system in which the position of each component caste is fixed for all time. Movement has always been possible, and especially so in the middle regions of the hierarchy. A low caste was able, in a generation or two, to rise to a higher position in the hierarchy by adopting vegetarianism and teetotalism, and by Sanskritizing its ritual and pantheon. In short, it took over, as far as possible, the customs, rites and beliefs of the Brahmins, and the adoption of the Brahminic way of life by a low caste seems to have been frequent, though theoretically forbidden. This process has been called 'Sanskritization'. (Srinivas 1952: 30)

Srinivas argues that 'economic betterment . . . seems to lead to the Sanskritization of the customs and way of life of a group', which itself depends on 'the collective desire to rise high in the esteem of friends, neighbours and rivals' and is followed by 'the adoption of methods by which the status of the group is raised' (Srinivas 1962: 56–7). Such a desire is, it seems, usually preceded by the acquisition of wealth, but the acquisition of political power, education and leadership also seems to be relevant. In brief, the evidence suggests that there is a significant difference between the caste system as it exists in the 'popular conception' and as it actually operates (Srinivas 1962: 56). What to the outside observer may appear as a value consensus which sanctifies an extreme, elaborately precise and stable hierarchy actually conceals the fact that perceived opportunities of lower castes to rise within the system are very often, if not invariably, seized.

It could be argued that this is not a very persuasive case, since upward mobility within a hierarchical system implies acceptance of the hierarchy, so that the Sanskritizing castes are not rejecting but embracing the value system. But against this it

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can be objected that this is precisely a case of a gap between thought and action, since the adoption of the Brahminic way of life by a low caste is theoretically forbidden and in general caste position is held to be ascriptive, hereditary and unchangeable.

Other, less ambiguous, evidence relating to the Indian caste system can, however, be adduced which supports the claim that the internalization of subordinate status is a consequence of power. Consider the effects of the introduction of universal suffrage upon lower castes' acceptance of the principle of hierarchy.²⁰ More tellingly still, consider the 'ways out' taken by the Untouchables, above all that of mass conversion into other religions.²¹ At various periods in their history, the Untouchables have embraced Islam,²² Christianity and Buddhism,²³ because they proclaimed egalitarian principles and offered the hope of escape from caste discrimination.²⁴

I conclude, then, that, in general, evidence can be adduced (though by nature of the case, such evidence will never be conclusive) which supports the relevant counterfactuals implicit in identifying exercises of power of the three-dimensional type. One can take steps to find out what it is that people would have done otherwise.

How, in the second place, is one to identify the process or mechanism of an alleged exercise of power, on the three-dimensional view? (I shall leave aside the further problems of identifying an operative exercise of power, that is, the problem of overdetermination. That is a whole issue in itself.) There are three features, distinctive of the three-dimensional view, which pose peculiarly acute problems for the researcher. As I have argued, such an exercise may, in the first place, involve inaction rather than (observable) action. In the second place, it may be unconscious (this seems to be allowed for on the two-dimensional view, but the latter also insists that nondecisions are *decisions* – and, in the absence of further explanation, an unconscious decision looks like a contradiction). And in the third place, power may be exercised by collectivities, such as groups or institutions. Let us examine these difficulties in turn.

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First, inaction. Here, once more, we have a non-event. Indeed, where the suppression of a potential issue is attributed to inaction, we have a *double* non-event. How can such a situation be identified empirically? The first step to answering this is to see that inaction need not be a featureless non-event. The failure to act in a certain way, in a given situation, may well have specifiable consequences, where acting in that way is a hypothesised possibility with determinate consequences. Moreover, the consequence of inaction may well be a further non-event, such as the non-appearance of a political issue, where the actions in question would, *ex hypothesi*, have led to its appearance. There seems to be no impossibility in principle of establishing a causal nexus here: the relation between the inaction of US Steel and the public silence over air pollution is an admirable case in point.

Second, unconsciousness. How can power be exercised without the exerciser being aware of what he (it) is doing? Here it will be useful to make a number of distinctions (and, for brevity, in what follows I use the term 'action' to cover the case of inaction). There are a number of ways of being unconscious of what one is doing. One may be unaware of what is held to be the 'real' motive or meaning of one's action (as in standard Freudian cases). Or, second, one may be unaware of how others interpret one's action. Or, third, one may be unaware of the consequences of one's action. Identifying an unconscious exercise of power of the first type presents the usual difficulty, characteristic of Freudian-type explanations, of establishing the 'real' motive or meaning, where the interpretations of observer and observed differ. This difficulty, however, is well known and has been very widely discussed, and it is not peculiar to the analysis of power. Identifying an unconscious exercise of power of the second type seems to pose no particular problem. It is the third type which is really problematic, in cases where the agent *could not be expected* to have knowledge of the consequences of his action. Can *A* properly be said to exercise power over *B* where knowledge of the effects of *A* upon *B* is just not available to *A*? If *A*'s ignorance of those effects is due to his (remediable) failure to find out, the answer appears to be yes. Where, however, he could not have

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found out – because, say, certain factual or technical knowledge was simply not *available* – then talk of an exercise of power appears to lose all its point. Consider, for instance, the case of a drug company which allegedly exercises the most extreme power – of life and death – over members of the public by marketing a dangerous drug. Here the allegation that power is being exercised is not refuted if it could be shown that the company's scientists and managers did not know that the drug's effects were dangerous: they could have taken steps to find out. On the other hand, did cigarette companies exercise this power over the public before it was even supposed that cigarette smoking might be harmful? Surely not. This suggests that where power is held to be exercised unconsciously in this sense (i.e. in unawareness of its consequences), the assumption is being made that the exerciser or exercisers could, in the context, have ascertained those consequences. (Of course, justifying that assumption raises further problems, since it involves, for example, the making of historical judgments about the locus of culturally determined limits to cognitive innovation.)

The third difficulty is that of attributing an exercise of power to collectivities, such as groups, classes or institutions. The problem is: when can social causation be characterized as an exercise of power, or, more precisely, how and where is the line to be drawn between structural determination, on the one hand, and an exercise of power, on the other? This is a problem which has often reappeared in the history of Marxist thought, in the context of discussions of determinism and voluntarism. Thus, for example, within post-war French Marxism, an extreme determinist position was adopted by the structuralist Marxism of Louis Althusser and his followers, as opposed to the so-called 'humanist', 'historicist' and 'subjectivist' interpretations of thinkers such as Sartre and Lucien Goldmann, and behind them of Lukács and Korsch (and, behind them, of Hegel) for whom the historical 'subject' has a crucial and ineradicable explanatory role. For Althusser, Marx's thought, properly understood, conceptualizes 'the determination of the elements of a whole by the structure of the whole', and 'liberated definitively from the

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empiricist antinomies of phenomenal subjectivity and essential interiority', treats of 'an objective system governed, in its most concrete determinations, by the laws of its *arrangement* (*montage*) and of its *machinery*, by the specifications of its concept' (Althusser and Balibar 1968, ii: 63, 71).

The implications of this position can be seen very clearly in the debate between the Althusserian Nicos Poulantzas, and the British political sociologist Ralph Miliband, over the latter's book *The State in Capitalist Society* (Miliband 1969). According to Poulantzas, Miliband had

difficulties . . . in comprehending social classes and the State as *objective structures*, and their relations as an *objective system of regular connections*, a structure and a system whose agents, 'men', are in the words of Marx, 'bearers' of it – *träger*. Miliband constantly gives the impression that for him social classes or 'groups' are in some way reducible to *inter-personal relations*, that the State is reducible to inter-personal relations of the members of the diverse 'groups' that constitute the State apparatus, and finally that the relation between social classes and the State is itself reducible to inter-personal relations of 'individuals' composing social groups and 'individuals' composing the State apparatus. (Poulantzas 1969: 70)

This conception, Poulantzas continued,

seems to me to derive from a *problematic of the subject* which has had constant repercussions in the history of Marxist thought. According to this problematic, the agents of a social formation, 'men', are not considered as the 'bearers' of objective instances (as they are for Marx), but as the genetic principle of the levels of the social whole. This is a problematic of *social actors*, of individuals as the origin of *social action*: sociological research thus leads finally not to the study of the objective coordinates that determine the distribution of agents into social classes and the contradictions between these classes, but to the search for *finalist* explanations founded on the *motivations of conduct* of the individual actors. (p. 70)

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Miliband, in response to this, maintained that Poulantzas

is here rather one-sided and that he goes much too far in dismissing the nature of the state elite as of altogether no account. For what his *exclusive* stress on 'objective relations' suggests is that what the state does is in every particular and at all times *wholly* determined by these 'objective relations': in other words, that the structural constraints of the system are so absolutely compelling as to turn those who run the state into the merest functionaries and executants of policies imposed upon them by 'the system'. (Miliband 1970: 57)

Poulantzas, wrote Miliband, substituted 'the notion of "objective structures" and "objective relations" for the notion of a "ruling" class', and his analysis leads 'straight towards a kind of structural determinism, or rather a structural super-determinism, which makes impossible a truly realistic consideration of the dialectical relationship between the State and "the system"' (p. 57).²⁵

The first thing to say about this debate is that Poulantzas's implied dichotomy between structural determinism and methodological individualism – between his own 'problematic' and that of '*social actors*, of individuals as the origin of social action' – is misleading. These are not the only two possibilities. It is not a question of sociological research 'leading finally' *either* to the study of 'objective co-ordinates' *or* to that of 'motivations of conduct of the individual actors'. Such research must clearly examine the complex interrelations between the two, and allow for the obvious fact that individuals act together and upon one another within groups and organisations, and that the explanation of their behaviour and interaction is unlikely to be reducible merely to their individual motivations.

The second thing to say about the Poulantzas–Miliband debate is that it turns on a crucially important conceptual distinction – which the language of power serves to mark out. To use the vocabulary of power in the context of social relationships is to speak of human agents, separately or together, in

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groups or organisations, through action or inaction, significantly affecting the thoughts or actions of others (specifically, in a manner contrary to their interests). In speaking thus, one assumes that, although the agents operate within structurally determined limits, they none the less have a certain relative autonomy and could have acted differently. The future, though it is not entirely open, is not entirely closed either (and, indeed, the degree of its openness is itself structurally determined).²⁶ In short, within a system characterized by total structural determinism, there would be no place for power.

Of course, one always has the alternative of stipulatively redefining 'power' in terms of structural determination. This is the path which Poulantzas took in his book *Political Power and Social Classes* (1973 [1968]). He defined his concept of power as 'the capacity of a social class to realize its specific objective interests' (p. 104) and argued that this concept 'points to the effects of the structure on the relations of conflict between the practices of the various classes in "struggle"'. In other words, power is not located in the levels of structures, but is an effect of the ensemble of these levels . . .' (p. 99). Class relations are 'at every level relations of power: power, however, is only a concept indicating the effect of the ensemble of the structures on the relations of the practices of the various classes in conflict' (p. 101). But this conceptual assimilation of power to structural determination simply serves to obscure a crucial distinction which it is theoretically necessary to make, and which the vocabulary of power articulates. My claim, in other words, is that to identify a given process as an 'exercise of power', rather than as a case of structural determination, is to assume that it is *in the exerciser's or exercisers' power* to act differently. In the case of a collective exercise of power, or the part of a group, or institution, etc., this is to imply that the members of the group or institution could have combined or organized to act differently.

The justification of this claim, and the key to the latter two difficulties involved in the identification of the process of exercising power, lies in the relation between power and responsibility.²⁷ The reason why identifying such an exercise involves the assumption that the exerciser(s) could have acted differently – and,

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where they are unaware of the consequences of their action or inaction, that they could have ascertained these – is that an attribution of power is at the same time an attribution of (partial or total) responsibility for certain consequences. The point, in other words, of locating power is to fix responsibility for consequences held to flow from the action, or inaction, of certain specifiable agents. We cannot here enter into a discussion of the notion of responsibility (and the problems of identifying collective responsibility): it is no less problematic – and essentially contested – a notion than the others examined in this essay. Nor can we here discuss the underlying theoretical (and non-empirical?) issue of how one determines where structural determination ends and power and responsibility begins. But it is worth noting, in conclusion, that C. Wright Mills perceived the relations I have argued for between these concepts in his distinction between *fate* and power. His ‘sociological conception of fate’ had, he wrote, ‘to do with events in history that are beyond the control of any circle or groups of men (1) compact enough to be identifiable, (2) powerful enough to decide with consequence, and (3) in a position to foresee the consequences and so to be held accountable for historical events’ (Mills 1959: 21). He argued in favour of attributing power to those in strategic positions who are able to initiate changes that are in the interests of broad segments of society but do not, claiming it to be ‘now sociologically realistic, morally fair, and politically imperative to make demands upon men of power and to hold them responsible for specific courses of events’ (p. 100).

9 Conclusion

The one-dimensional view of power offers a clear-cut paradigm for the behavioural study of decision-making power by political actors, but it inevitably takes over the bias of the political system under observation and is blind to the ways in which its political agenda is controlled. The two-dimensional view points the way to examining that bias and control, but conceives of them too

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narrowly: in a word, it lacks a sociological perspective within which to examine, not only decision-making and nondecision-making power, but also the various ways of suppressing latent conflicts within society. Such an examination poses a number of serious difficulties.

These difficulties are serious but not overwhelming. They certainly do not require us to consign the three-dimensional view of power to the realm of the merely metaphysical or the merely ideological. My conclusion, in short, is that a deeper analysis of power relations is possible – an analysis that is at once value-laden, theoretical and empirical.²⁸ A pessimistic attitude towards the possibility of such an analysis is unjustified. As Frey has written (1971: 1095), such pessimism amounts to saying: ‘Why let things be difficult when, with just a little more effort, we can make them seem impossible?’

2

POWER, FREEDOM AND REASON

In this chapter I seek to broaden the discussion of the concept of power. I begin from the fact of unending disagreement about how power is to be conceived and ask whether we need the concept at all and, if so, what for. I will then draw a sort of conceptual map in order to situate and focus upon the argument of *PRV* and the debate of which it was part. Because *PRV* was a response and contribution to an ongoing debate within American political science, it was also caught up in the presuppositions of that debate whose shared concept of power, based on Dahl's 'intuitive idea' that '*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do' (Dahl 1957 in Scott (ed.) 1994: vol. 2, p. 290), has been condemned as 'sterile' (Taylor 1984: 171). That condemnation was made in the light of subsequent theorizing about power, notably by Michel Foucault, whose treatment of power promised to broaden and deepen the discussion. I think the condemnation of the earlier debate is too dismissive: Dahl and his followers brought welcome and healthy precision, clarity and methodological rigour to the study of an admittedly narrow range of important questions. The contention of their critics was that their method was too

LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY

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Translation, Endnotes, and Foreword
by Grzegorz Ignatik



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CHAPTER I

The Person and the Drive

Part One

Analysis of the Verb “to use”

The person as the subject and object of action

The world in which we live consists of many objects. The word “object” in this case signifies more or less the same as “a being” (*byt*).¹ This is not the proper meaning of this word, for properly speaking an “object” signifies what is posited in relation to some “subject.” The subject is also a being—a being that in some way exists and acts. It can be said accordingly that the world in which we live consists of many subjects. It would even be suitable to speak about subjects before objects. If this order has been reversed here, this was done in order to emphasize from the first words of this book objectivity, and realism together with it. For when we start from the subject, and in particular from man as the subject, then it is easy to treat everything else that is located outside the subject, namely the whole world of objects, in a merely subjective way, that is, inasmuch as this world reaches the subject’s consciousness, lives in it, and embeds itself in it. It must be clearly recognized from the beginning that every subject is at the same time an objective being, that it is an objective something or somebody.*

Man is objectively a “somebody”—and this distinguishes him from the rest of the beings of the visible world, the beings that objectively are always merely “something.” This simple, elementary distinction conceals a deep abyss that divides the world of persons from the world of things. The objective world, to which we belong, consists of persons and things. A thing is customarily considered a being that is deprived not only of reason, but also of life; a thing is an inanimate object. We will hesitate to call an animal or even a plant a thing. However, nobody speaks convincingly about an animal person. Instead, one speaks about animal individuals,

regarding them simply as specimens of a given animal species. And such a description suffices. Yet, it is not sufficient to speak of man as an individual of the species *Homo sapiens*. The word “person” has been coined in order to stress that man cannot be reduced wholly to what is contained in the concept of a “specimen of the species,” but has in himself something more, some particular fullness and perfection of being. To emphasize this fullness and perfection the word “person” must necessarily be used.

The most proximate and the most proper reason for this is the fact that man possesses reason, that he is a rational being, which by no means can be stated about any other being of the visible world, for in none of them do we encounter any trace of conceptual thinking. What issued hence is the well-known definition of Boethius, according to which the person is simply an individual of a rational nature (*individua substantia rationalis naturae*).² This distinguishes the person in the whole world of objective beings; this constitutes the person’s distinctness.

The fact that the person is an individual of a rational nature—that is, an individual to whose nature reason belongs—makes the person at the same time the only subject of its kind among the whole world of beings, a subject that differs completely from subjects such as animals, i.e., beings (especially some of them) that are relatively most similar to man with respect to their bodily constitution. Speaking somewhat descriptively, it must be said that the person as a subject differs from even the most perfect animals by his *interiority* and a specific life, which is concentrated in it, i.e., an interior life. One cannot speak about this life in the case of animals, even though bio-physiological processes, which are similar to man’s and which are related to the constitution that is more or less similar to that of man, take place inside their organisms. On the basis of this constitution a more or less abundant sensual life develops in them—a life whose functions extend far beyond the elementary vegetation of plants and sometimes deceptively resemble the typical functions of human life: cognition (*poznanie*) and desire (*pożądanie*), or, speaking somewhat more broadly about the former function, striving (*dążenie*).

Cognition and desire in man take on a spiritual character, and therefore they contribute to the formation of the true interior life, which does not occur in animals. The interior life is the spiritual life. It focuses on truth and the good. It also deals with a multitude of problems; it seems that the most central of these are the following two: what is the final cause of everything, and how to be good and possess the fullness of the good. The first of these central problems of man’s interior life primarily engages cognition, whereas the other one engages desire, or rather striving. Besides, both of these functions seem to be something more than functions; they are rather some natural orientations of the whole man-being. It is remarkable that precisely through his interiority and interior

life man not only is a person, but at the same time mostly through them inheres in the objective world, in the “external” world, where he inheres in the manner proper and characteristic to him. The person is an objective being, which, as a definite subject, most closely contacts the whole (external) world and most thoroughly inheres in it precisely through his interiority and interior life. It must be added that he contacts in this way not only the visible world, but also the invisible one, and above all God. And this is another manifestation of the person’s distinctness in the visible world.

The contact of the person with the objective world, with reality, is not merely “biological” (*przyrodniczy*), physical, as is the case with all other creations of nature (*przyroda*), nor only sensual, as is the case with animals.³ The human person, as a distinctly definite subject, establishes contact with other beings precisely through his interiority, whereas the whole “biological” contact, which also belongs to him—for the person possesses a body and even in a sense “is a body”—and the sensual contact in the likeness of animals do not constitute for him the characteristic ways of connecting with the world.⁴ Although the connection of the human person with the world begins on the “biological” and sensual basis, it is nevertheless formed in the manner proper to man only in the orbit of the interior life. Here appears a moment characteristic of the person: man not only appropriates the content that reaches him from the external world and reacts to it in a spontaneous or even downright mechanical manner, but in all his relation to this world, to reality, he attempts to make his mark, to state his “I”—and he has to act this way since this is demanded by the nature of his being. Man has a fundamentally different nature from animals. His nature includes the power of self-determination based on reflection and manifested in the fact that, while acting, man chooses what he wants to do.* This power is called free will.⁵

Thanks to the fact that man—a person—possesses free will, he is also a master of himself, *sui iuris*, as the Latin phrase declares of the person.⁶ A second characteristic property of the person remains closely linked to this distinctive feature of his. The Latin of philosophers grasped this property in the statement that the person is *alteri incommunicabilis*—nontransferable, incommunicable.⁷ The point in this case is not to emphasize that the person is always some unique and unrepeatable being, as this can also be stated about any other being: about an animal, a plant, or a stone. This nontransferability or incommunicability of the person is most closely linked with his interiority, with self-determination, with free will. No one else can will in my stead.⁸ No one can substitute his act of the will for mine. It happens that sometimes someone wants very much for me to want what he wants. What is then best made manifest is this impassable boundary between him and me, the boundary that is determined precisely

by free will. I can not want what he wants me to want—and precisely in this I am *incommunicabilis*. I am and should be self-reliant in my actions.⁹ All human interactions are based on this presupposition, and the truth about education (*wychowanie*) and about culture is reduced to it.¹⁰

For man is not only the subject of action, but he also at times is its object.¹¹ At every step acts occur that have the other man as their object. Within the theme of this book, which is sexual morality, we will continually speak precisely about such acts. In relations between persons of different sex, and especially in sexual intercourse, a woman is constantly an object of some action of a man, and a man, an object of a woman's action. Therefore, first it would be proper to become aware, at least briefly, of who is the one who acts—the subject, and who is the one toward whom the action turns—the object of action. It is already known that both the subject and the object of action are persons. Now, we need to consider well the principles that the action of man must comply with when the object of this action is another human person.*

The first meaning of the verb “to use”

Precisely for this purpose we must thoroughly analyze the verb “to use.” It signifies a certain objective form of action. To use means to employ some object of action as a means to an end, namely to the end for which the acting subject strives. The end is always that for the sake of which we act. The end also suggests the existence of means (by means we understand the objects on which our action centers for the sake of the end we intend to attain). By nature, then, a means is subordinated to an end, and, at the same time, it is also to a certain degree subordinated to the one who acts. It cannot be otherwise, since the one who acts makes use of means for the sake of his end—the very expression suggests a subordinate and, so to speak, “servile” relation of the means with respect to the acting subject: the means serves both the end and the subject.

So, it seems beyond doubt that various things or beings, which are only individuals, that is, specimens of their species, can and should remain in such a relation to man-person. Man in his diverse activity makes use of the whole created world. He takes advantage of its resources for these ends, which he posits himself, because he alone understands them. This attitude of man toward inanimate nature (*przyroda*), whose riches mean so much to economic life, or toward animate nature (*przyroda*), whose energy and values man assimilates, in principle does not raise doubts. The only thing that is demanded from the rational human being is that he does not destroy and squander these natural resources, and that he uses them with the moderation that will not impede the personal development of man

himself and will guarantee for human societies a just and harmonious coexistence. In particular, concerning the relation to animals—the beings endowed with sensation and sensibility to pain—it is demanded from man that the use of these beings never involves torment or physical torture.*

All these are simple principles that are easily understandable by every normal man. The problem begins when a relation to another man, to another human person is concerned. Is it permissible to treat this person as a means to an end and use him in this manner? The problem posited in this question possesses a very broad scope; it extends over many spheres of human life and interactions. Let us take, for example, such cases as the organization of work in a factory, the relation of a commanding officer to a soldier in an army, or even the relation of parents to a child in a family. Does not the employer use a worker, thus a human person, for the purpose of attaining the ends he chose himself? Does not the commanding officer employ soldiers under his command for conducting certain military objectives, which are intended by him and sometimes known only by him? Do not parents, who alone understand the ends for which they educate their children, treat the children in a sense as means to an end, since the children themselves do not understand those ends and do not consciously strive for them? Yet both a worker and a soldier are adults and fully-mature (*pełnowartościowy*)¹² persons, and a child—even if unborn—cannot be denied personhood in the most objective ontological sense, even though it is true that the child is meant to acquire only gradually many characteristics that determine that personhood in the psychological and ethical senses.¹³

The same problem will emerge as we delve deeply into the analysis of the whole reciprocal woman-man relation, which is the basis for the reflections in the field of sexual ethics.* We will discover this problem in, so to speak, various layers of our analysis. Does not a woman in sexual intercourse serve for a man as something of a means for him to attain various ends of his, precisely those ends that he seeks to realize in sexual intercourse? Similarly, does not a man serve for a woman as a means of attaining her own ends?

For the time being let us be content with posing questions that implicate a very essential ethical problem—a problem that is not first of all psychological but precisely ethical.† For a person should not be merely a means to an end for another person.* This is excluded due to the very nature of the person, due to what every person simply is. For the person is a subject that is thinking and capable of self-determination—these are two properties that first of all we discover in the interiority of the person. Accordingly then, every person is capable by his nature to define his ends himself.¹⁴ When someone else treats a person exclusively as a means to an end, then the person is violated in what belongs to his very essence and at

the same time constitutes his natural right. It is clear that it must be demanded from the person, as a thinking individual, that those ends be truly good, for striving for evil ends is contrary to the rational nature of the person.† This also explains the sense of education, both the education of children as well as the reciprocal education of people in general. The point is precisely to seek true ends, that is, true goods as ends of action, and to find and show ways for their realization.

But in this educational activity, especially in the case of educating small children, a person must never be treated as a means to an end. This principle has the most universal scope; no one may use a person as a means to an end: neither any man nor even God the Creator.* Indeed, this is excluded most completely on the part of God, because he, by the very fact of giving a rational and free nature to the person, decided that the person himself will define the ends of action and will not serve as a tool for the ends of others. Therefore, if God intends to direct man to some ends, first and foremost he lets him know these ends, so that man can make them his own and strive for them on his own.¹⁵ In this, among others, lies the deepest logic of Revelation: God lets man know the supernatural end, but the decision to strive for this end, its choice, is left to man's freedom.¹⁶ Therefore, God does not save man against his will.

This elementary truth—that the person may not be a means of action as opposed to all other objects of action, which are not persons—is thus the exponent of the natural moral order. Thanks to this truth, this order acquires personalistic properties: the order of nature, which also includes personal beings, must possess such properties. Perhaps it is not irrelevant to add at this point that at the end of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant formulated this elementary principle of the moral order in the following imperative: “Act in such a way so that the person is never a mere means of your action, but always an end.”¹⁷ In light of the previous reflections, this principle should not so much be formulated in the wording Kant gave to it, but rather as follows: “Whenever the person is an object of action in your conduct, remember that you may not treat him merely as a means to an end, as a tool, but [you must] take into account that the person himself has or at least should have his end.”¹⁸ The principle thus formulated stands at the basis of every properly comprehended freedom of man, especially freedom of conscience.†

Love as the opposite of “using”

The whole previous reflection on the first meaning of the verb “to use” gives us only a negative solution to the problem of the proper relation to the person. The person may not be either exclusively or first

and foremost an object of use, because the role of a blind tool or a means to an end intended by another subject is contrary to the nature of the person.

In turn, when we seek a positive solution to the same problem, then love appears—but only, so to speak, at first glance—as the only distinct opposite of using the person in the role of a means to an end or of a tool of one’s own action. For it is evident that I can strive for the other person to will the same good that I will. Clearly, this other person must recognize this end of mine and acknowledge it as a good; he must make it also his own end. Then, between myself and this other person a particular bond is born: the bond of a *common good* and a common end, which binds us. This particular bond is not limited to the fact that we strive together for a common good, but unites the acting persons “from within”—and then it constitutes the essential core of every love. In any case, love between persons is unthinkable without some common good, which binds them.* This good precisely is at the same time the end which both of these persons choose. When different persons consciously choose an end together, this makes them equal to each other, thereby excluding a subordination of one person to another. So, both persons (although more than two persons can be bound by a common end) are in a sense uniformly and equally subordinated to that good, which constitutes a common end. When we look at man, then we perceive in him an elementary need for the good, a natural urge and tendency toward it—although this does not yet manifest the capacity to love. In animals we observe manifestations of instinct that are analogically directed. But instinct itself does not yet determine the capacity to love. People, however, possess such a capacity linked to free will. The capacity to love is determined by the fact that man is ready to seek the good consciously with others, to subordinate himself to this good because of others, or to subordinate himself to others because of this good. Only persons can love.

Love in reciprocal relations between people is not something readily available. Love is first of all a principle or an idea, which people must live up to, so to speak, in their conduct if they want—and they should want—to liberate it from a utilitarian, i.e., consumer (Latin *consumere*—to use up), attitude toward other persons.¹⁹ Let us return for a moment to the examples put forward previously. A serious danger of treating the worker merely as a means exists in the employer-worker relationship; this is demonstrated by various faulty ways of organizing labor. If, however, the employer and the worker arrange their whole interaction in such a way that the common good, which they both serve, will be clearly visible in it, then the danger of treating the person as less than what he truly is will be diminished and almost eliminated. For love will gradually eliminate in the conduct of both interested parties a purely utilitarian or consumer attitude

toward the person of the worker. Much has been simplified in this example while retaining only the essential core of the issue. The case is similar with the second example regarding the relation of the commanding officer to the soldier. When both of them are bound by a certain basic attitude of love (of course, the point does not concern the very affection of love) evoked by the shared search for the common good, which in this case is the defense or safety of the homeland, this is simply because they both desire the same thing. We cannot speak merely about using the person of the soldier as a blind tool or a means to an end.

This whole reflection* must be applied in turn to the woman-man relationship, which constitutes the basis of sexual ethics. In this relationship as well—and indeed particularly in it—only love is able to exclude the use of one person by another. Love, as has been said, is conditioned by the common relation of persons to the same good that they choose as an end and to which they subordinate themselves. Marriage is one of the most important areas for realizing this principle. For in marriage, two persons, a woman and a man, unite in such a way that they become in a sense “one flesh” (to use the words of the Book of Genesis), that is, so to speak, one common subject of sexual life.²⁰ How can it be ensured that a person does not then become for the other—a woman for a man, and a man for a woman—merely a means to an end, that is, an object used to attain only one’s own end? In order to exclude this possibility, both of them must then have a common end. Concerning marriage, this end is procreation, progeny, the family, and at the same time the whole constantly growing maturity of the relationship between both persons in all the spheres brought by the spousal relationship itself.

This whole objective finality of marriage fundamentally creates the possibility of love, and fundamentally excludes the possibility of treating the person as a means to an end and as an object of use. However, in order for the former possibility to be realized within the framework of the objective finality of marriage, we must consider more attentively the very principle that excludes the possibility of one person treating another person as an object of use in the whole sexual context. The very recognition of the objective finality of marriage does not yet completely solve the problem.

For it seems that the sexual sphere in particular presents many occasions to treat the person—even unknowingly*—as an object of use. In addition, it must be taken into account that the entire sphere of sexual morality is broader than the sphere of conjugal morality alone, and that it encompasses many issues from the area of interaction or even coexistence of men and women. So, within the framework of this interaction or coexistence, all must constantly with all the conscientiousness and with a full sense of responsibility attend to this fundamental good of each and

every one—the good that is simply “humanity,” or, in other words, the value of the human person. If we treat this fundamental woman-man relationship as broadly as possible and not only within the boundaries of marriage, then love in this relationship is identified with a particular readiness to subordinate oneself to the good that is “humanity,” or speaking more precisely, the value of the person, despite the whole distinctiveness of sex. In fact, this subordination by all means obliges in marriage itself, and the objective ends of this institution can be realized only in accord with this broadest principle that results from acknowledging the value of the person in the whole expanded sexual context. This context creates an altogether specific sphere of morality—whereas with respect to science, a specific sphere of ethical problems—in reference to both marriage and many other forms of interaction or simply of coexistence concerning persons of different sex.²¹

The second meaning of the verb “to use”

In order to comprehend these problems in their totality, it is necessary to reflect further on the second meaning that is quite often applied to the verb “to use.” Various *emotional-affective* moments or states accompany our thinking and acts of the will, i.e., what constitutes the objective structure of human action. They precede the action itself, go hand in hand with it, or finally manifest themselves in the consciousness of man when the action is already complete.* The emotional-affective moments or states themselves are a separate theme, as it were, which weaves and forces itself sometimes with great strength and insistence into the whole objective structure of human acts. An objective act itself would at times be something pale and almost unnoticeable to the consciousness of man if it were not manifested and sharply delineated in that consciousness by variously colored emotional-affective lived-experiences.²² Moreover, these emotional and affective moments or states usually exercise some influence on what determines the objective structure of human acts.

For the time being we shall not analyze this problem in detail, for we shall need to return to it repeatedly throughout the book. At this point, our attention must be directed to one thing only: the emotional-affective moments and states, which mean so much in the whole interior life of man, are in principle colored positively or negatively, as if they contained in themselves a positive or negative interior charge. The positive charge is *pleasure*, whereas the negative one is *pain*. Pleasure occurs in various shapes or shades, depending on the emotional-affective lived-experiences to which it is bound: either as sensual satisfaction, as affective

contentment, or as a deep and thorough joy. Pain also depends on the character of the emotional-affective lived-experiences evoking it and occurs in various shapes, kinds, or shades: as sensual pain, as affective discontent, or as deep sorrow.

Here we must turn our attention to the particular richness, variety, and intensity of these emotional-affective moments and states occurring when a person of the other sex is an object of action. They then color this action in a specific way and confer on it some exceptional vividness. This pertains especially to some actions that are linked with the reciprocal relations between persons of different sex and with sexual intercourse itself between a woman and a man. And therefore, precisely within the scope of these actions, the second meaning of the verb “to use” is particularly sharply delineated. To use means to experience (*przeżywać*) pleasure—the pleasure that in various shades is linked to action and to the object of action. It is known that this object of action in the reciprocal relations of a woman and a man and in their sexual intercourse is always a person. And the person becomes a proper source of variously colored pleasure or even delight.

It is an easily understandable fact that precisely one person is for another the source of lived-experiences that have a particular emotional-affective charge. For it is a person who must be for another person an equal object—a “partner” of action. This equality of the subject and the object of action constitutes a particular basis for emotional-affective lived-experiences, and for the emotional-affective positive or negative charges in the form of pleasure or pain that are linked to these lived-experiences. Also, it should not be supposed that a pleasure that is purely and exclusively sensual comes into play here. Such a supposition would diminish the natural greatness of a contact that in every case retains its inter-personal, human character. Even purely “bodily” love, due to the nature of partners who participate in it, does not cease to be a fact of this kind. Hence, for this reason, the sexual life of animals and people cannot be properly compared, although it is clear that in animals this life also exists and constitutes the basis of procreation, thus the preservation and extension of species. In animals, however, it exists on the level of nature and the instinct linked to it, whereas in the case of people it exists on the level of the person and morality. Sexual morality results from the fact that persons not only have a consciousness of the finality of sexual life, but also a consciousness of being persons. The whole moral problem of using as the opposite of loving is linked to this consciousness.²³

This problem has been delineated previously concerning the first meaning of the verb “to use.” The second meaning of this verb is equally important for morality. For man, since he possesses reason, can in his action not only clearly distinguish pleasure or pain, but also in a sense

separate them and treat them as a distinct end of action. Then his acts are formed with regard to pleasure alone, which he wants to acquire, or exclusively with regard to pain, which he wants to avoid. Since acts related to the person of the other sex will be formed exclusively or even first and foremost because of that, then that person will become in a particular way only a means to an end—hence, as we can see, the second meaning of the verb “to use” constitutes a particular case of the first meaning. This case, however, is very frequent and can easily occur in the conduct of the man-person. Yet, it does not occur in the sexual life of animals, which takes place exclusively on the level of nature and instinct and therefore tends solely toward the end which the sexual drive serves, that is, toward procreation, the preservation of species. On this level, sexual pleasure—purely animal, of course—cannot constitute a separate end. It is different with man. Here, it is clear how personhood and rationality generate morality. This morality is in this case subjectively and objectively personalistic—objectively, because what is at stake is the proper relation to the person in the context of sexual pleasure.

The person (of the different sex) may not be for another person merely a means to an end, which is constituted by this sexual pleasure or even delight. A conviction that man is a person leads to accepting the postulate that using should be subordinated to loving. “To use,” not only in the first meaning, the broader and objective one, but also in the second meaning, the rather narrower and subjective one—for by its nature the experience (*przeżywanie*) of pleasure is something subjective—may be interiorly ordered and elevated to the level of the persons only by love. Only “loving” excludes “using,” also in that second meaning. Therefore, if ethics intends to fulfill its proper task in the area of sexual morality, it must—in the whole abundance and variety of actions, and perhaps also of human lived-experiences linked to this area—accurately distinguish “loving” a person from what is but “using” him, even when it keeps the appearance of love and uses love’s name as its own. Consequently, in order to investigate this issue even more thoroughly on the basis of ethics as a scientific system (which after all finds its confirmation in morality that corresponds to it), a critique of so-called utilitarianism is needed.

Critique of utilitarianism*

From the background of the previous reflections a critique of utilitarianism emerges—utilitarianism as a certain theoretical notion in ethics as well as a practical program of conduct. In this book we will often return to this critique, for utilitarianism is a characteristic property of contemporary man’s mentality and his attitude toward life. In any case, it

is difficult to attribute this mentality and attitude only to modern man—for utilitarianism constitutes a perennial bedrock, as it were, on which the life of individuals and human collectives tends to flow. Nonetheless, utilitarianism in the modern age is conscious, formulated in respect to its philosophical presuppositions, and specified with scientific precision.

The name itself relates to the Latin verb *uti* (to use, to take advantage) and the adjective *utilis* (useful). In accord with this etymology, utilitarianism emphasizes usefulness in the whole action of man. The useful is what brings pleasure and excludes pain, for pleasure constitutes the essential manifestation of man's happiness. To be happy according to the assumptions of utilitarianism means nothing else but to live pleasantly. It is well known that pleasure itself assumes various shapes and shades. However, there is no need to pay too much attention to that in order to affirm certain pleasures as spiritual or higher while depreciating others, such as sensual, bodily, or material ones. The utilitarian values pleasure as such, for his vision of a man does not discover in that man a distinct composition of matter and spirit as two factors constituting one personal being, which owes its whole specificity precisely to the spiritual soul. For the utilitarian, man is a subject endowed with sensibility and the ability to think. Sensibility makes him desire pleasure and compels him to shun pain. Furthermore, the ability to think, i.e., reason, is given to man for the purpose of directing his action in such a way so as to secure for himself the maximum possible pleasure with the minimum possible pain. The utilitarian considers the principle of maximizing pleasure while at the same time minimizing pain as the chief norm of human morality, adding that it should be applied not only individually, egoistically, but also collectively, socially. In its final formulation, the *principle of utility* (*principium utilitatis*) proclaims the maximum of pleasure for the greatest possible number of people with, of course, the simultaneous minimum of pain for that number.

At first sight this principle seems both right and attractive, for it is difficult to imagine that people could act otherwise, that is, that they could want to find more pain than pleasure both in their individual and collective lives. However, a somewhat more thorough analysis must reveal the weakness and superficiality of this way of thinking and of this principle of normalizing human acts.²⁴ The essential error lies in the recognition of pleasure alone as the only or the greatest good, to which everything else in the action of man and of human society should be subordinated. But pleasure in itself is not the only good; it is also not the proper end of man's action, as we will have the opportunity to affirm in the course of this work. Pleasure in its essence is something collateral, accidental, something that may occur when acting. Thus, undertaking to act for the sake of pleasure itself as the exclusive or highest end naturally

clashes with the proper structure of human acts. I can will or do something that is linked to pleasure, and I can not will or not do something that is linked to pain. I can even will this or not will that, do this or not do that, because of this pleasure or that pain. This is all true. But I may not treat this pleasure (contrasting it with pain) as the only norm of action, and even less so as a principle based upon which I declare and judge what is morally good and morally evil in my acts or the acts of another person. For it is known that sometimes what is truly good, what morality and conscience command me, is accompanied precisely by some pain and demands forgoing some pleasure. This pain, however, or the pleasure that I forgo in a given case, is not the final criterion for my rational conduct. Besides, it is not something that can be fully determinable in advance. Pleasure and pain are always linked to a concrete act, hence there is no way to determine them in advance or much less to plan or even, as the utilitarians would want, to calculate them. For pleasure is actually something rather elusive.

We could indicate many difficulties and misunderstandings that utilitarianism conceals both in theory and in practice. We will disregard all others in order to pay particular attention to only one, namely to what was also indicated by the resolute opponent of utilitarianism, Immanuel Kant. His name has already been mentioned above in connection with the moral imperative, in which Kant demands that when we act we should never treat a person as a means to an end, but always only as an end. This demand exposes one of the weakest points in utilitarianism: if pleasure is the only and indispensable good and end of man, if it alone constitutes the whole basis of moral norms in human conduct, then consequently everything in that conduct must be treated as a means to this good and end. So even the human person, both my own as well as any other, every one, must be presented in that role. If I accept the presuppositions of utilitarianism, I must look at myself as a subject that wants to have as many sensations and lived-experiences possessing a positive emotional-affective charge as possible, and at the same time as an object that may be used in order to evoke these sensations and lived-experiences. As a result, I also must look at any other person besides myself from the same point of view, that is, inasmuch as he is a means to attain maximum pleasure.

In this form, the utilitarian mentality and attitude must influence various spheres of human life and interaction, although in particular they seem to threaten the sexual sphere. The essential danger consists in this, that with utilitarian presuppositions it is not clear how interaction and relations between persons of different sex can be placed on the plane of true love, thus liberated by love both from using the person (in the second and in the first meaning of the verb "to use") and from treating the person as a means to an end. Utilitarianism seems to be a program of consistent

egoism without any possibility of turning into authentic altruism. For although in the declarations of the representatives of this system we meet with the principle of maximum pleasure (“happiness”) for the greatest possible number of people, this principle nonetheless contains a deep interior contradiction. For pleasure by its very essence is a good that is merely temporary, belonging solely to a given subject—it is not a supra-subjective or transsubjective good. So as long as this good is considered to be the complete basis of the moral norm, there can be no way of transcending what is *good only for me*.

We can supplement this only with some fiction, an appearance of altruism. For if, presuming that pleasure is the only good, I strive for maximum pleasure also for the other—and not only for myself, which would then be plain egoism—then I assess this pleasure of the other person through my own pleasure; it brings me pleasure that somebody else feels pleasure. If, however, it brings me no more pleasure or if it does not follow from my “balance of happiness” (the term that the utilitarians very often use), then this pleasure of the other person ceases to be for me something binding, something good, and may even become something evil. Then, according to the presuppositions of utilitarianism, I will strive to eliminate the other person’s pleasure because no pleasure of mine is linked to it, or at least I will be indifferent toward the pleasure of another and will not seek it. It is quite clearly visible that with the presuppositions of utilitarianism, the subjective attitude regarding the understanding of good (good as pleasure) leads on a straight path to egoism, even if this may be not deliberate. The only way out of this inevitable egoism is to recognize besides a purely subjective good, i.e., besides pleasure, an *objective good*, which can also unite persons—and then it acquires the characteristics of a common good. This objective common good is the foundation of love, and the persons choosing this common good together at the same time subordinate themselves to it. Thanks to this, they bind one another with the true, objective bond of love, the bond that enables them to liberate themselves from subjectivism and from egoism inherently concealed in it.* 25 Love is a union of persons.

Consistent utilitarianism can (and has to) counter this objection only with some harmonization of egoisms, which is furthermore questionable since, as we have seen, there is no way out of egoism once utilitarian presuppositions are accepted. Can various egoisms be harmonized? For example, can the egoism of a woman and that of a man be harmonized in the sexual sphere? Certainly, this can be done according to the principle of “maximum pleasure for each of the two persons,” but nevertheless the realization of this principle will never lead us out of egoisms. In this harmonization, egoisms will still remain egoisms, with the only difference that these two egoisms, the feminine and masculine, will be for each other

mutually useful and mutually advantageous. Once the mutual usefulness and advantage cease, nothing remains from this whole harmony. Love is then nothing in the persons and nothing between them; it is not an objective reality, for the objective good, which constitutes love, is missing. According to such understanding, “love” is a coming together of egoisms that are arranged in such a way so as not to appear to each other as something painful, as something contrary to two-sided pleasure. Hence, by virtue of this understanding, love is an appearance that must be painstakingly maintained in order not to reveal what it truly conceals: egoism—and an egoism that is most rapacious, using another person for one’s own sake, for one’s “maximum pleasure.” Then, the person is and remains merely a means to an end, as Kant rightly observed in his critique of utilitarianism.

Thus, in place of love—love that as a reality present in various persons, for instance, in a concrete man X and in a concrete woman Y,²⁶ allows them to go beyond the attitude of two-sided and reciprocal use of themselves as means to a subjective end—utilitarianism introduces in their mutual relation the following paradoxical relationship: each person, Y as well as X, fundamentally disposes himself toward securing his own egoism while at the same time agreeing to serve the egoism of the other person, because this gives him a chance to gratify his own egoism, but of course only inasmuch as this chance is given. This paradoxical relationship between Y and X, which is not only a possible relationship, but which must occur in reality when the utilitarian mentality and attitude are realized, demonstrates that indeed the person here, and not only one’s own person, is reduced to the role of a means, a tool. This implicates some logically indispensable and penetrating necessity: I must treat myself as a means and a tool since for my own sake I treat the other in this way. This is the reverse, as it were, of the commandment to love.

The commandment to love and the personalistic norm

The commandment formulated in the Gospel demands from man love for other people, for neighbors (*bližni*); in its full reading, however, it demands love for persons. For God, whom the commandment to love names in the first place, is the most perfect personal Being. The whole world of created persons draws its distinctness and natural superiority in relation to the world of things (non-persons) from its more particular likeness to God. The commandment formulated in the Gospel, while demanding love in relation to persons, remains indirectly in opposition to the principle of utilitarianism, for this principle—as was demonstrated in

the previous analysis—is incapable of ensuring love in the relation between human beings, between persons. The opposition between the evangelical commandment and the principle of utilitarianism is indirect inasmuch as the commandment to love does not formulate the very principle on which realizing this love in the relations between persons is possible. Christ's commandment, however, lies in a sense on a different level than the principle of utilitarianism; it is a norm of a different degree. It does not directly concern the same thing: the commandment speaks of love for persons, whereas the principle of utilitarianism indicates pleasure as the basis not only of action, but also of normalizing human actions. Yet, we have stated in the critique of utilitarianism that starting from this basis of normalizing, which that system adopts, we will never be able to arrive at love. For the very principle of "using," that is, of treating the person as a means to an end, and even to the end that is pleasure—the maximization of pleasure—will always stand in the way of love.

Thus, the opposition between the principle of utilitarianism and the commandment to love results from the fact that on the basis of this principle, the commandment to love simply loses its meaning. Of course, certain axiology is linked to the principle of utilitarianism; according to this axiology, pleasure is the only or the highest value. However, at this point we do not even have to analyze this further. For it becomes clear that if the commandment to love, and love that is the object of this commandment, are to possess meaning, then we must base them on a different principle from the principle of utilitarianism, on another axiology, and on another fundamental norm. In the given case it will be the personalistic principle and norm. As a principle formulated negatively, this norm states that the person is a kind of good that is incompatible with using, which may not be treated as an object of use and, in this sense, as a means to an end. Hand in hand with this goes the positive formulation of the personalistic norm: the person is a kind of good to which only love constitutes the proper and fully-mature relation. And this positive content of the personalistic norm is precisely what the commandment to love brings out.

Can we say in that case that the commandment to love is the personalistic norm? Strictly speaking, the commandment to love is only based on the personalistic norm as a principle containing the negative and positive content, thus—in the strict sense of the word—it is not the personalistic norm. It is only derived from this norm as from a principle (a fundamental norm) that constitutes the proper ground for the commandment to love, whereas the principle of utilitarianism does not constitute this ground. It is necessary to seek this ground of the commandment to love in a different axiology, in a different system of values than the system of utilitarianism—it must be precisely the

personalistic axiology, within which the value of the person is always higher than the value of pleasure (and therefore the person cannot be subordinated to pleasure; he cannot serve as a means to the end which is pleasure). So, although strictly speaking the commandment to love is not identified with the personalistic norm, but only presupposes it and the personalistic axiology together with it, speaking more broadly, however, it is permissible to say that the commandment to love is the personalistic norm. Strictly speaking, the commandment declares: "Love persons," whereas the personalistic norm as a principle says: "The person is a kind of being such that only love constitutes the proper and fully-mature relation to it." It is evident then that the personalistic norm is a substantiation for the commandment of the Gospel. So, when we take the commandment together with this substantiation, we can say that the commandment is the personalistic norm.

This norm as a commandment defines and commends a certain way of relating toward God and people, that is, a certain attitude toward them. This way of relating, this attitude, is in conformity with what the person is, with the value he represents, and therefore it is honorable. Honorableness (*godziwość*) is superior to utility alone (which is the focus of the principle of utilitarianism) even though it does not cancel utility, but only subordinates it: everything that is honorably useful in relation to the person is contained within the scope of the commandment to love.²⁷

By defining and commending a certain way of relating to beings that are persons, a certain attitude toward them, the personalistic norm, as the commandment to love, presupposes not only the honorableness of such a relation, of such an attitude, but also its justice. For it is always just to render what is rightly due to somebody. It is rightly due to the person to be treated as an object of love, and not as an object of use. In a certain sense it could be said that love is a requirement of justice, just as the use of a person as a means would be contrary to this justice. Essentially, the order of justice is more fundamental than the order of love—and in a certain measure even contains it—inasmuch as love can be a requirement of justice. For certainly to love man or God, to love a person, is something just. At the same time, however, love—if its very essence is taken into account—is something above and beyond justice; simply, the essence of love differs from the essence of justice. Justice pertains to things (material goods or also moral goods, e.g., a good name) for the sake of persons, so it pertains to persons rather indirectly, whereas love pertains to persons immediately and directly. The affirmation of the value of the person as such is contained in the essence of love. And if we may rightly say that the one who loves a person is thereby just toward him, it will not be true at all to state that loving a person consists in being only just toward him. In the course of the book we will attempt to analyze separately and more

broadly what constitutes the love of the person. So far, we have explicated one thing, namely that the love of the person must consist in affirming his supra-material and supra-consumer (supra-utilitarian) value. Whoever loves will attempt to show this in his entire conduct. And there is no doubt that this way he will also be just toward the person as such.*

This aspect of the problem, this encounter of love with justice on the basis of the personalistic norm, is very important for the whole of our reflections, which have sexual morality for their object. Precisely here, the basic task is to develop the concept of love that is just to the person, that is, of love that is always ready to give every man what is rightly due to him on account of his being a person. For what is at times considered "love" in the sexual context can quite easily even be unjust for the person. This happens not because sensuality and affectivity take a particular part in the formation of this love between persons of different sex (which we will analyze separately), but rather because, partly unknowingly and partly even consciously, an interpretation based on the utilitarian principle is permitted for love in its sexual context.

This interpretation, in a sense, forces itself into this love by taking advantage of the natural gravitation toward pleasure of the sensual-affective factors contained in this love. There is an easy transition from experiencing (*przeżywanie*) pleasure to not only seeking this pleasure or even seeking it for its own sake, but also considering it as the superior value and the proper basis of a norm. This constitutes the very essence of the distortions that occur in love between a woman and a man.

Thus, because the sexual sphere happens to be so easily associated with the concept of "love," while at the same time being the field of constant attrition between two fundamentally different ways of valuating and two fundamentally different ways of normalizing, namely the personalistic and the utilitarian, it is then necessary in order to clarify the whole issue to state explicitly that this love, which is the content of the commandment in the Gospel, is connected only with the personalistic norm, and not with the utilitarian one.²⁸ Therefore, we must seek the proper solutions for sexual morality within the scope of the personalistic norm if these solutions are to be Christian. They must be based on the commandment to love. However, although man completely realizes the commandment to love in its full evangelical sense through supernatural love of God and neighbors, this love nonetheless does not conflict with the personalistic norm and is not realized in isolation from it.

Perhaps, at the end of these reflections, it is worth recalling the distinction St. Augustine made between *uti* and *frui*, by which he distinguished two attitudes.²⁹ The one that tends to pleasure alone, disregarding the object, is exactly *uti*. The other, which finds joy in the fully-mature relation to the object because this relation is precisely what

CHAPTER II

The Person and Love

Part One

Metaphysical Analysis of Love

The word “love”

The word “love” is not univocal. In this book we consciously narrow down the scope of this word’s meaning, for we mean love between two persons who differ with respect to sex.¹ It is known, however, that even with this narrowing down the word “love” still possesses various meanings, so we cannot think of using it univocally. A detailed analysis is needed in order to reveal at least in a certain measure the whole wealth of the reality often signified by the word “love.” This reality is complex and multifaceted. For the starting point we shall accept that love is always some reciprocal relation of persons. In turn, this is based on a certain relation to the good. Each person remains in such a relation, and both of them also remain in it. This is the starting point for the first part of our analysis of love, the metaphysical analysis. The analysis also concerns the general characteristic of love between a woman and a man. In order to conduct it, we must distinguish the fundamental elements that are contained in love, both the content-related elements linked with the relation to the good, and the structural elements linked with the reciprocal relation of persons. These elements are included in every kind of love. Thus, for instance, every love contains fondness or benevolence. Love between a woman and a man is one concretization of love in general, in which these common elements of love are contained in a specific way. Therefore, this analysis is called metaphysical—the word “love” clearly possesses an analogical sense.

In turn, the metaphysical analysis will open a path to the psychological analysis. Love of a woman and a man is formed deeply in the psyche of both persons and is linked to the specific sexual vitality of

man. Hence, in fact, there is a need for a psycho-physiological or bio-psychological analysis. The bio-physiological moments will be discussed in the last chapter ("Sexology and Ethics"). Human love, the love of persons, is neither reduced to nor identified with them. If this were the case, it would not be love, unless perhaps in the broadest meaning when we speak, for instance, of *amor naturalis* or of cosmic love, perceiving the latter in all the final tendencies occurring in nature (*przyroda*).

The love of a man and a woman is a reciprocal relation of persons and possesses a personal character. This is linked most closely to its profound ethical meaning, and in this ethical meaning it constitutes the content of the greatest commandment of the Gospel. Our analysis must finally turn to precisely this meaning. Its object will then be love as virtue, and the greatest virtue at that, which in a sense encompasses all the other virtues and elevates them all to its own level, while impressing on them its own profile.

This threefold analysis of what unites a woman and a man is indispensable in order to explicate gradually the precise meaning that interests us from the multitude of meanings associated with the word "love."

Love as fondness²

The first element in the general analysis of love is the element of fondness (*upodobanie*).³ As has been said, love signifies a reciprocal relation of two people, of both a woman and a man, based on some relation to the good. This relation to the good begins precisely with fondness. To be fond of something (*podobać się*) means more or less to present this something as a certain good. A woman can easily enter a man's field of vision as a specific good, and he, also as a good, can enter her field of vision. This two-sided ease of fondness toward each other is a fruit of the sexual drive understood as a property and a force of human nature, but a force working in persons and demanding to be placed on the level of persons. Fondness toward a person of the other sex places this force of nature, i.e., the drive, on the level of the person's life.

Fondness is most closely linked to cognition (*poznanie*), and with intellectual cognition at that, even though the object of cognition—a woman or a man—is concrete and as such falls under the senses. Fondness is based on impression, but impression alone does not yet constitute it. For in fondness we already discover a certain cognitive commitment of the subject toward the object, a woman toward a man and vice versa. Knowledge itself, even the most thorough knowledge, and mere thinking about a given person are not yet fondness, which is often formed

independently from thorough knowledge of the person and without prolonged thinking about him. Fondness does not possess a purely cognitive structure. It must be admitted that not only meta-intellectual but also meta-cognitive factors, namely affections and the will, take part in this cognitive commitment that has a character of fondness.

Fondness is not only thinking about some person as a good; fondness means a commitment of thinking about this person as a certain good, and this commitment can be brought forth ultimately only by the will. So, some element of "I want" is already contained in this "fondness" although this element is still very indirect, and as a result of this, fondness has first of all a cognitive character. This is, so to speak, cognition committing the will, and it commits because it is committed by the will. It is difficult to explain fondness without granting a reciprocal penetration of reason and will. The sphere of affections, which plays a great role in fondness, will be an object of a somewhat more insightful analysis in the next part of this chapter. However, already it is proper to say that affections are present at the birth of love precisely through the fact that they help to shape a man's fondness toward a woman and hers in relation to him. The whole affective sphere of man is not by nature disposed toward cognition but rather toward passion (*doznawanie*).⁴ The natural attitude of this sphere is expressed in an emotional-affective reaction to a good. Such a reaction must possess a great significance for fondness, in which a person, for instance Y, stands in the field of vision of another person, X, precisely as a good.

Affectivity is an ability to react to a good of a certain quality, an ability to be moved in an encounter with it (in the psychological analysis we will assume more detailed meanings of affectivity when contrasting it with sensuality). This quality of a good that a concrete man or a concrete woman is particularly capable of reacting to depends in a certain measure on various innate and inherited factors, as well as on various factors acquired both as a result of various influences and also by the conscious effort of a given person, by his work on himself. And this is precisely whence the tint of the content of affective life originates, the life that comes to light in individual emotional-affective reactions and possesses a great significance for fondness. To a large extent this life conditions the direction that fondness will follow, which person it will turn to, and what in this person it will focus on above all.⁵

For every human person is a good that is complex beyond words and in a sense not unvarying. Both a man and a woman are by nature bodily-spiritual beings. They are also goods of such a kind. As such this good stands in the field of vision of another person and becomes an object of fondness. So, if we consider fondness, so to speak, on the film of the consciousness of the subject who is fond of another person, then without

violating and without upsetting the fundamental uniformity of this fondness, we must discover in it the lived-experiences of various values. All these values experienced (*przeżywać*) by the person who feels fondness toward another person originate from the latter person. The subject of fondness, Y, finds them in X. Precisely because of this, X stands in the field of vision of Y as a good that has awakened fondness.

Nevertheless, fondness does not equal only a certain sum of lived-experiences born in the contact of person X with person Y. All these lived-experiences appear with fondness in the consciousness of the person who is its subject. Fondness, however, is something more than this state of consciousness experiencing (*przeżywać*) these or those values. It has for its object a person and also proceeds from the whole person. This relation to the person is nothing else but love, although still in its bud. Fondness belongs to the essence of love and, in a sense, it is already love, even though love is not just fondness. This in particular was expressed by medieval thinkers who spoke of *amor complacentiae*. Fondness is not only one of the elements of love, in a sense its part, but also it is one of the essential aspects of love as a whole. Applying the principle of analogy, we can already speak of fondness itself as love. Hence *amor complacentiae*. The lived-experience of various values, which at that point can be in a sense read in the consciousness, is symptomatic of fondness, inasmuch as the lived-experience places on it one chief accent, so to speak, or even many of them. Therefore, in Y's fondness toward the person X, this or that value, which Y finds in X and to which he reacts particularly strongly, is manifested most powerfully.

However, the value to which Y reacts (clearly, one could similarly speak about the fondness of X toward Y) depends not only on the fact that it resides in X, that X possesses it, but also on the fact that Y is particularly sensitive to it, particularly inclined to perceive and experience (*przeżyć*) this value. This has much significance especially for love between a woman and a man. Although the object of fondness in such love is always the person, nevertheless there is no doubt that someone can be fond of a person in various ways. When, for instance, a concrete Y [he] is capable of reacting only or simply first and foremost to sensory-sexual values, then all his fondness toward X [her], and indirectly all his love for her, will be formed differently than when Y is more capable of a lively reaction to the spiritual or moral values of the other person, for example, to her intelligence or virtues of character.⁶

The emotional-affective reaction plays a considerable part in fondness and impresses its own mark on it. By themselves affections do not have cognitive power, although they have the power of disposing and orienting cognitive acts, and this in fact is most clearly manifested in fondness. But this in particular creates a certain interior difficulty with regard to the

personal-sexual sphere.

This difficulty exists in the relation of lived-experience to truth. For affections appear in a spontaneous way—hence fondness toward some person arises at times suddenly and unexpectedly—but properly speaking this reaction is “blind.” The natural activity of affections does not tend to grasp the truth about the object. Truth is in man a function and a task of reason. And although some thinkers (such as Pascal and Scheler) have strongly emphasized the distinctive logic of affections (*logique du coeur*), nonetheless emotional-affective reactions can help as much as hinder fondness of the true good.⁷ And this is an extremely important issue for the value of every fondness. It is because the value of fondness lies in the fact that the good to which it turns is truly the good that is sought. So, in fondness between Y and X, the truth about the value of the person of whom the other person is fond is something fundamental and decisive. And precisely here the emotional-affective reactions at times contribute to distorting or falsifying fondness, when through them one perceives values in a given person that in truth do not exist there. This can be very dangerous for love. For when the affective reaction passes away—and fluctuation belongs to its nature—then the subject who based his entire relation to a given person on this reaction, and not on the truth about the person, is left in a vacuum, so to speak, being deprived of the good that he thought he had found. And sometimes an affective reaction of the opposite coloring is born out of this vacuum and the sense of disappointment linked to it: a purely affective love often turns into an affective hate toward the same person.

Therefore, precisely already in fondness—and even mostly in it—the moment of truth about the person toward whom this fondness turns is of such great importance. One must then take into account the tendency born from the whole dynamic of affective life, the tendency that inclines to diverting this moment of truth from the object of fondness, from the person, and turning it precisely toward the subject, that is, strictly speaking, toward the affections alone. Then one does not consider whether the person truly possesses the values that are perceived in him with fondness, but above all whether the affection born for the other is a true affection. Here there is at least one of the sources of subjectivism so common in love (we will return to this in due time).

In people’s opinion love is first of all reduced to the truth of affections. Although there is no way to deny this completely, for it follows at least from the analysis of fondness alone, nevertheless due to the value of both fondness and love as a whole, one must demand that the truth about the person, who is the object of fondness, plays at least no lesser role in that fondness than the very truth of affections. The proper culture of fondness, one of the elements of truly educated and truly good love,

consists in the appropriate unification of these truths.

Fondness is linked very closely with the lived-experience of values. The person of the other sex can provide many lived-experiences of varied value. All of them play some role in fondness as a whole, which, as has been said, finds its chief accent thanks to one of these values, thanks to a value experienced (*przeżyć*) most strongly. Since we now speak of truth in fondness (and indirectly of truth in love), an effort must be necessarily made so that fondness is never limited to partial values, to something that only inheres in the person without being the person himself. The point is simply to feel fondness toward the person, that is, while experiencing (*przeżywać*) various values that inhere in him, to experience (*przeżywać*) always together with them in the act of fondness the value of the person as such—that the person himself is a value, and not only that he deserves fondness because of the various values contained in him. At this point we cannot yet indicate why this moment is so important for fondness, as it will be manifested above all in the part devoted to the ethical analysis of love. In any case, fondness, which among various values contained in the person knows how to capture acutely above all the very value of the person, possesses the value of full truth; the good to which it turns is precisely the person and not something else. And the person as a being—thus also as a good—differs from everything else that is not a person.

“To be fond of something” (*podobać się*) means to present this something as a certain good, moreover, as a good that it is (this must be added in the name of truth, so important for the structure of fondness). The object of fondness, which stands as a good in the field of vision of the subject, presents itself to him at the same time as the beautiful. This is very important for fondness, upon which love between a woman and a man is based. It is known that a separate and extensive issue exists: the problem of feminine and masculine beauty. The lived-experience of beauty goes hand in hand with the lived-experience of value, as if each of them contained an “additional” aesthetic value. “Charm,” “glamour,” “enchantment”—these and similar words serve to describe this important moment of the love of persons. Man is beautiful, and as beautiful he can “reveal” himself to another person. A woman is beautiful in her own way, and through her beauty she can stand in a man’s field of vision. A man is beautiful in his own way, and through his beauty he can stand in a woman’s field of vision. The beautiful finds its place precisely in fondness.

There is no time here to engage in an analysis of all of man’s beauty. It is proper, however, to recall that man is a person, a being whose nature is determined by “interiority.” Thus, besides exterior beauty one must also know to discover the interior beauty of man and be fond of each other in it, or perhaps even know how to be fond of each other first and foremost in it. This truth is in some particular way important for love between a

man and a woman, since this love is, and in any case should be, the love of persons. Fondness, upon which this love is based, cannot be born merely from visible and sensual beauty, but should completely and thoroughly take into account the beauty of the person.

Love as desire

Based on the same principle previously used to define fondness, we can in turn speak of desire as one of the aspects of love. Again, it translates the Latin phrase *amor concupiscentiae*, which indicates not so much that desire constitutes one of the elements of love, but that love is also contained in desire. It belongs to the essence of love, as fondness does, and sometimes is manifested in love most strongly. Thus, the medieval thinkers who spoke about love of desire (*amor concupiscentiae*), as they similarly spoke about love of fondness (*amor complacentiae*), were completely right. Desire also belongs to the very essence of this love that is established between a woman and a man. This proceeds from the fact that the human person is a limited being, and not self-sufficient, and therefore—speaking most objectively—he needs other beings. Acknowledging the limitations and insufficiency of the human being serves as a point of departure for understanding the relation of this being to God. Man needs God, just as any other creature does, simply in order to live.

At this point, however, something else is at stake. Man, the human person, is a woman or a man. Sex is also a certain limitation, a certain one-sidedness. Thus, a man needs a woman as if to complement (*uzupełnić*) his being, and in a similar way she needs a man.⁸ This objective, ontic need is manifested through the sexual drive.⁹ The love of the person X toward the person Y grows on the substratum of this drive. This love is love of desire, for it proceeds from a need and aims at finding the missing good. This good is a woman for a man, and a man for a woman. Thus, objectively speaking, their love is love of desire. However, a deep difference occurs between love of desire (*amor concupiscentiae*) and desire itself (*concupiscentia*), especially sensual desire. Desire presupposes a sensual feeling of some lack, and this unpleasant feeling could be removed by means of a certain good. In this way, for instance, a man can desire a woman. A person then becomes a means to satisfy desire, just as food is used to satisfy hunger (this comparison is quite deficient). Nevertheless, what is hidden in the word “desire” suggests a relation of utility, and in the given case the object of this relation would be a person of the other sex. This is precisely what Christ spoke about: “Whoever looks at a woman in order to desire her has already committed adultery with

her in his heart" (Mt 5:28). This sentence explains much concerning the essence of love and sexual morality. This problem will be outlined more fully in the analysis of sensuality.

So, love of desire is not reduced to desires alone. What is crystallized in this love is merely an objective need of a being directed to another being, which is a good and an object of pursuit for the former. However, in the consciousness of the person who is the subject of this pursuit, love of desire is not manifested in the least as desire alone. This love is manifested only as *longing for the good for oneself*: "I want you, because you are a good for me." The object of love of desire is a good for the subject: a woman for a man, a man for a woman. Therefore, love is experienced (*przeżywać*) as a longing for a person and not as desire alone, *concupiscentia*. Desire goes hand in hand with this longing, though it rather remains, so to speak, in its shadow. The loving subject is conscious of its presence and knows that it is in a sense at his disposal, but if he works on his love for the other person, he does not allow desire alone to prevail; he prevents it from overpowering all that is above it and belongs to his love. For even if he does not understand, he nonetheless feels that this predominance of desire would in a certain way deform love and deprive them both of it.

Although love of desire is not identified with sensual desires alone, it nonetheless constitutes that aspect of love in which—especially concerning the man-woman relation—attitudes close to utilitarian ones can settle in most easily. For, as has been stated, love of desire presupposes a real need, thanks to which (to use the words just employed) "you are a good *for me*." The good that serves to satisfy a need is in some way beneficial or even useful. But to be useful or even beneficial is different from being an object of use. Thus, one can simply state that through its aspect manifested in love of desire, love closely approaches the field of utility, permeating it nonetheless with its own essence. Therefore, true love of desire never turns into a utilitarian attitude, for it always (even in desire) originates from the personalistic principle. Let us add that *amor concupiscentiae* comes to light also in love of God, for whom man can long and does long as the good for himself. This is also the case in love between persons Y and X—if we apply a remote though eloquent analogy. The problem of their relations precisely in this area requires a particular precision so as not to see in sensual desires alone the full equivalent of love of desire and, on the other hand, not to think that the essence of love—the love of which a human person is capable in relation to another human person (all the more in relation to God)—is exhausted completely in love of desire.

Love as benevolence

At this point, it is proper to emphasize that love is the fullest realization of the possibilities that dwell in man. Potentiality (from Latin *potentia*: possibility, potency, power) that is proper to the person is actualized most fully through love (the word “actualize” comes from Latin *actus*: act, perfection). The person finds in love the greatest fullness of his being, of his objective existence. Love is such action, such an act, which most fully develops the existence of the person.¹⁰ Of course, this has to be true love. What does true love mean? It means a love in which the true essence of love is realized, the love that turns to the true (and not merely apparent) good in a true way, that is, the way that corresponds to the nature of the good. This ought to be also applied to love between a man and a woman. In this field also, true love perfects the being of the person and develops his existence. False love, on the other hand, causes quite contrary effects. False love is a love that either turns to an apparent good or—as usually happens—turns to some true good, but in a way that does not correspond to the nature of the good, in a way contrary to it. At times this happens to be the love between a man and a woman either in its assumptions or—even despite (apparently) good assumptions—in its particular manifestations, in its realization. False love is, in fact, evil love.

Also, the love of a woman and a man would be evil, or in any case incomplete, if it did not transcend desire. However, love of desire alone does not exhaust fully the essence of love between persons. It is not enough only to desire the person as a good for oneself, but in addition—and above all—it is also necessary to desire his good. This utterly altruistic turning of the will and affections is called in the language of St. Thomas *amor benevolentiae*, or *benevolentia* for short, which corresponds in our language, not quite accurately, by the way, to the concept of benevolence (*życzliwość*).¹¹ Love of one person for another must be benevolent, otherwise it will not be true. Moreover, it will not be love at all, but it will be only egoism. In the nature of love not only is there no contradiction between desire and benevolence, but in fact a connection exists between them. Let us say that Y [he] wants X [her] as a good for himself. In that case, however, he must want X to be a good, since without this she cannot be a good for him. In this way a connection between desire and benevolence is manifested.

However, benevolence alone does not consist in the following configuration of wants: Y [he] wants X [her] to be a good as complete as possible in order to be a good all the more for him. Benevolence separates itself from any self-interest, whose elements still prominently inhere in love of desire. Benevolence is simply disinterestedness in love: “I do not long for you as a good,” but “I long for your good,” “I long for what is

good for you.” A benevolent person longs for this without any thought of himself, without any regard for himself. Therefore, benevolent love, *amor benevolentiae*, is love in a more absolute sense than love of desire. It is love that is most pure. Through benevolence we come as close as possible to what constitutes the “pure essence” of love. Such love perfects its object the most; it develops most fully both his existence and the existence of the person to whom it turns.

A man’s love for a woman and hers for him cannot but be love of desire, although it should move in the direction of becoming more and more complete benevolence, *benevolentia*. It should tend to this in every state and in every manifestation of their coexistence and interaction. However, it should tend to this particularly in marriage, since that is where not only love of desire is somehow manifested most distinctly, but also desire alone comes most distinctly to light. A specific richness of conjugal love, but also a specific difficulty, lies in this. There is no need to conceal or hide it. For true love of benevolence can go hand in hand with love of desire, and even with desire alone, as long as the latter does not overpower all else that is contained in the love of a man and a woman, or does not become its exclusive content and sense.

The problem of reciprocity

Now we must turn to the problem of reciprocity (*wzajemność*), which demands looking at the love of a man and a woman not so much as a love of X for Y and Y for X, but rather as something that exists *between* them. Reciprocity is closely linked with love “between” a man and a woman. It is worthwhile to pay attention to this preposition.¹² It suggests that love is not only something in a woman and something in a man—for in that case there would be two loves, properly speaking—but also it is something joined and one. Numerically and psychologically speaking, there are two loves, but these two distinct psychological facts join and create one objective whole—one being, as it were, in which two persons are involved.

The relation of “I” to “we” is connected with this. Every person is a unique and unrepeatable “I.” This “I” possesses its interiority thanks to which it is, so to speak, a little world, which depends on God for its existence, while at the same time being self-reliant within the proper limits.¹³ The path from one to another “I” leads, then, through free will, through its commitment. This path, however, can lead only in one direction, for example, from X to Y. Then, love for a person is one-sided. Even though it does possess its distinct and authentic psychological profile, it nevertheless does not possess the objective fullness that

reciprocity imparts to it. In that case it is called unrequited love, and it is well known that unrequited love is linked with pain and suffering. Such love may sometimes remain very long in its subject, in the person who experiences (*przeżywać*) it, but this happens in virtue of interior obstinacy, as it were, which rather deforms love and deprives it of its proper character. Unrequited love is condemned first to vegetation in its subject and then to a gradual agony. Sometimes even by its agony it also causes the very ability to love to die with it. However, it does not always come to this extreme.

In any case it is quite evident that love by its nature is not something one-sided but something two-sided, something “between” persons, something social. Its full being is precisely inter-personal and not individual. It is closely linked with the force of joining and uniting, and by its nature opposes dividing and isolating. It is necessary for the fullness of love that the path from X to Y meets the path from Y to X. Two-sided love creates the most proximate basis for two “I’s” to become one “we.” Its natural dynamic dwells in that. In order for the “we” to exist, two-sided love itself is not enough because, after all, there are still two “I’s” in it, although they are already fully predisposed to become one “we.” Reciprocity is decisive precisely for this “we” to come into existence. Reciprocity reveals that love has matured, that it has become something “between” persons, that it created some community—in this its full nature is realized. Reciprocity belongs precisely to it.

This sheds new light on the whole problem. We have previously stated that fondness, longing (desire), and benevolence all belong to the nature of love. Love of desire and love of benevolence differ from each other, but not so much as to exclude each other: Y can long for X as a good for himself and at the same time long for a good for X, regardless of the fact that X is a good for him. This is understood in a new way in light of the truth about reciprocity. Namely, when Y [he] longs for love from X [her] as a response to his love, then he longs for the other person above all as a co-creator of love and not as an object of desire. The “self-interest” of love would then lie only in the fact that it seeks a response, and this response is reciprocal love. However, because reciprocity belongs to the nature of love, determines its inter-personal profile, it is difficult to speak of “self-interest.” The longing for reciprocity does not exclude the disinterested character of love. Indeed, reciprocal love can be thoroughly disinterested; nonetheless, what constitutes the content of love of desire between a woman and a man finds full satisfaction in it. Reciprocity, however, brings a synthesis, as it were, of love of desire and of benevolent love. Love of desire manifests itself especially when one of the persons begins to be jealous “about the other,” when he fears the other’s infidelity.

This is a separate problem, so important in the entire love between a

woman and a man, so important in marriage. It is worthwhile to recall here what Aristotle said on the topic of reciprocity in his treatise on friendship (books VIII and IX of *Nicomachean Ethics*). According to Aristotle, reciprocity can vary, and this is determined by the character of the good upon which reciprocity, along with the entire friendship, is based. If this good is true (the honorable good), reciprocity is something profound, mature, and in a sense immovable. When, on the other hand, only advantage, utility (the useful good), or pleasure determines reciprocity, then it is something shallow and unstable. Indeed, although reciprocity is essentially always something "between" persons, it principally depends on what both persons contribute to it. Hence arises the fact that each of the persons, both X and Y, treats reciprocity in love not as something supra-personal, but as something utterly personal.

So, in reference to Aristotle's thought, if both persons contribute to reciprocal love their personal love, but a love of full ethical value, love-virtue, then reciprocity itself acquires characteristics of thorough stability, of certainty. This explains trust in the other person, a trust that liberates from suspicion and from jealousy—a trust that determines that love is the true good of two people. The fact that one can rely on the other person, that one can think of the other as a friend who will not fail, is for the one who loves a source of peace and of joy. Peace and joy are fruits of love very closely linked to its very essence.

However, if two persons contribute to reciprocal love only or above all desire that is inclined to use, to seek pleasure, then the very reciprocity does not possess the characteristics we are now discussing. One cannot have trust in the other human person once one knows or at least feels that that person is disposed only toward using and pleasure as the only end. Also, one cannot have this trust while being first of all disposed toward that oneself. At this place, the particular property of love by virtue of which love creates an inter-personal community "takes its revenge," as it were. It is enough for one of the persons to contribute a utilitarian attitude, and already the problem of "reciprocal love" generates much suspicion and jealousy. Suspicions and spells of jealousy in fact often proceed from man's weakness. However, people who even with all their weakness contribute true good will to their love are those who attempt to base reciprocity on "the honorable good"—on virtue, perhaps still imperfect but nonetheless real. Their life together gives them a constant opportunity to test their good will and complement it through virtue. Life together becomes, so to speak, a school of perfection.

It is a different matter when two people, or at least one of them, contribute merely a consumer attitude to "reciprocal love." A woman and a man can provide pleasure of a sexual nature to each other; they can be for each other a source of various advantages. However, pleasure and

sensual delight themselves are not goods that join and unite people in the long run, as Aristotle pointed out most accurately. If only pleasure or advantage determines their "reciprocal love," a woman and a man will be united to each other as long as they continue to be a source of this pleasure or advantage for each other, as long as they will provide it for each other. As soon as this ends, the proper reason for "love" will also cease, the illusion of reciprocity will vanish. For true reciprocity cannot exist if it is based only on desire or on a consumer attitude. For this attitude does not seek an expression proper to it in the shape of reciprocal love, but it seeks only satisfaction, satiation. It is basically only and exclusively egoism, whereas reciprocity must presuppose altruism in both persons. True reciprocity cannot arise from two egoisms, since only a momentary or at least periodic pretense of reciprocity can arise from them.

Hence, two conclusions follow, one with a rather theoretical and the other with a more practical meaning. The first conclusion: in light of reflections on reciprocity, it is evident how much we need to analyze love not only from the psychological but above all from the ethical angle. The second, practical conclusion: one must always "test" love thoroughly before it is declared to each other, and especially before one considers it one's vocation and starts building one's life on it. Specifically, it is necessary to test what is "in" each of the persons co-creating this love, and consequently also what is "between" them. It must be established what their reciprocity is based on, and whether it is not merely an appearance of reciprocity. For love can survive only as a unity in which the mature "we" is manifested; it will not survive as an arrangement of two egoisms in the framework of which two "I's" are manifested. Love has a structure of interpersonal community.*

From sympathy to friendship

Now we must take a look at the problem of human love in yet another aspect. Although this look is already strongly associated with the psychological analysis, we will still place it within this first part of the chapter, in which we deal with the general analysis of love. The word "sympathy" is of Greek origin and consists of the prefix *syn* (together with somebody) and the stem *pathein* (to suffer).¹⁴ Literally then, sympathy means as much as "co-passion."¹⁵ The meaning of the word indicates two moments that are contained in sympathy, namely the moment of a certain togetherness or community expressed by the prefix, and the moment of a certain passivity ("to suffer") expressed by the stem. Therefore, sympathy signifies above all what "happens" between people in the field of their

affections—that through which emotional-affective lived-experiences unite people. It must be nonetheless clearly emphasized that this “happens” to them, and not that this is their work, the fruit of acts of the will. Sympathy is a manifestation of passion rather than of action: people yield to it in a way that is sometimes incomprehensible to them, and the will is pulled into the orbit of emotions and affections, which bring two people closer to each other regardless of whether or not one of them chose the other consciously as an object of love. Sympathy is purely affective love, in which the decision of the will and the choice do not yet play a proper role. At best, the will consents to the fact of sympathy and to its direction.

Although etymologically it seems to refer to affective love “between” persons, nevertheless we often think and speak about sympathy (*sympatia*) as being “toward” some person. When some person is agreeable (*sympatyczny*) to me, then he is located in my field of awareness as an “object” that is accompanied by a positive affective overtone, and this overtone denotes at the same time a “plus” for that person. This “plus” is born together with sympathy, and it can also die together with it, for it depends precisely on the affective attitude toward the person who is the object of sympathy. Nonetheless this “plus” of the person that is based only on sympathy can turn gradually into a thorough conviction about the person’s value. Within the limits of sympathy itself, the lived-experience of the value of the object seems, however, something rather indirect: X experiences (*przeżywać*) the value of Y through the mediation of his sympathy, for thanks to the sympathy, Y acquires value for X. This implies a hint of subjectivism, which, together with the passivity advanced at the beginning, contributes to a certain weakness of sympathy. The weakness of sympathy lies in the fact that sympathy takes into possession man’s affection and his will, often independently from the objective value of the person to whom it turns. The value of affection replaces in some sense the value of the person (of the object of sympathy).

As it is evident, the weakness of sympathy proceeds from its inadequate objectivity. However, this goes hand in hand with a great subjective force of sympathy, which confers on human loves their subjective vividness. By itself the rational acknowledgment of the value of the other person, even if most genuine, does not yet constitute love (as it also does not constitute fondness, which we spoke of at the beginning of this chapter). Only sympathy has the power to bring people closer together in a way perceptible to them, in an experiential way. For love is experience (*doświadczenie*) and not deduction only. Sympathy places one person in the circle of the other as somebody close. Because of it, one can “feel,” so to speak, the other’s whole personhood, that one lives in the circle of the other, at the same time finding him at every step in one’s own. Precisely for this reason sympathy is for people an experiential and

perceptible manifestation of love (a manifestation between a woman and a man that is so important). Thanks to sympathy they feel their own reciprocal love, and without it they in a sense lose this love and remain in some vacuum, one they can perceive. Therefore, it seems to them that once sympathy breaks off, love ends as well.

Yet, sympathy is not in the least the whole of love, just as emotion and affection are not the whole interior life of the human person, but only one of its elements. A deeper and much more fundamental element is the will, which is a power called to form love in man and between people. This statement is important because the love between a woman and a man cannot remain on the level of sympathy alone, but it must become friendship. For in friendship—unlike in sympathy itself—the participation of the will is decisive. I want the good for you as much as I want it for myself, for my own “I.” One could grasp the content and structure of friendship with this paradigm. As is evident, it contains *benevolentia*, that is, benevolence (I want the good for you), as well as a characteristic “doubling” of the subject, a doubling of the “I”: my “I” and your “I” constitute a moral unity, for the will relates to both with equal favor. Thus, as a matter of fact, your “I” becomes in a sense mine; it lives in my “I” as my “I” does in itself. This explains the very word “friendship.” The doubling of “I” contained in it manifests moments of the personal union that friendship brings.

This union differs from the one achieved in sympathy. There it is based exclusively on emotion and affection, and the will only consents. In friendship, however, the will commits itself. And therefore friendship really takes possession of the whole man, it is his work, it contains in itself a clear choice of the person, of the second “I” to which it turns, while all this has not yet taken place within the limits of sympathy. The objective force of friendship consists precisely in that. Friendship, however, needs to be manifested in the subject; it needs a subjective accent, as it were. And sympathy provides this. In itself sympathy is not yet friendship, although it creates conditions so that friendship between two persons can come into existence, and, once existing, can possess its subjective vividness, its climate, and its affective warmth. For the very two-sided and reciprocal “I want the good for you,” even though it constitutes the core of friendship, remains nonetheless, so to speak, suspended in a vacuum once it is deprived of the affective warmth that sympathy provides. By no means can affection alone replace this “I want the good for you,” which nevertheless seems cold and incommunicative when isolated from affection.

From the point of view of education of love a clear postulate emerges here: sympathy must be *transformed* into friendship, and friendship *complemented* with sympathy. This postulate, as we see, develops in two

directions. Sympathy alone still lacks an act of benevolence, without which there can be no true love. So, although sympathy can already seem to be benevolence (indeed, even something more than benevolence), nonetheless this entails a certain measure of illusion. In analyzing fondness we have already paid attention to this subjectivistic feature of affection, namely to the fact that affection shows a tendency to “divert truth” from an object and to turn it as much as possible toward itself. This tendency also results in taking sympathy and affective love already for friendship, and even for something more than friendship. And therefore such facts as marriage, which objectively speaking can be based only on friendship, are often based only on sympathy. As has been stated, friendship consists in a mature commitment of the will in relation to the other person with regard to his good. Consequently, a problem exists regarding the maturation of sympathy into friendship, and under normal circumstances this process demands reflection and time. Specifically, the point is to complement the value of affection itself—as the relation to the person and to his value within the limits of sympathy alone is based above all on affection—with objective knowledge of that person’s value and with conviction about that value. For the will can actively commit itself only on this basis. Affections alone can commit the will, but only in a passive and rather superficial way, with a certain measure of subjectivism. Friendship, however, demands a genuine commitment of the will with as much objective justification as possible.

On the other hand, we encounter the problem of complementing friendship with sympathy, for without sympathy friendship would remain cold and incommunicative. This latter process is possible because sympathy is not only born in man in a spontaneous way and sustained in him in an irrational manner, but despite being born in this way tends to gravitate toward friendship; it has a tendency toward becoming friendship. This is a simple consequence of the structure of man’s personal interiority, in which only what possesses a full justification in conviction and in free will can acquire full value. Neither impression itself nor affection based exclusively on it will replace this justification. And therefore, the possibility or at least the modest beginning of friendship as a rule goes hand in hand with sympathy between persons (X-Y). However, sympathy often happens to be vivid from the beginning, whereas friendship is at first pale and weak. The next step is to form a reciprocal friendship while taking advantage of the affective situation that sympathy produces, thereby conferring a thorough and objective meaning on sympathy itself. A mistake often made in human love, especially concerning the love between X and Y, consists in not forming friendship consciously from it but leaving it, in a sense, on the level of sympathy. A consequence of this mistake is also a belief that once sympathy breaks off, love also ends. This belief is very dangerous for human love, and this

mistake is one of the fundamental gaps in the education of love.

Love can by no means consist in "using up" sympathy or finding an "outlet" in it (which often in relations between a man and a woman is accompanied by sexual "relief"). Love, however, consists in the thorough transformation of sympathy into friendship. For by its nature it is something creative and constructive, and not merely something to consume.¹⁶ Sympathy is always only some indication and not a definitely finished fact possessing the complete, specific weight of persons.¹⁷ Sympathy must only, so to speak, strive after man's substratum, strive after a solid ground in friendship, as, on the other hand, friendship must be complemented with the climate and temperature of sympathy. These are two processes, which should permeate reciprocally without hindering each other. The "art" of educating love, the proper *ars amandi*, consists precisely in this.¹⁸ This art is greatly opposed by the type of conduct in which sympathy (which is vivid especially in the man-woman relation where a strong sensual-bodily drive accompanies it) obscures the need of creating friendship and prevents it in practice. It seems that this is frequently the cause of various disasters and failures to which human love is exposed.

This whole problem contains some incoherence between *two profiles of love*: the objective profile does not coincide with the subjective profile. Sympathy, in which the subjective profile of love is vividly outlined, is not yet friendship, in which the objective profile of love finally matures. At the same time, however, love itself must be something subjective, as, after all, it must inhere in subjects, in two personal subjects, in X and Y, and must be formed and expressed in them. Nonetheless, one ought not to confuse this subjective love with subjectivism. Love is always something subjective, for it inheres in subjects, but at the same time it should be free from subjectivism. It should be something objective in the subject, in the person, have an objective profile and not merely a subjective one. Precisely for this reason, love cannot be mere sympathy but must be friendship. The maturity of friendship between X and Y can be proved, among other ways, by whether sympathy accompanies friendship, and even more by whether or not friendship is completely dependent on sympathy (on emotional moments and affective moods alone), and whether besides these it possesses its distinct objective being (*byt*) in the person and between persons. Only then may marriage and the life of two people together be built on it.

Therefore, it seems that *companionship* (*koleżeństwo*) can play an important role in the development of love between a woman and a man. Companionship differs from both sympathy and friendship. It differs from sympathy by the fact that above all it does not reach to man's emotional-affective sphere, but is based on objective foundations such as common

work, common objectives, common interests. Companionship differs from friendship by the fact that this “I want the good for you as if for my own ‘I’” does not yet come to light in it. Thus, what is characteristic of companionship is the moment of community caused by some objective factors. People attend the same class, work in the same scientific laboratory, serve in the same military company, or their interests lie in the same field (in philately, for instance)—and this makes them companions. Companionship may also be born between Y and X—both independently from affective sympathy and in its background. This latter combination seems to be very beneficial, for it can help pure sympathy develop into true friendship. The point is that companionship introduces between two people, a woman and a man, some objective community, whereas sympathy joins them only in a subjective way. Thus, what can emerge thanks to companionship is the objective profile of love, without which love is always something incomplete. Affections themselves are rather changeable, as experience demonstrates, and therefore they cannot durably and exclusively determine the relation between two people. It is necessary to find the means by which affections not only will find their way into the will, but—what is more—will bring about this unity of the will (*unum velle*), thanks to which two “I’s” become one “we.”¹⁹ It is precisely friendship that contains this unity.

Reciprocal friendship possesses an inter-personal character expressed in this “we.” In companionship this “we” is also included, although it still lacks the cohesion and depth that belong to friendship. After all, companionship can link many persons with one another, whereas friendship can do so only with a small number of them. The social feature of companionship is manifested in the fact that people linked by it usually create a certain environment. And therefore companionship can still be so very important for the formation of reciprocal love between X and Y, if their love is to mature for marriage and become the cornerstone of a new family. People who are capable of living in an environment, who are capable of creating it, are rather well prepared to confer on the community of the family the character of a cohesive environment in which a good atmosphere of shared life prevails.

Spousal love

The general analysis of love has above all a metaphysical character, even though at every step we also refer to psychological or ethical moments. These various aspects permeate one another, so that in no way can we penetrate one of them without involving the second or the third. In the analysis thus far we have attempted to grasp what belongs to the

essence of every love and is realized in a specific way in the love between a woman and a man. In an individual subject, love is formed through fondness, desire, and benevolence. However, love finds its full being not merely in an individual subject only but in an inter-subjective, interpersonal relation. Hence, we have the problem of friendship, which has been analyzed here in connection with sympathy, and the problem of reciprocity—a problem linked to friendship. The transition from “I” to “we” is for love no less essential than transcending one’s “I” as expressed through fondness, love of desire, and love of benevolence. Love—especially the one that interests us in this book—is not only a striving, but still far more a meeting, a uniting of persons. Clearly, this meeting and uniting of persons occurs on the basis of fondness, love of desire, and love of benevolence as they increase in the individual subjects. The aspect of individual love does not cease to occur in the inter-personal aspect, but indeed the former conditions the latter. As a result, love is always some inter-personal synthesis and synchronization of fondness, desire, and benevolence.

Spousal love (*miłość oblubieńcza*) is something else than all the aspects or forms of love analyzed up to this point.²⁰ It consists in giving one’s own person. The essence of spousal love is giving oneself, giving one’s “I.” It constitutes at once something other and something more than fondness, than desire, and even than benevolence. All these forms of going out toward the other person with regard to the good do not reach as far as spousal love. “To give oneself” means more than merely “to want the good,” even if by that the other “I” became as if my own, as happens in friendship. Spousal love is something other and something more than all the forms of love analyzed so far, both from the perspective of the individual subject, from the perspective of the person who loves, and from the perspective of the inter-personal connection created by love. When spousal love enters in this inter-personal relation, then something other than friendship arises, namely the reciprocal self-giving of persons.

This problem demands a more thorough consideration. First, the question presents itself: Can a person give himself to another person? After all it was stated that every person by his essence is nontransferable—*alteri incommunicabilis*. So, he is not only his own master (*sui iuris*), but also cannot impart or give himself. The nature of the person opposes such self-giving. Indeed, in the order of nature we cannot speak of giving a person to another person, especially if we understand this giving in a physical sense. What is personal rises above any form of giving and, on the other hand, above any form of appropriation in the physical sense. The person as such cannot be somebody’s possession, like a thing. Consequently, treating the person as an object of use is also excluded, which was already analyzed in more detail. However, what is not possible and correct in the

order of nature or in the physical sense can be accomplished in the order of love and in the moral sense. In this sense, the person can give himself to another person, both to a human person and to God, and through this giving a particular shape of love, which we define as spousal love, is formed.* This also testifies to a particular dynamic of the person and particular laws governing his existence and development. Christ expressed this in the sentence that seems to contain a deep paradox: "Whoever wants to save his soul will lose it, and whoever loses his soul for my sake will find it" (Mt 10:39).²¹

Indeed, the problem of spousal love contains a deep paradox, not only verbal but utterly real. The words of the Gospel indicate the particular reality and contain the truth that is realized in the life of the person. Now, because of his nature, every person is somebody non-transferable, incommunicable. In the order of nature, the person is disposed to perfecting himself, to attaining an ever greater fullness of his being, the being which, after all, is always some concrete "I." We have already stated that this perfecting of oneself comes through love and together with love. The fullest and so to speak the most radical form of love consists precisely in the fact of giving oneself, of making one's nontransferable and incommunicable "I" someone else's possession.²² The paradox in this case is twofold and proceeds in two directions: first, that one can go out of one's own "I" in this way, and second, that by doing so, this "I" is not in the least destroyed or devalued, but, on the contrary, is developed and enriched—of course in the supra-physical sense, in the moral sense. The Gospel emphasizes this vividly and decidedly: "will lose—will find," "to save—to lose." We evidently discover in it not only the personalistic norm itself, but also very detailed and bold instructions that develop this norm in various directions. The world of persons possesses its own laws of existence and laws of development.

Self-giving as a form of love is formed in the interiority of the person on the basis of a mature perception of values, and on the basis of the readiness of the will capable of committing itself in precisely this way. In any case, spousal love cannot be something fragmentary or fortuitous in the interior life of the person. It always constitutes some particular crystallization of the whole human "I," since by virtue of this love it is determined to govern itself precisely in this way. In giving ourselves we must find a particular proof of possessing ourselves. Concerning particular realizations of this form of love, it seems that they may be quite varied. Not to mention the self-giving of a mother to a child, can we not find self-giving, giving one's "I," in the relation of a physician to a sick person, for instance, or of a teacher who with total devotion gives himself to the task of forming his pupil, or also of a pastor who with similar devotion gives himself to the soul entrusted to his care? In a similar way great social

activists or apostles can give themselves to many people—often unknown by them personally—whom they serve by serving society. It is not easy to state the extent to which the authentic love of self-giving takes place in each of the aforementioned or similar cases. For what can be at work in all these cases is simply genuine benevolence and friendship toward people. In order, for example, to realize the vocation of a physician, of a teacher, or of a pastor “with total self-giving,” it is enough simply to “want the good” for whom it is performed. And even if this attitude acquires the characteristics of full self-giving and is verified in this form as love, at any rate it would be difficult to apply to it the name of spousal love.

The concept of spousal love is linked to the giving of the individual person to another chosen person. And therefore we speak of spousal love in certain cases concerning the relation between man and God, which will be discussed separately in chapter IV. There also exist the deepest reasons to speak of spousal love in connection with marriage. The love of persons, of a man and a woman, leads in marriage to reciprocal self-giving. From the perspective of the individual person, it is explicit self-giving to another person, whereas in the inter-personal relation it is reciprocal self-giving. The self-giving being discussed here ought not to be completely identified (and consequently confused) with “self-giving” in the mere psychological sense, that is, with the lived-experience of self-giving, nor even more so with “self-giving” merely in the physical sense. Concerning the former of these senses, it is only a woman, or in any case first and foremost a woman, who experiences (*przeżywać*) her share in marriage as “self-giving;” a man experiences (*przeżywać*) it differently, so that, speaking psychologically, some correlation of “self-giving” and “possessing” takes place. However, the psychological point of view is insufficient here. For when we grasp the problem objectively throughout, thus ontologically, there must also occur in this relation reciprocal self-giving on behalf of a man, which—even though differently experienced (*przeżyć*) than by a woman—must nevertheless be real self-giving to the other person. For otherwise there is a danger of treating this other person, a woman, as an object, and even as an object of use. So, if marriage is to meet the demands of the personalistic norm, reciprocal self-giving, reciprocal spousal love, must be realized in it. Two facts of self-giving, the masculine and the feminine, meet in marriage on the basis of reciprocity, and even though psychologically they have different shapes, ontologically they occur and “compose” the mature totality of reciprocal self-giving. Hence a particular task emerges for a man, who must introduce in “conquering” or “possessing” a proper attitude and content that also includes self-giving.

All the more, of course, this self-giving with regard to marriage, or even generally in the relation of X to Y, cannot possess a merely sexual meaning. Merely sexual self-giving in the reciprocal relation of persons,

without being fully justified by the self-giving of the person, must lead to the forms of utilitarianism, which we attempted to analyze as thoroughly as possible in chapter I. We must pay attention to this, since a more or less clear tendency exists to understand this “self-giving” in the Y-X relation in a purely sexual or sexual-psychological way. Instead, a personalistic understanding is necessarily needed here. And therefore, the whole profile of morality in which the commandment to love plays a central role by all means agrees with reducing marriage to spousal love, or rather—taking the problem educationally—with bringing marriage forth from this form of love. Hence certain consequences emerge, to which we shall return in chapter IV where we give reasons for monogamy. The self-giving of a woman to a man the way it occurs in marriage excludes—morally speaking—the simultaneous self-giving on his or her part to other persons in the same way. The sexual moment plays a particular role in the formation of spousal love. Sexual intercourse causes it to be restricted only to one couple, although at the same time it gains a specific intensity. Only in being so restricted can this love all the more fully open toward new persons who by nature are fruits of spousal love between a man and a woman.

The concept of spousal love possesses a key meaning for establishing norms for all sexual morality. A very particular link certainly exists between *sexus* and the person in the objective order, to which corresponds in the order of consciousness a particular awareness of the right for personal possession of one’s own “I.” This problem will be yet analyzed separately in chapter III (in its second part: “Metaphysics of Shame”). Consequently, out of the question is a sexual self-giving that would not mean a self-giving of the person and would not enter in some way into the orbit of these demands, which we have the right to make of spousal love. These demands proceed from the personalistic norm. Although spousal love itself differs by its essence from all the forms of love previously analyzed, it nonetheless cannot be formed in separation from them. It is especially indispensable for it to be closely bound with benevolence and with friendship. Without this interrelation spousal love may find itself in a very dangerous vacuum, and the persons involved in it will feel helpless in the face of interior and exterior facts, which they improvidently permitted to come into being within and between themselves.

Part Two

Psychological Analysis of Love