

Andras Toth: Crisis of Globalization and Economic Nationalism: Understanding the Rise of Populist Nationalist Right and Moving away from the European Model in the European periphery

It is widely feared that European model is cracking up. Crisis after crisis weakens the European Union. One of the major crises is the revolt of peripheries against Brussels, and what it represents, European values of liberal democracy and globalized market economy. This paper is seeking answer what is the causal linkage between turning away from globalized market economy and liberal political democracy. In answering it searches the causes why gaining considerable popular support those populist right wing political parties, who are turning against globalized market economy. This attempt is utmost important in the second decade of the XXI. Century, when the resurgent Russia is widely believed that supports such parties to weaken the European Union.

Mainstream literature discussing generic populist parties does not put economic policy of populist parties into the center of the analyses. Economic nationalism is a “known” fact, mentioned sometimes among many other characteristics of these parties, but the main debates of the mainstream academic community rather centered on nativist or anti-elite slogans of populist parties.

This paper proposes to include the phenomena of economic nationalism as one of the key ingredients of the concept of modern post-2008 populism. It will be argued that economic nationalism is one of the key messages of these parties, which helps to understand the causes of the popularity of these parties and also the policies they pursue after gaining power. Economic nationalism is also the key to understand the drive for gaining power for the state and the content of rejuvenation of the nation. The main thesis of the paper is that in periods following breakdown of free trade based globalization process in those countries, which have suffered somewhere in the past a major crisis in their nation formation process, there exist the possibility for the emergence of a generic fascist with program of economic nationalism centered national rejuvenation. The paper is based on the Hungarian experience.

The paper will be structured as follows. The first chapter discusses economic nationalism and establishes that the type of economic nationalism of post-2008 populist as economic nationalism of exploited nation. The second chapter analyzes what are the implications for political action of economic nationalism of exploited nation embraced by generic fascist parties. The third section shows the casual linkages between economic crisis, breakdown of globalization and the possible success of the quest for economic nationalism of exploited nation. The fourth section discusses the emergence of economic nationalism in the Eastern periphery of the European Union. The conclusion of the paper assesses the sustainability of economic system based economic nationalism.

Péter Balogh: Understanding Hungarian and East Central European politics through national narratives

Globalisation is a dialectic of flows and closures (Meyer & Geschiere 1999) and some ideas of nationalism seem no less influential today than they did many decades ago. Yet achieving any social cohesion among members of any (imagined) community may require at least some level of consensus or a shared master narrative. Of course, all societies feature some sort of fault-lines (e.g. socio-economic, ideological, political, ethnic, religious) that can be sources of sustained tension, and the quest for new “metanarratives” of nationhood – i.e. new visions of national solidarity and identification that are meaningful and effective in the conditions of the 21st century – have been particularly difficult and painful in post-socialist contexts (Bassin 2012). Even without having had to deal with a new, post-socialist state-formation or any “sizeable” ethnic minority, Hungary is characterised by particularly deep cultural-mental dividing lines – indeed deeper than for instance Poland (Janke 2013). While (constructive)

debate is of course always positive and even necessary, it is illustrative of the Hungarian situation that even the necessity of a national metanarrative is contested (Kiss 2017). Yet over the last few years, more and more commentators have lamented the lack of what is called a 'national minimum' (Pritz 2016, Balázs 2013, Monok 2012). In the midst of democratic decline in East Central Europe in general, and in Hungary in particular (Ágh 2016), understanding the deployed national narratives is even more pressing.

This paper shows that current fault-lines within Hungarian society reflect the particularly diverse heritage of ideas and traditions that have been used as guidance by domestic political and intellectual elites to navigate the country in the past and, importantly, also in the present. These ideas are related to collective identity-forming concepts such as Christian bulwark (Tazbir 2005, Metz 2017), 'ferry country' (Kovács et al. 2011), Turan (Akcali & Korkut 2012, Balogh 2015), Central Europe (Balogh 2017), East Central Europe, the West etc. The preference for one or the other notion is then reflected in further societal ruptures such as the folkish-urbane division (Fricz 1997). Since 1989, a number of such concepts have been competing to shape a widely shared Hungarian national metanarrative. Yet considering the mutual exclusivity of the concepts (as reflected by the competing ideological and geopolitical orientations they imply), such a project was perhaps bound to be challenging. As this paper argues, however, the incumbent elite's desperate attempt to push for a hegemonic national narrative largely built on the self-image of a Christian bulwark surrounded by enemies in the East and West alike has only contributed to further societal polarisation in Hungary, but also in some other CEE countries such as Poland.

Zoltán Kántor: Kin-state politics from an electoral perspective: kin-votes at kin-state elections

In my presentation I will present how some ECE countries regulate the right to vote of kin-minorities, and I will focus on the electoral results (and political preferences) of the Hungarian kin-minorities in the 2014, 2018 national elections, the Hungarian quota-referendum, and the EP elections from 2014. I will draw some conclusions regarding kin-state politics and democratic theory (political participation in two political communities /states/).