

# Programme of the 2024 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design

**Budapest, 8-12 2024 July**



The 2024 Conference of the Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, organised and sponsored by



**CORVINUS  
UNIVERSITY**  
of BUDAPEST

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Utku Unver, Boston College  
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Péter Biró, Corvinus University of Budapest, KRTK  
Dávid Losonci, Corvinus University of Budapest

General chair:

Péter Biró, Corvinus University of Budapest, KRTK

## Programme overview

### Monday 8 July:

13:00-13:50 Registration (lobby of building C)

13:50-14:00 Opening

#### **Celebration of the 75th birthday of Vincent Crawford:**

14:00-14:45 Plenary talk by Alex Teytelboym (University of Oxford)

14:45-15:30 Plenary talk by Kristof Madarasz (London School of Economics)

15:30-16:00 coffee break

16:00-16:45 Plenary talk by Nagore Iriberry (University of the Basque Country)

16:45-17:45 Plenary talk by Vincent Crawford (University of Oxford and UC San Diego)

17:45-18:00 short break

18:00-18:30 Surprise talks

18:30-22:00 Welcome reception and wine tasting (lobby of building C)

### Tuesday 9 July:

9:00-11:00 Session 1 (4 talks in each parallel session)

11:00-11:30 coffee break

11:30-13:00 Session 2 (3 talks in each parallel session)

13:00-14:00 lunch break

14:00-15:00 Plenary talk by Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)

15:00-15:30 coffee break

15:30-17:30 Session 3 (4 talks in each parallel session)

17:30-18:30 Memorial gathering

### Wednesday 10 July:

9:00-11:00 Session 4 (4 talks in each parallel session)

11:00-11:30 coffee break

11:30-13:00 Session 5 (3 talks in each parallel session)

13:00-14:00 lunch break

14:00-15:00 Plenary talk by Al Roth (Stanford University)

15:00-15:30 coffee break

15:30-17:30 Session 6 (4 talks in each parallel session)

18:30-22:00 Conference dinner on Európa boat

### Thursday 11 July:

9:00-11:00 Session 7 (4 talks in each parallel session)

11:00-11:30 coffee break

11:30-13:00 Session 8 (3 talks in each parallel session)

13:00-14:00 lunch break

14:00-15:00 Plenary talk by Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

15:00-15:30 coffee break

15:30-17:00 Session 9 (3 talks in each parallel session)

17:00-18:00 Plenary talk by Roger Myerson (University of Chicago – Online talk)

### Friday 12 July:

9:00-11:00 Session 10 (4 talks in each parallel session)

11:00-11:30 coffee break

11:30-13:00 Session 11 (3 talks in each parallel session)

13:00-14:00 closing and lunch

## Schedule of the contributed sessions

9 July, Tuesday

	<b>Session 1 (9:00-11:00)</b>	<b>Session 2 (11:30-13:00)</b>	<b>Session 3 (15:30-17:30)</b>
<b>Plenary Room</b>	On Vince Crawford's contributions	Understanding Behavior in Games	Narratives
<b>Room V</b>	Mechanism Design 1	Mechanism Design 2	Mechanism Design 3
<b>Room VI</b>	Multilateral Bargaining and Experiments on Pricing and Norms	Information Design 1	Information Acquisition and Disclosure
<b>Room VII</b>	Behavioral Economics	Experiments 1	Networks
<b>Room IX</b>	Auction 1	Contest and IO	Auction Design and Multidimensional Screening
<b>Room X</b>	Sequential Market Mechanisms	Allocation 1	Matching 1
<b>Room 103</b>	Contract Design	Voting 1	Industrial Organisations 1
<b>Room 104</b>	Fair Division	Learning	Social Choice 1

10 July, Wednesday

	<b>Session 4 (9:00-11:00)</b>	<b>Session 5 (11:30-13:00)</b>	<b>Session 6 (15:30-17:30)</b>
<b>Plenary Room</b>	Mechanism Design and Competition	Applied Matching	Fair Market Design
<b>Room V</b>	Topics in Mechanism Design	Mechanism Design 4	Public Goods
<b>Room VI</b>	Theory and Experiment	Information Design 2	Financial Markets
<b>Room VII</b>	Game Theory 1	Behavioural and Experimental	Signalling
<b>Room IX</b>	Auction 2	Institution Design	Auction 3
<b>Room X</b>	School Choice	Market Design 1	Allocation 2
<b>Room 103</b>	Contest 1	Voting 2	Industrial Organisations 2

## 11 July, Thursday

	<b>Session 7 (9:00-11:00)</b>	<b>Session 8 (11:30-13:00)</b>	<b>Session 9 (15:30-17:00)</b>
<b>Plenary Room</b>	Matching 2	New Directions in Market Design	Characterisation in Game Theory
<b>Room V</b>	Implementation	Mechanism Design 5	Mechanism Design 6
<b>Room VI</b>	Digital Economy	Contest 2	Information Design 3
<b>Room VII</b>	Social Choice 2	Contest, Matching, and Experiments	Market Design 2
<b>Room IX</b>	Auction Theory Without Quasi-Linearity	Experiments 2	Assignment and Matching with Money
<b>Room X</b>	Bargaining	Allocation 3	Matching 3
<b>Room 103</b>	Industrial Organisations 3	Voting 3	Voting 4

## 12 July, Friday

	<b>Session 10 (9:00-11:00)</b>	<b>Session 11 (11:30-13:00)</b>
<b>Plenary Room</b>	Financial Networks	Matching Theory
<b>Room V</b>	Mechanism Design 7	Mechanism Design 8
<b>Room VI</b>	Advances in Mechanism Design and Information Economics	Information Design and IO
<b>Room VII</b>	Game Theory 2	Mechanism Design in Sports
<b>Room IX</b>	Auction 4	Cheap Talk
<b>Room X</b>	Matching 4	Allocation 4
<b>Room 103</b>	Search	Voting 5

## Detailed programme

8 July, Monday

13:00-13:50 Registration (in the lobby of building C)

13:50-14:00 Opening (Plenary Room)

Plenary talks celebrating Vincent P. Crawford (Plenary Room)

14:00-14:45 Alex Teytelboym (University of Oxford): Putting Markets into Matching Markets

14:45-15:30 Kristof Madarasz (London School of Economics): Cheap(est) Talk

15:30-16:00 Coffee break

16:00-16:45 Nagore Iriberry (University of the Basque Country): Level-k thinking on games

16:45-17:45 Vincent P. Crawford (University of Oxford and UC San Diego): Meaningful Theorems: Nonparametric Analysis of Reference-dependent Preferences

17:45-18:00 Short break

18:00-18:30 Surprise talks

18:30-22:00 Welcome reception, wine tasting (in the lobby of building C)



## 9 July, Tuesday

### 9:00-11:00: Session 1

**Session organised by Nagore Iriberry: Celebrating the work of Vincent Crawford / On Vince Crawford's contributions (Plenary Room)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Zeky Murra-Anton; ISO New England <u>Roberto Serrano; Brown University</u>	Mediated (Anti)Persuasive Communication
<u>Joel Sobel; UCSD</u>	<del>Preserving Privacy</del>
Alfred Galichon; New York University <u>Larry Samuelson; Yale University</u> Lucas Vernet; Banque de France	Unified Gross Substitutes and Inverse Isotonicity for Equilibrium Problems
Adam Sanjurjo, Universidad de Alicante	Complexity in Choice

### **Mechanism Design 1 (Room V)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Tom Rauber; University of Kaiserslautern</u> Philipp Weinschenk; University of Kaiserslautern-Landau	Detrimental Incentive Mechanisms in Dynamic Principal-Agent Relationships
<u>Noemie Cabau; QSMS Research Group BME</u> Arseniy Samsonov; Ozyegin University	Signaling Effort: Information structures in a Principal-Agent model
Aloisio Araujo; FGV/EPGE and IMPA <u>Victor Perez; IMPA</u>	Single crossing in multidimensional screening with one-dimensional allocation space
Changhyun Kwak; Academia Sinica	Screening without Single Crossing: A General Approach

**Session organised by Yuan Ju: Multilateral Bargaining and Experiments on Pricing and Norms (Room VI)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Jingru Wang; Waseda University</u> Yukihiko Funaki; Waseda University Yoshiaki Ogura; Waseda University Ryuichiro Ishikawa; Waseda University	An experimental analysis of IPO pricing mechanism – The case of Book-building
Jiawen Li; Lancaster University	Trust and Trustworthiness Norm-conforming Behavior
<u>David Wettstein; Ben-Gurion University</u> Yuan Yu, University of York	Bidding with Coalitional Externalities: a strategic approach to partition function form games
Yuan Ju; University of York	Decentralized Multilateral Bargaining

### **Behavioral Economics (Room VII)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Ville Korpela; Turku School of Economics Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool and University of Napoli Federico II	Behavioral Implementation Without Unanimity

<u>Julius Zachariassen; Turku School of Economics</u>	
Ivan Samoylenko; HSE Moscow	The model of two-level tug-of-war competition: uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and phase transition to instability with information spreading delays
Manachaya Uruyos; Chulalongkorn University	Enhancing Retirement Savings Behavior: Leveraging Psychological Biases and Nudging Strategies
<u>Mehmet Barlo; Sabanci University</u> Nuh Aygun Dalkiran; Bilkent University	Robust Behavioral Implementation

### Auction 1 (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
<u>Simon Finster; CREST-ENSAE</u> Patrick Loiseau; Inria Simon Mauras; Inria Mathieu Molina; Inria Bary SR Pradelski; CNRS	Equitable Pricing in Auctions
Kuo-chih Yuan; Soochow University, Bo Chen	Parallel auctions of objects within budget constraints
<u>Dmitriy Knyazev; University of Vienna</u>	Optimal Discrimination-free Auction
Thanh Nguyen; Purdue University <u>Alexander Teytelboym; University of Oxford</u>	Approximate Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets

### Session organised by Ning Neil Yu: Sequential Market Mechanisms (Room X)

Authors	Titles
<u>Ken Ho; Liaoning University</u> Jinyong Jeong; Liaoning University	Matching Through Agents
<u>Yajing Chen; East China University of Science and Technology</u> Zhenhua Jiao; Shanghai University of International Business and Economics	The Machiavellian frontier of top trading cycles
Ning Yu; Nanjing Audit University	Something about Auction
Ziyang Shen; Columbia University	Sequential Solicitation

### Contract Design (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Fahad Khalil; University of Washington Jacques Lawarree; University of Washington <u>Alexander Rodivilov; Stevens Institute of Technology</u>	Rewarding success and failure: moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic experimentation
Chang Liu; UNSW Business School	Robust Contracts with Exploration
<u>Marc Claveria-Mayol, Stony Brook University</u> Pau Milán (UAB and BSE) Nicolás Oviedo-Dávila (UAB and BSE)	Incentive Contracts and Peer Effects in the Workplace
<u>Laurent Lamy; Ecole des Ponts, ParisTech</u> Clément Leblanc; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées – ENPC	Robust Production Insuring Procurement and their Pitfalls

**Fair Division (Room 104)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Ruben Juarez; University of Hawaii Chiu Yu Ko; Chinese University of Hong Kong <u>Jung You; California State University East Bay</u>	Sharing Profit by Ranking Partners
<u>Zsuzsanna Jankó; Corvinus University of Budapest</u> Attila Joó; University of Hamburg Erel Segal-Halevi; Ariel University Sheung Man Yuen; National University of Singapore	On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting
Mihir Bhattacharya; Ashoka University <u>Ojasvi Khare; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Center</u>	Fair allocation with (semi-single-peaked) preferences over location and quantity
Niccolò Urbinati; Università di Napoli "Federico II"	Fair allocation problems when agents have outside options

11:00-11:30: Coffee break

**11:30-13:00: Session 2**

**Sessions organised by Nagore Iriberry: Celebrating the work of Vincent Crawford / Understanding Behavior in Games (Plenary Room)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Amil Camilo Moore; Universitat Pompeu Fabra <u>Fabrizio Germano; Universitat Pompeu Fabra</u> Rosemarie Nagel; ICREA-UPF-BGSE	Toward a behavioral taxonomy of 2x2 games
Amil Camilo Moore; IPF-BSE <u>Rosemarie Nagel; ICREA-UPF-BGSE</u>	Fair and Efficient: Re-evaluating Normal-Form Games with Near-Equal Split
Anna Bogomolnaia; University of Glasgow	Fair division under different entitlements: a quest for Round Robin

**Mechanism Design 2 (Room V)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Krisztina Antal-Pomázi; Center for Economic and Regional Studies	Expert Evidence in Court: A New Method for Choosing a Court-Appointed Neutral Expert
Martin Hagen; CUNEF Universidad	Optimal refugee status determination
Alessandro Ispano; CY Cergy Paris Universite <u>Peter Vida; CY Cergy Paris Universite and Corvinus University of Budapest</u>	Good cop-bad cop: delegating interrogations

**Information Design 1 (Room VI)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Naoki Watanabe; Keio University	Resale and Sequential Trades of Information
Pia Ennuschat; UPF	Information Discrimination Shaping Markets Through Tailored Algorithms

Claudia Herresthal; University of Bonn Tatiana Mayskaya; NRU Higher School of Economics Arina Nikandrova; City, University of London	Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm?
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### Experiments 1 (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
Hubert Kiss; KRTK & Corvinus University of Budapest Jaromir Kovarik; University of the Basque Country Agnes Pinter; Universidad Autónoma de Madrid	Risk of imminent collective failure alleviates but does not prevent the tragedy of the commons
Yohanes Riyanto; Nanyang Technological University Nilanjan Roy; City University of Hong Kong Lirong Yang; Nanyang Technological University	Action Revisions in Coordination Games with Conflicting Interests: An Experiment
Carmen Arguedas; Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Hubert Kiss; KRTK & BCE Agnes Pinter; Universidad Autónoma de Madrid	Final Countdown? An Experimental Collective Risk Dilemma with Horizon Uncertainty

### Session organised by Xiaogang Che: Contest and IO (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Yuta Yasui; Kochi University of Technology Hisayuki Yoshimoto; University of Glasgow	Oligopoly Competition in Fake Reviews
Rabah Amir; Univ of Iowa David Rietzke; Lancaster University	Monotone comparative statics and bounds on strategic influence
Zhuoqiong Chen; Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen	Information Acquisition in Contests with Conditional Investments

### Allocation 1 (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Yao Cheng; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics Zaifu Yang; University of York Jingsheng Yu; Wuhan University	Proper Exclusion Right, Priority and Allocation of Positions
Tsuyoshi Adachi; Waseda University Zheng Lin; Waseda University	Fair and Strategy-proof Probabilistic Allocation with Payment
Marek Pycia; University of Zurich, Peter Troyan; University of Virginia	The Random Priority Mechanism is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair

### Voting 1 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Bernardo Moreno; Universidad de Málaga, Pietro Salmaso; Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II	Strategy-Proofness in Domains of Lexicographical Preferences: A Characterization

Dezso Bednay; Corvinus University of Budapest Balázs Fleiner; Budapest Business University Attila Tasnadi; Corvinus University of Budapest	An indifference result for voting rules in large societies
David Piazolo; University of Heidelberg	The “German Vote” and its consequences: (Un)reliable parties in multilateral bargaining under private information

### Learning (Room 104)

Authors	Titles
Yangbo Song; Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen	Social Learning among Opinion Leaders
Lukasz Sliwinski; University of Edinburgh David Siska	Pseudo-collusion due to algorithmic pricing with transient demand response
Audrey Hu; City University of Hong Kong Liang Zou; University of Amsterdam	Optimal Allocation Strategies in a Discrete-Time Exponential Bandit Problem

13:00-14:00: Lunch break

14:00-15:00: Plenary talk by Paul Milgrom (Stanford University):

Transforming Rights: Applications from Radio Spectrum to Water (Plenary Room)

15:00-15:30: Coffee Break

15:30-17:30: Session 3

**Sessions organised by Nagore Iriberry: Celebrating the work of Vincent Crawford / Narratives (Plenary Room)**

Authors	Titles
Andreas Blume; University of Arizona	Language Games: Correlation through Non-Understanding, Dialogue, Inarticulateness, and Misunderstanding
Marco Angrisani; University of Southern California Anya Samek; University of California, San Diego Ricardo Serrano-Padial; Drexel University	Competing Narratives in Action: An Empirical Analysis of Model Adoption Dynamics
Klaus Zauner; City, University of London	Competition in Salop's Circular City Model: Shake-out and Price Discrimination
Antonio Cabrales, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid	Parenting styles with externalities

### Mechanism Design 3 (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Junrok Park; National Taiwan University	Informationally robust mechanism design

<u>Sushil Bikhchandani; UCLA</u> Debasis Mishra; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi	Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms
Francesco Giovannoni; University of Bristol <u>Toomas Hinnosaar; University of Nottingham</u>	Pricing Novel Goods
Wanchang Zhang; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen	Robustly Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading

#### Session organised by Peter Achim: Information Acquisition and Disclosure (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
Andreas Asseyer; Freie Universität Berlin	Information Design with Competing Receivers
Avi Lichtig; Bonn Helene Mass; University of Bonn	Optimal testing in disclosure games
Helene Mass; University of Bonn	Optimal Transparency in Task Design
Deniz Kattwinkel; UCL, <u>Justus Preusser; Bocconi University</u>	The Burden of Proof and the Division of Surplus

#### Networks (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
Vincent Meisner; HU Berlin	Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach
Yanlin Chen; Nanjing Audit University Xueheng Li; Nanjing Audit University Tianle Song; Nanjing Audit University	Influencer Networks
Arup Daripa; Birkbeck University of London Sandeep Kapur; Birkbeck College, University of London <u>Marco Pelliccia; Heriot-Watt University</u>	Incentive Design on Networks
Anastas Tenev; Corvinus University of Budapest	Pitfalls of Information Spillovers in Persuasion

#### Session organised by Marek Pycia: Auction Design and Multidimensional Screening (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
<u>Haoyuan Zeng; University of Zurich</u>	Identity-Proof Auctions
Byeong-Hyeon Jeong; University of Zurich Marek Pycia; U Zurich	The First-Price Principle of Maximizing Economic Objectives
Kyle Woodward; UNC Chapel Hill	Self-Auditable Auctions
<u>Alexey Kushnir; Carnegie Mellon University</u> Ali Shourideh; Carnegie Mellon University	Selling with network flows: a new approach to optimal multi-dimensional mechanisms

#### Matching 1 (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Gregory Gutin; Royal Holloway University of London <u>Philip Neary; Royal Holloway University of London</u> Anders Yeo; University of Southern Denmark	Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints

Fatma Aslan; Budapest University of Technology and Economics	Job Exchange in Markets with Couples
Bojia Li; University of York, Zaifu Yang; University of York	Matching with Endogenous Constraints
Umut Dur; North Carolina State University Robert Hammond; University of Alabama Utku Unver; Boston College	Rematching with Contracts under Labor Mobility Restrictions: Theory and Application

### Industrial Organisations 1 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
<u>Hsiao-Chi Chen; National Taipei University</u> Yunshyong Chow; Academia Sinica Shi-Miin Liu; National Taipei University	Dynamics of Cournot and Bertrand Firms: Exploring Imitation and Replicator Processes
Jihwan Do; Yonsei University <u>Nicolás Riquelme; Universidad de los Andes</u>	Vertical contracting and information spillover in Cournot competition
Tahmina Faizi; University of Paderborn	Effects of Artificial Intelligence on Price Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
Kolos Ágoston; Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem <u>Manuel Mago; Corvinus University of Budapest</u> Veronika Varga; Corvinus University of Budapest	Sequential Bertrand price competition with substance averse preferences in insurance markets

### Social Choice 1 (Room 104)

Authors	Titles
<u>Guilherme Carmona; University of Surrey</u> Konrad Podczeck; University of Vienna	Large Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Linus Thierry Nana Noumi; CY CERGY Paris University	Expected utility theory on hyperpreference rules
<u>Tom Demeulemeester; KU Leuven</u> Dries Goossens Ben Hermans; ORTEC Roel Leus; KU Leuven	Fair integer programming under dichotomous and cardinal preferences

17:30-18:30: Memorial gathering

Remembering Makoto Shimoji (Plenary Room) and YingHua He (Room X)

10 July, Wednesday

9:00-11:00: Session 4

**Sessions organised by Nagore Iriberry: Celebrating the work of Vincent Crawford / Mechanism Design and Competition (Plenary Room)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Herve Moulin; University of Glasgow</u> Anna Bogomolnaia; University of Glasgow	Designing welfare guarantees
<u>Ines Moreno de Barreda; Oxford University</u> Evgenii Safonov; Queen Mary University of London	Socially Efficient Approval Mechanisms with Signaling Costs
<u>Daniel Marszalec; International Christian University</u> Alexander Teytelboym; University of Oxford Sanna Laksá; P/F Varđin	EPIC Fail: How Below-Bid Pricing Backfires in Multiunit Auctions
<u>Miguel Costa-Gomes; University of Edinburgh</u> Alexander Coutts; York University	How Robust is Overconfidence

**Session organised by Wei He: Topics in Mechanism Design (Room V)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Tangren Feng; Bocconi University</u> Qinggong Wu; Hong Kong University of Science and Technology	Ex Post Strategy-proofness
Wei He; The Chinese University of Hong Kong Jiangtao Li; Singapore Management University Kexin Wang; Singapore Management University	Interim Regret Minimization
Wei He; The Chinese University of Hong Kong	The limit of ambiguous mechanisms
Alex Suzdaltsev; Higher School of Economics	Minimax-regret contracts and Optimal Innovation Prizes

**Session organised by Jaimie Lien: Theory and Experiment (Room VI)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Di Feng; Dongbei University of Finance and Economics</u> Yun Liu; Shandong University	Informative Simplicity in Matching
Luke Garrod; Loughborough University <u>Ruochen Li; Shandong University</u> Antonio Russo; University of Sheffield Chris Wilson; Loughborough University	Understanding Cost Pass-Through when Prices are Dispersed
<u>Wendy Ye Jin; NYU Shanghai</u> , <u>Zhen Zhou; Tsinghua University</u>	Strategic Understatement
Yunwen He; Central University of Finance and Economics Jaimie Lien; Shandong University <u>Yang Yang; Sun Yat-Sen University</u> Jie Zheng; Shandong University	A Goose Feather from a Thousand Miles Away: A Theory and Experiment on Reciprocity



### Game Theory 1 (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
Andrés Salamanca; Ca' Foscari University of Venice	Conditional Random Dictatorship and the Value of a Bayesian Cooperative Game
<u>Pedro Calleja; University of Barcelona</u> Francesc Ilerena; Universitat Rovira i Virgili	Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems
Evgeny Zalyubovsky; HSE University	Extended backward induction and sequential equilibria
Pedro Calleja; University of Barcelona <u>Francesc Ilerena; Universitat Rovira i Virgili</u> Peter Sudhölter; University of Southern Denmark	Self-consistency for multi-valued solutions and the core

### Auction 2 (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Dmitriy Knyazev; University of Vienna <u>Daniel Rehsmann; University of Vienna</u>	Choose your auction: Mechanism design for a bidder
<u>Sergei Severinov; University of British Columbia</u> Gabor Virag; University of Toronto	Who Wants to be an Auctioneer?
Bing Liu; Stanford University <u>Simon Loertscher; University of Melbourne</u>	Efficient auction design with externalities
Federica Carannante; Princeton University <u>Marco Pagnozzi; Università di Napoli Federico II</u> Elia Sartori; Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico	Adaptive Reserve Prices in Repeated Auctions

### School Choice (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Maximilian Bach; ZEW Mannheim Thilo Klein; ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research <u>Sarah McNamara; ZEW Mannheim</u>	The Effects of Attending High Track Schools: Evidence from Hungarian Centralized School Assignments
Emil Temnyalov, University of Technology Sydney	Capacity Design, Organizational Structure and Differential Treatment
Benoit Decerf; The World Bank <u>Guillaume Haeringer; Baruch College</u> Martin Van der Linden; Independent scholar	Incontestable assignments
<u>Georgy Artemov; The University of Melbourne</u> Kentaro Tomoeda; University of Technology Sydney	School Choice, Housing, and Inequality

### Contest 1 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Daniel Rehsmann; University of Vienna Beatrice Roussillon; Université Grenoble Alpes <u>Paul Schweinzer; Alpen-Adria-University Klagenfurt</u>	Contesting fake news
Chen Cohen, Ishay Rabi, <u>Aner Sela; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev</u>	An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests

<u>Constantine Sorokin; University of Glasgow, A. Matros</u>	A New Approach to Contests with Complete and Incomplete Information
<u>Bo Chen; Shenzhen University</u> <u>Jingfeng Lu; National University of Singapore</u> <u>Lianmin Zhang; Nanjing University</u>	(Non-)Disclosure in Competitions with Type-dependent Favoritism

11:00-11:30: Coffee break

11:30-13:00: Session 5

**Applied Matching (Plenary Room)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Peter Biro; HUN-REN KRTK and Corvinus University of Budapest</u> <u>Kristof Druzsins; HUN-REN KRTK</u> <u>Rita Fleiner; Obuda University</u> <u>Xenia Klimentova; INESC Technology and Science</u>	Multi-criteria optimisation in the Spanish kidney exchange programme
<u>Ashwin Kambhampati; United States Naval Academy</u> <u>Chad Redmer; U.S. Naval Academy</u> <u>Naomi Utgoff; United States Naval Academy</u>	Service Assignment at the United States Naval Academy
<u>Jonah Peranson; National Matching Services</u>	Beyond Algorithms: Strategic Insights into Implementing Effective Matching Programs

**Mechanism Design 4 (Room V)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Gustavo Quindere Saraiva, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile</u>	An Upper Bound to the Benefits of Implementing Positive Assortative Matching in Pooled Testing
<u>Svetlana Boyarchenko; University of Texas-Austin</u>	On dangers of large scale experimentation and product competition
<u>Andrea Attar; Toulouse School of Economics and Tor Vergata University</u> <u>Lorenzo Bozzoli; Università degli studi di Roma "Tor Vergata"</u> <u>Roland Strausz; Humboldt Universitaet Berlin</u>	Mediated Renegotiation

**Information Design 2 (Room VI)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Audrey Hu; City University of Hong Kong</u> <u>Yating Yuan; University of Warwick</u>	Path-Dependent Equilibrium and Polarization in Public Responses to a Pandemic
<u>Philipp Denter; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid</u> <u>Boris Ginzburg; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid</u>	Troll Farms
<u>Luca Sandrini; ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research</u> <u>Robert Somogyi; Budapest University of Technology and Economics; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies</u>	News Media Bargaining Codes

**Session organised by Jaimie Lien: Behavioral and Experimental (Room VII)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Yihong Huang; Harvard University <u>Juanjuan Meng; Peking University</u> Xi Weng; Peking University	How Awareness of Media Bias Affects Reaction to News: Evidence from Chinese Microblog Users
<u>Jaimie Lien; Shandong University</u> Anning XIE; The Chinese University of Hong Kong Jie Zheng; Shandong University	Club Dynamics and Non-Rival Resources
Huanhuan Zheng; NUS	Corporate green identity

**Institution Design (Room IX)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Yidi Xu; Hefei University of Technology</u> Zaifu Yang; University of York	Wealth Inequality, Stability and Optimal Wealth Redistributive Policies
<u>Guadalupe Correa-Lopera; Universidad Pública de Navarra</u> Bernardo Moreno; Universidad de Málaga	Voting Equilibria and Public Funding of Political Parties
David Rodriguez; CUNEF University	Life Pension and Parliamentarian Effort

**Session organised by Szilvia Papai: Market Design (Room X)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Ozgun Ekici; Ozyegin University	How to allocate kidneys across multi-center queues: An axiomatic analysis
<u>Jorgen Kratz; University of York</u> Makoto Shimoji; University of York	Weak misrepresentations in school choice
<u>William Phan; North Carolina State University</u> Ryan Tierney; University of Southern Denmark Yu Zhou; Nagoya University	School Finance, Peers, and Choice

**Voting 2 (Room 103)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Dora Greta Petroczy; John von Neumann University</u> Laszlo Csato; Institute for Computer Science and Control	Voting power in the Council of the European Union: A comprehensive sensitivity analysis
László Kóczy; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies <u>Balazs Sziklai; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies</u>	One Man, One Vote, One Price
Yolanda F. Rebollo-Sanz; Universidad Pablo de Olavide	Political opportunism behind changes in party affiliation: Evidence from Spanish municipal elections

13:00-14:00: Lunch Break

14:00-15:00: Plenary talk by Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University): Ethical issues in market design (Plenary Room)

Coffee Break: 15:00-15:30

15:30-17:30: Session 6

**Session organised by Lars Ehlers : Fair Market Design (Plenary Room)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Vikram Manjunath; University of Ottawa <u>Alexander Westkamp; University of Cologne</u>	Marginal mechanisms for balanced exchange
<u>Sean Horan; Université de Montréal</u> Vikram Manjunath; University of Ottawa	Sequential Composition of Choice Functions
Christian Basteck; WZB Berlin Social Science Center <u>Lars Ehlers; Université de Montréal</u>	On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
Christian Basteck; WZB Berlin Social Science Center	An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule

**Public Goods (Room V)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Kim-Sau Chung, Hong Kong Baptist University	Differentiated Public Goods
Ying Chen; Johns Hopkins University <u>Liuchun Deng; National University of Singapore/Yale-NUS College</u> Minako Fujio; Yokohama National University M. Ali Khan; The Johns Hopkins University	Irreversibility, Complementarity, and the Dynamics of Public Good Provision
Lijian Qin, Anhui University of Finance and Economics	The Impact of Human Capital on Health Entitlement Acquisition among Migrant Workers in China
Giovanni Valvassori Bolgè; ETH Zürich	Mechanism Design by a Politician

**Financial Markets (Room VI)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Oleg Telegin; Higher School of Economics	Always Silent? Endogenous Central Bank Communication During the Quiet Period
Angel Hernando-Veciana; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid	Designing Price Benchmarks Robust to Manipulation
Ondrej Cernik; University of Finance and Administration	Position investing mechanism
Te-Tsun Chang; National Chi-Nan University	Liquidity, Unemployment and Investment

**Signalling (Room VII)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
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<u>Carl Heese; University of Hong Kong</u> <u>Shuo Liu; Peking University</u>	Persuasion versus Presentation
Peter Vida; CY Cergy Paris University Takakazu Honryo; Doshisha University <u>Helmuts Azacis; Cardiff University</u>	Simple Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-Sender Signaling Games
Qianjun Lyu; University of Bonn Wing Suen; The University of Hong Kong <u>Yimeng Zhang; The University of Hong Kong</u>	Coarse Information Design
<u>Papatya Duman; Paderborn University</u> Claus-Jochen Haake; Paderborn University Sarah Kühn; University Paderborn	Does the blockchain technology help to reduce information asymmetries?

### Auction 3 (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Thanh Nguyen; Purdue University <u>Alexander Teytelboym; University of Oxford</u> Shai Vardi	Efficient Combinatorial Assignment
Karl-Martin Ehrhart; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Jan Kreiss; KIT <u>Marion Ott; ZEW Mannheim</u>	Bidder heterogeneity and winner's curse in multi-unit auctions
Min Zhang; University of St Andrews	A Simple Model of Trading Artworks
Yu Ching Lam; Bocconi University	Concurrent Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects

### Allocation 2 (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Umutcan Salman; University of Padova	Object Allocation Problem with Maximum and Minimum Number of Changes
Xihao Song, University of Glasgow	Property of Flow Algorithm and characterization
Gergely Csáji; HUN-REN KRTK KTI	Popularity and Perfectness in One-sided Matching Markets with Capacities
Francesco Conti; The University of Texas at Austin	Allocation Design with Strictly Convex Preferences


### Industrial Organisations 2 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
<u>Jim Dearden; Lehigh University</u> David Goldbaum; University of Technology Sydney Ernest Lai; Lehigh University Qichao Shi; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics	Competitive Disclosure of Multiple Product Attributes
Abdul Quadir; XLRI-Xavier School of Management	Supplier Encroachment with a Dominant Retailer
<u>Yong Chao; University of Louisville</u> Mingjun Xiao; Hubei University of Economics	The Limit of Market-share Contracts
<u>Nima Haghpanah; Penn State University</u> Ron Siegel; Penn State	A Theory of Stable Market Segmentations

18:30-22:00: Conference Dinner on Európa boat (cruise on the Danube)

The boat will leave and arrive back to the following location:

Jégverem utca (Buda side, near Clark Ádám tér, at the Chain Bridge)



Please arrive by 19:00 the latest, since the boat will leave at that time!

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## 11 July, Thursday

### 9:00-11:00: Session 7

#### Matching 2 (Plenary Room)

Authors	Titles
Ata Atay; University of Barcelona <u>Antonio Romero-Medina; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid</u>	Complementarities in childcare allocation under priorities
Denis Sokolov; Inria	College Admissions in France: Affirmative Action, Overlapping Reserves, and Housing Quotas
<u>Ákos Balázs; HUN-REN Centre for Economic and Regional Studies</u> Peter Biro; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (KRTK)	Comparing mechanisms for course allocation with contracts
Tayfun Sonmez; Boston College <u>Utku Unver; Boston College</u>	Market Design for Social Justice: A Case Study on a Constitutional Crisis in India

#### Implementation (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Ville Korpela; <u>Turku School of Economics</u> Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool and University of Napoli Federico II Riccardo Saulle	Implementation in vNM stable set
<u>Malachy James Gavan; University of Liverpool</u> Antonio Penta; Universitat Pompeu Fabra	Safe Implementation
<u>Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool and University of Napoli Federico II,</u> R. Jain; Academia Sinica	Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions: A Full Characterization
<u>Takashi Hayashi; University of Glasgow</u> Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool and University of Napoli Federico II	Implementation in Stationary Markov-Perfect Equilibrium

#### Session organised by Kim-Sau Chung: Digital Economy (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
<u>Melody Lo, National Taiwan University, Kim Sau Chung Hong</u> Kong Baptist University	Designing Open Source Licenses
<u>Kong-Pin Chen; Academia Sinica, Chia-Hui Chen; Kyoto University, Junichiro Ishida; Osaka University</u>	Social Learning and Strategic Pricing with Rating System
Jinglei Huang; Tsinghua University Guofu Tan; University of Southern California <u>Tat-How Teh; Nanyang Technological University</u> Junjie Zhou; Tsinghua University	Network interoperability in multi-sided markets
Leifu Zhang; HKUST(GZ)	Robust (Decentralized) Oracle Design

**Social Choice 2 (Room VII)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Wonki Cho; Korea University</u> <u>Biung-Ghi Ju; Seoul National University</u>	Arrovian Social Choice and Decentralizability: An Integrated Approach
<u>María Gómez-Rúa; Universidade de Vigo</u> <u>Elena Molis; Universidad de Granada</u> <u>Bernardo Moreno; Universidad de Málaga</u>	Group threshold when making a decision
<u>Oihane Gallo; Université de Lausanne</u>	Anonymity and strategy-proofness on a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
<u>Thayer Morrill; North Carolina State University</u> <u>Peter Troyan; University of Virginia</u>	Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process

**Session organised by Shigehiro Serizawa: Auction Theory Without Quasi-Linearity (Room IX)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Yuya Wakabayashi; Osaka University</u> <u>Ryosuke Sakai; Tokyo Institute of Technology</u> <u>Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University of Economics</u>	A General Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices
<u>Ryosuke Sakai; Tokyo Institute of Technology</u> <u>Shigehiro Serizawa, Osaka University of Economics</u>	Fair and efficient object allocation rules under constraints of discrete payments
<u>Tomoya Kazumura; Kyoto University</u> <u>Debasis Mishra; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi</u> <u>Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University of Economics</u>	Equal treatment of equals and strategy-proofness in object allocation with non-quasi-linear preferences
<u>Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University of Economics</u> <u>Hiroki Shinozaki; Hitotsubashi University</u>	Efficiency, fairness, and strategy-proofness in constrained package assignment problems with money

**Session organised by Claus Jochen Haake: Bargaining (Room X)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Claus-Jochen Haake; Paderborn University</u> <u>Thomas Streck; University Paderborn</u>	A measure for contestedness of a two-person bargaining problem
<u>Walter Trockel; Bielefeld University, Papatya Duman; Paderborn University</u>	Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: $H\alpha$ -Essential Equilibria
<u>Bas Dietzenbacher; Maastricht University</u> <u>William Thomson; University of Rochester</u>	Utility distortion in claims problems
<u>Kemal Kivanc Akoz; HSE University</u> <u>Arseniy Samsonov; Ozyegin University</u>	Information Agreements

**Industrial Organisations 3 (Room 103)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Kyungmin Kim; Emory University</u> <u>Nenad Kos; Bocconi University</u>	Pricing and Consumer Surplus in Monopoly with Product Design
<u>Debasis Mishra; Indian Statistical Institute</u> <u>Sanket Patil; IIM Bangalore</u>	Undominated monopoly regulation
<u>Attila Tasnadi; Corvinus University of Budapest</u> <u>Gabor Virag; University of Toronto</u>	Cournot mechanisms and consumer search



Leopold Monjoie; University PSL - Paris Dauphine	Designing Markets for Reliability with Incomplete Information
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11:00-11:30: Coffee Break

11:30-13:00: Session 8

**Session organised by Lars Ehlers : New Directions in Market Design (Plenary Room)**

Authors	Titles
Julien Combe; CREST - Ecole polytechnique Umut Dur; North Carolina State University Olivier Tercieux; Paris School of Economics Camille Terrier; Queen Mary University London Utku Unver; Boston College	Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools
Florian Brandl; University of Bonn Andrew Mackenzie; Maastricht University	Patience Ensures Fairness
Tommy Andersson; Lund University Lars Ehlers; Université de Montréal Lars-Gunnar Svensson; Lund University Ryan Tierney; University of Southern Denmark	A General Non-Manipulable Matching Mechanism for Markets with One-Sided Preferences

**Mechanism Design 5 (Room V)**

Authors	Titles
Andrea Attar; Toulouse School of Economics and Tor Vergata University Eloisa Campioni; Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata Thomas Mariotti; Toulouse School of Economics Alessandro Pavan; Northwestern University	Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms
Roberto Rozzi; University of Siena Luca Sandrini; ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research	Endogenous peer based discrimination
Aditya Aradhya; Tel Aviv University	Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents

**Contest 2 (Room VI)**

Authors	Titles
Yuxi Chen; University of Lausanne Luis Santos-Pinto; University of Lausanne	Overconfidence in Elimination Contests
Kaiqi Liu; Maastricht University Hannes Rusch; Max Planck Institute Christian Seel; Maastricht University Stefan Terstiege; Maastricht University	Competition in Higher Education: Sorting, Ranking and Fees
Jingfeng Lu; National University of Singapore Yiyao Zhu; National University of Singapore	Prize Allocation Equilibrium in Team Contests

**Session organised by Zhen Lei: Contest, Matching, and Experiments (Room VII)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Qichao Shi; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics</u> Zhan Wang Jingsheng Yu; Wuhan University	Shirk Responsibility: An Experimental Study of Accountability System
<u>Yun Liu; Shandong University</u> Zhuo Chen; Shandong University	Chasing Contests
<u>Yao Cheng; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics</u> Dazhong Wang; Nanjing University Jingsheng Yu; Wuhan University	Games of priority-based allocation problem under the efficient-adjustment deferred acceptance mechanism

### Experiments 2 (Room IX)

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Andrej Woerner; Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich	Overcoming Time Inconsistency with a Matched Bet: Theory and Evidence from Exercising
Papatya Duman; Paderborn University Britta Hoyer; Paderborn University <u>Sarah Kühn; University Paderborn</u> Nadja Stroh-Maraun; Paderborn University	Non-induced preferences in matching experiments
Elena Molis; Universidad de Granada Robert Veszteg; Waseda University	Experimental results on the roommate problem

### Allocation 3 (Room X)

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Georgios Gerasimou; University of Glasgow	Ordinal intensity-efficient allocations
Emre Dogan; Higher School of Economics, Moscow Onur Kesten; School of Economics <u>Danisz Okulicz; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology</u>	Achieving Efficiency and Fairness in a Congested Lawyer Assignment Problem
Manshu Khanna; Peking University	Affirmative Action's Cumulative Fractional Assignments

### Voting 3 (Room 103)

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Anindya Bhattacharya; University of York <u>Francesco Ciardiello; University of Salerno</u>	How sensitive are the results in voting theory when just one other voter joins in? Some instances with spatial majority voting
Tiberiu Dragu; New York University <u>Xiaochen Fan; New York University</u>	Polarization and Issue Selection in Elections
<u>Junze Sun; Wuhan University</u> Arthur Schram; University of Amsterdam Randolph Sloof; University of Amsterdam	Public Persuasion in Elections: Single-Crossing Property and the Optimality of Interval Revelation

13:00-14:00: Lunch break

14:00-15:00: Plenary talk by Éva Tardos (Cornell University): Stability and Learning in Strategic Games (Plenary Room)

15:00-15:30: Coffee Break

15:30-17:00: Session 9

**Characterisation in Game Theory (Plenary Room)**

Authors	Titles
Di Feng; Dongbei University of Finance and Economics <u>Bettina Klaus; University of Lausanne</u> Flip Klijn; CSIC	Characterizing no-trade-bundled top trading cycles mechanisms for multiple-type housing markets
<u>Abhigyan Bose; Indian Statistical Institute</u> Souvik Roy; Indian Statistical Institute	Matching under multiple single-peaked domains
<u>Tsuyoshi Adachi; Waseda University</u> Shin Sato; Fukuoka University	Single-peaked, or Enforceable: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Strategy-proofness and Unanimity

**Mechanism Design 6 (Room V)**

Authors	Titles
Lorenzo Bozzoli; Università degli studi di Roma "Tor Vergata"	Moral hazard and mediated contracts with limited commitment
Endre Csóka; Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics Heng Liu; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute <u>Alexander Rodivilov; Stevens Institute of Technology</u> Alexander Teytelboym; University of Oxford	A Collusion-Proof Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
Endre Csóka; Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics	Efficient Teamwork

**Information Design 3 (Room VI)**

Authors	Titles
Erika Domotor; University of Cyprus	Bringing Rational Inattention to the Market for Lemons
Ryoji Jinushi, Seikei University	Costly Advertising and Information Congestion: Insights from Pigou's Successors
<u>Matthias Lang; LMU Munich</u> Cédric Wasser; University of Basel	Benefits and Challenges of Ambiguous Product Information

**Market Design 2 (Room VII)**

Authors	Titles
<u>Tetsutaro Hatakeyama; Keio University</u> Onur Kesten; School of Economics Morimitsu Kurino; Keio University	Who makes the cut? Priority design for heterogeneous groups of agents
Thilo Klein; ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research	Matching for Credit: Identifying Information Asymmetries in Joint-Liability Lending

Ben Balmford; LEEP Institute Brett Day; University of Exeter <u>Luke Lindsay; University of Exeter Business School</u>	Designing markets for bundled environmental goods
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**Session organised by Yu Zhou: Assignment and Matching with Money (Room IX)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Ryan Tierney; University of Southern Denmark <u>Yu Zhou; Nagoya University</u>	Discrete Pricing in Multi-object Auctions
<u>Keisuke Bando; Keio University</u> Kenzo Imamura; University of Tokyo Tomoya Kazumura; Kyoto University	Strategy-Proofness and Competitive Equilibrium with Transferable Utility: Gross Substitutes Revisited
<u>Masahiro Kawasaki; Independent Researcher,</u> Ryosuke Sakai; Tokyo Institute of Technology,	Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money

**Matching 3 (Room X)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Li Nie; Nanjing Audit University	Hierarchic matching with single peaked preferences and the formation of pyramidal organizations
Yi-You Yang; Aletheia University	Vacancy chains in matching markets with contracts
Keisuke Bando; Keio university <u>Toshiyuki Hirai; Hosei University</u>	Substitutes for Nonunitary Many-to-Many Matching with Contracts

**Voting 4 (Room 103)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Hector Hermida-Rivera; Budapest University of Technology and Economics	Minimal Stable Voting Rules
<u>Federico Fioravanti; University of Amsterdam</u> Ulle Endriss; University of Amsterdam	Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes
Yuliya Veselova; National Research University Higher School of Economics	On the safety of group manipulation

17:00-18:00: Plenary talk by Roger Myerson (University of Chicago): Dual reduction and elementary games with senders and receivers (Online – on screen at Plenary Room)

12 July, Friday

9:00-11:00: Session 10

**Session organised by Jean-Jacques Herings: Financial Networks (Plenary Room)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Péter Csóka; Corvinus University of Budapest <u>P. Jean-Jacques Herings; Tilburg University</u>	An Axiomatization of the Pairwise Netting Proportional Rule in Financial Networks
Lorenzo Zino; Politecnico di Torino Giulia Fracastoro; Politecnico di Torino <u>Anton Proskurnikov; Politecnico di Torino</u> Giuseppe Carlo Calafiore	On the Influence of Network Structure on the Resilience and Losses of Financial Systems
Zafer Kanik; University of Glasgow	Optimal Capital Structure under Risk-Sharing
<u>Luitgard Veraart; London School of Economics and Political Science</u> Iñaki Aldasoro; Bank for International Settlements	Systemic Risk in Markets with Multiple Central Counterparties

**Mechanism Design 7 (Room V)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Jin Yeub Kim; Yonsei University</u> Wooyoung Lim; HKUST	Toward an Understanding of Optimal Mediation Choice
Zaifu Yang; University of York <u>Rong Zhang; Chongqing University</u>	Optimal Taxation with Complete Bunching
<u>Gerrit Bauch; Bielefeld University</u> Frank Riedel; Bielefeld University	The Texas Shoot-Out under Knightian Uncertainty
<u>Burak Can; Maastricht University School of Business</u> Bart Kleibrink; Maastricht University School of Business and Economics Ingrid Rohde; Bilgi University	Social Perception on AI-supported decision systems

**Session organised by Yunan Li: Advances in Mechanism Design and Information Economics (Room VI)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Mengxi Zhang, University of Bonn	Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors
Tilman Borgers; University of Michigan <u>Jiangtao Li; Singapore Management University</u> Kexin Wang; Singapore Management University	Undominated Mechanisms
Mariann Ollar <u>Antonio Penta; Universitat Pompeu Fabra</u>	Incentive Compatibility and Belief Restrictions

**Game Theory 2 (Room VII)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
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Tamás Solymosi; Corvinus University of Budapest	Computing the per-capita nucleolus in assignment games
Xiangliang Li; Nankai University	The Cooperation Problem
Ville Korpela; Turku School of Economics Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool and University of Napoli Federico II Foivos Savva; University of Southampton	The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view
Jinglei Huang; Tsinghua University Danxia Xie; Tsinghua University	The Shapley Value and the Nucleolus of a Two-Sided Platform Game

#### Auction 4 (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Marieke Pahlke; Corvinus University of Budapest	Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Dutch Auctions
<u>Donglai Luo; UTS</u> Benjamin Balzer; UTS	Smooth Ambiguity Aversion in k-Double Auction
Federica Carannante; Princeton University Marco Pagnozzi; Università di Napoli Federico II Elia Sartori; Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II	Interim Information and Seller's Revenue in Standard Auctions
Sungjin Cho; Seoul National University Harry Paarsch; University of Central Florida <u>John Rust; Georgetown University</u>	Explaining Early Bidding in Informationally-Restricted, Ascending-Bid Auctions

#### Matching 4 (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Duygu Sili; Koç University, Özgür Yılmaz; Koç University	How to incentivize hospitals in Dynamic Kidney Exchange
<u>Márton Benedek; Corvinus University of Budapest</u> Peter Biro; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (KRTK) Walter Kern; University of Twente Dömötör Pálvölgyi; MTA-ELTE Lendület Daniel Paulusma; Durham University	Partitioned Matching Games for International Kidney Exchange
Hyunjun Cho; Yonsei University Jin Yeub Kim; Yonsei University <u>Jaeok Park; Yonsei University</u>	When Same-Sex Marriages are Unstable
<u>Diana MacDonald; Banco de México</u> , Ahmet Altınok; Nazarbayev University	Designing the Menu of Licenses for Foster Care

#### Search (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Kemal Kivanc Akoz; NRU-Higher School of Economics Levent Celik; City, University of London <u>Emre Dogan; Higher School of Economics, Moscow</u>	Search in a Non-exclusive Online Matching Platform
Isaac Swift; Hong Kong Baptist University	A Recommendation Game

Xin Feng; Nanjing University	Monopoly Pricing, Bayesian Persuasion, and Costly Information Acquisition

11:00-11:30: Coffee break

11:30-13:00: Session 11

**Session organised by Szilvia Papai: Matching Theory (Plenary Room)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Pinaki Mandal, Arizona State University	Equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability
Md. Shahidul Islam; Concordia University <u>Szilvia Papai; Concordia University</u>	Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
Aram Grigoryan; University of California, San Diego <u>Markus Möller; University of Bonn</u>	A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms

**Mechanism Design 8 (Room V)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Gian Caspari; ZEW	Bidding for Subsidies with ones Patience
<u>Justin Burkett; Georgia Tech</u> Kyle Woodward; Assign Group	Intertemporal Allocation with Unknown Discounting
Kohmei Makihara; Aix-Marseille University, Aix-Marseille School of Economics	Peer-review mechanism design to allocate goods with externality

**Information Design and IO (Room VI)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Ming Li; Concordia University</u> Ting Liu; Stony Brook University	Mandatory disclosure of conflicts of interest: Good news or bad news?
Yeran Dong; Capital University of Economics and Business Haipeng Han; Tsinghua University <u>Jie Zheng; Shandong University</u>	Duopoly Competition through Information Design
Guillaume Pommey; Tor Vergata University of Rome	Asymmetric information, liquidity constraints, and efficient trade

**Mechanism Design in Sports (Room VII)**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<u>Julian Matthes; Heidelberg University</u> David Piazzolo; University of Heidelberg	The Strategic Benefits of Sending Your Friends Away: Evidence from Coopetition Behavior in Professional Road Cycling
Andrew Clausen; University of Edinburgh <u>Christopher Stapenhurst; Budapest University of Technology and Economics</u>	Deterring Bribery with Scotch Hold 'em Poker

Laszlo Csato, Institute for Computer Science and Control	Random matching in balanced bipartite graphs: The (un)fairness of draw mechanisms used in sports
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### Cheap Talk (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Changyeop Lee; The Ohio State University <u>Sungmin Park; The Ohio State University</u>	Delegated Cheap Talk: A Theory of Investment Banking
<u>Qianjun Lyu; University of Bonn</u> Wing Suen; The University of Hong Kong	Information design in cheap talk
Peter Wagner; University of York	Hidden Cost of Cheap Advice

### Allocation 4 (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Antonio Nicolò; University of Padova, Italy <u>Pietro Salmaso; University of Naples</u> <u>Federico Il</u> Riccardo Saulle	Coherent Dynamic Matching
Sreoshi Banerjee, Budapest University of Technology and Economics	On identifying efficient, fair and stable allocations in "generalized" sequencing games
Leanne Streekstra; Feruniversität Hagen	Core constraints when scheduling with deadlines

### Voting 5 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Tsuyoshi Adachi; Waseda University <u>Leo Kurata; Waseda University</u>	Legitimate Ranking by Tournament
Steven Kivinen; University of Graz	Equitable Voting with Many Alternatives
<u>Qinggong Wu; Hong Kong University of Science and Technology</u> , Xingye Wu; Tsinghua University	Modeling Political Spectra

13:00-14:00: Closing and lunch break