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Good representation

What are the determinants of a good representative?

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1. Introduction

Political representation is a multilayered concept, which consists of multiple actors, multiple possible ways of connections and even multiple political institutions. There are the elected representatives, and there are the voters, who vote for these representatives. The dynamics between these groups can and do vary widely – ranging from strong, meaningful bonds, to scenarios where there is hardly any connection between voters and representatives. Alongside these, one must take into consideration the broader institutional context as well, when thinking about representation. In case of proportional representation, legislature is supposed to mirror voters' preferences better than it does in majoritarian systems. These shed a light on the fact that political representation is not a simple and straightforward transaction between electorates and representatives. Rather this relationship is shaped and affected by personal connections, the characteristics of the electoral system, and the institutional framework.

During the recent years, the topic of political representation is getting more attention – not only in a theoretical sense, but also in its empirical approach. Experts studied political representation from various aspects in the past decades. Some of them explored representation from the perspective of representatives (Fenno, 1978; Mayhew, 2004). This approach implies the examination of the motivations and communication of representatives, among many other factors. Other scholars examined representation from the perspective of voters (Achen & Bartels, 2016; Allen, 2021; Downs, 1957). Downs (1957) presumed that voters were rational decision makers, whose main purpose was to maximize their own benefit. Allen (2021) puts an emphasis on the importance of voters' role in political decision-making processes – especially in difficult times, representing minorities, who are in need, becomes crucial. Achen and Bartels (2016) suggest that – contrary to Downs' work – voters often decide based on identity or party loyalty, because they are not informed or rational enough.

Voters are in the focus of my research as well. With this work I aim to get a better understanding of what voters think about the ideal representative's actions and personality. To be able to thoroughly answer this question, I employ the knowledge of three distinct disciplines – representation theory, political psychology, and voter behavior. I put the emphasis on political representation theories as the core of my research can be derived from them. In simple terms, the discipline of political representation provides the theories, while political psychology contributes the explanatory dynamics, and the field of voter behavior complements these with empirical data and results.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. The object of the research

In the field of political representation, hypotheses and objects of research vary across a broad spectrum. In my work, the focus is solely on voters; they constitute the object of the research, because they are the foundation of the system. People's interests and preferences transform into voting behavior, which then result in election outcomes, namely in the election of political representatives (Weßels, 2007). In this chain of events a vague part appears at the end, which is the *flashbulb metaphor* of political representation. Hanna Pitkin (1967) uses this to highlight the complexity of representation. According to this metaphor, political scientists are taking flash-bulb photographs of a given structure from different angles, which can result in different interpretation of the same situation (Kurebwa, 2015; Pitkin, 1967). To avoid these misinterpretations, she argues that one needs to know the context in which representation is examined. To support this process, Pitkin (1967) identified four dimensions of representation, which need to be assessed in order to examine representation in depth (Dovi, 2018). Pitkin's for views can be seen in Table 1.

		In focus	Main Research Questions	Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives / Aspects of evaluating
Formalistic Representation		Institutional arrangements	What is the institutional position of a representative?	None
	Authorization	The means by which a representative obtains their office	The process of gaining power (e.g., elections)? What are the ways of enforcing their decision?	Legitimacy
	Accountability	Punishment of representative	What are the sanctioning mechanisms available to voters?	Responsivity
Symbolic Representation		How the representative "stands for" the represented	What kind of response is invoked by the representative in those being represented?	Degree of acceptance among the represented
Descriptive Representation		Degree of resemblance	Does the representative look like, have common interests with, or share certain experiences with the represented?	Accuracy of resemblance
Substantive Representation		The representatives' actions	Does the representative advance the policy preferences that serve the interests of the represented?	Achievements

Table 1. Pitkin's four views of representation (Source: Dovi, 2018; Pitkin, 1967)

Pitkin's work uncovers the crux with these views of political representation. It is not only indispensable in the field of political representation, but also timeless. Her work explores the context of representation and the relationship between voters and representatives. This is proven by the fact that even decades later, Pitkin's four view of representation serves as a baseline for political representation research. I will elaborate on the particular aspects of the theory in the subsequent chapters of my dissertation.

Pitkin uncovers the crux with these views of political representation, with Formalistic representation giving the context and Symbolic, Descriptive, Substantive representation focusing on the relationship between voters and representatives. Pitkin's *Symbolic Representation* concentrates on symbols and the emotional connection between citizens and representatives – something they mutually share with each other. Queen Elizabeth II exemplifies the importance and effect of *Symbolic Representation*. Her presence and speeches at various events gave a sense of identity and unity to the citizens. *Descriptive Representation* emphasizes the importance of representatives resembling their voters in miscellaneous characteristics, like race, gender, ethnicity, or socio-economic background. This idea is based on the premise that representatives who share similarities with their voters are more likely to adequately understand their interests, thus they are more capable to represent them effectively. The Squad of the U.S. House of Representatives serves as an example in this case. The election of the members of the Squad – Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Ayanna Pressley, and Rashida Tlaib – shows that the composition of the US legislative bodies starts to reflect the characteristic of the American voters more precisely.

2.2. Locality – roots of representation

Historical roots of political representation theories bring us all the way back to the feudal Middle Ages. As Judge points out, "the basis of representation in Britain has, since medieval times, been territorial communities" (Judge, 1999, p. 46). There was a clear territorial distinction between the two represented units in the Commons. The two represented units were the counties and the boroughs. While representatives through counties represented the landed interests, those from boroughs represented commerce. Resulting from this, one might assume that in this arrangement instead of the interests of people, the interests of the nation were represented in the legislature (Childs & Cowley, 2011; Reeve & Ware, 1992). This operational practice is deeply incorporated into one of the oldest democracies, into the British political dynamics, as shown by empirical results. In the early 2000s, researchers found that British voters prioritized local issues more than they did national ones (An Audit of Political

Engagement, 2007; Childs & Cowley, 2011). Linked to this, local issues are not only significantly dominant in political actors' electoral campaigns (Robinson & Fisher, 2005), but the local economic performance can also influence voters' choice (Johnston & Pattie, 2006).

Locality provides the foundation for political representation, as presented. Not only does it provide a solid foundation for this conceptual work, but it also plays a crucial role in nowadays' politics. As time passed by, modernization and globalization transformed the world. Whereas land and ownership were central in the feudal, medieval ages, today's focus has shifted to other territorial issues, such as available resources, infrastructure, and environmental protection. Many works have demonstrated this preference to local candidates following Key (1949) who pointed out that local candidates have an advantage at elections – a phenomenon called friends-and-neighbors voting. He pointed out that a candidate *"gains support, not primarily for what he stands for or because of his capacities, but because of where he lives. A more or less totally irrelevant appeal – back to home-town boy – can exert no little influence over an electorate not habituated to the types of voting behavior characteristics of a two-party situation"* (Key, 1949, p. 41). This might lead to lack of accountability and weaknesses is of policy representation (R. Campbell et al., 2019; Miller & Stokes, 1963). Derived from these, according to Key (1949), the phenomena of friends-and-neighbors voting "justifies a diagnosis of low voter-interest in public issues and a susceptibility to control by the irrelevant appeal to support the home-town boy" (Key, 1949, p. 37).

The literature offers two distinctive possible explanations for the phenomenon. First, spatial proximity can translate to more intense communication between voters and candidates (Arzheimer & Evans, 2012, 2014). Empirical data show that even in situations, where voters have same amount of information about both the local and non-local candidate, they tend to choose the candidate with local roots (R. Campbell et al., 2019; R. Campbell & Cowley, 2014). Second, the local proximity between candidates and voters might translate into the shared interests (R. Campbell et al., 2019; Childs & Cowley, 2011; Meredith, 2013). Schulte-Cloos and Bauer take this argument even further by stating that "that voters' preference for local candidates may also be an expression of their place-based social identity" (Schulte-Cloos & Bauer, 2023, p. 680) and based on their research on the German cases concluded that "We contend that the local roots of political candidates act as social identity cues to voters." (Schulte-Cloos & Bauer, 2023, p. 695).

Independently from the possible explanations, many conceptual analyses show that local elections have a greater relevance from this perspective than elections on a national level.

Firstly, because local candidates share common interests and opinions with their voters. Secondly – as the British example presents – a smaller electoral division supports a clearer connection between voters' needs and candidate interests. Political actors on local levels spend their most of their time working on locally relevant issues. Thirdly, the concept of 'personal vote' plays a significant role in locality. Let it be retrospective delivery, or prospective perception, a candidate's proven or assumed ability to deliver has a crucial influence on voters' choice (Arzheimer & Evans, 2014, p. 2).

The knowledge of voter behavior (Evans, 2017, p. 656-657) and political psychology also supports the locality aspects of representation. Empirically measurable effects of localism on voters can manifest in different ways – voters might suppose that a local candidate has more knowledge and information regarding the specific are and its needs (Collignon & Sajuria, 2018). Furthermore, other research suggest that localness can be linked to the accountability of the representatives, as voters can easily assess and evaluate their representative's work (Jankowski, 2016; Kovarek, 2022). The latter findings are in line with Arzheimer and Evans' (2014) results, as they linked localism to retrospective delivery and prospective perception. Although it is crucial to point out that other scholars found contrasting results. Former works on locality suggests that "friends-and-neighbors" voting erodes the accountability of political representatives (R. Campbell et al., 2019; Key, 1949; Stokes & Miller, 1962). These theories and results can be traced back to Pitkin's (1967) *Formalistic Representation*.

2.3. Descriptive representation

As time passed by, the concept of representation has continued to evolve. While locality focuses solely on the geographical distance between voters and representatives, other new variables have emerged in the equation of representation. The main question remains the same – *"How can voters be represented?"*. The knowledge base needed to answer this question is provided not only by the representation theories, but also by studies voter behavior and political psychology.

The simplest answer is delivered by the descriptive approach of representation. The term "descriptive representation" was introduced by Griffiths and Wollheim (1960, p. 188). This approach refers to the scenario when representatives are identical in some ways to their constituents, in other words, a member of the group becomes the representative. Women political actors represent women, and a member of a minority represents that minority. This approach is not restricted solely to "visible characteristics" (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 629), such as

gender. Invisible features, such as shared residency, can also serve as a basis for descriptive representation. Residents, who have lived in a district for a long time often prefer a candidate born in that district, as this guarantees shared interests with the voters and the attachment to these interests (Mansbridge, 1999) – see '*2.2. Locality'* subchapter.

The resemblance model of representation is strongly linked to the previously presented descriptive approach of representation. The resemblance model puts an emphasis on the overall similarity between citizens and their representatives, and it focuses on the sympathetic attachment between voters and representatives. By this, the resemblance model presumes that representatives and voters might share experiences and values (Arowolo, 2015; Burke, 1975).

Interestingly, there are scenarios where, instead of voting for someone with shared experiences or someone identical, citizens vote for someone they perceive as better than themselves in some way. Edmund Burke as the member of parliament of Bristol can be considered as a pioneer in this approach of representation. During his term he withstood his voters' preferences in the case of the Irish trade. Although this resistance was not completely unforeseen. When Burke got elected, he made a clear and straightforward statement about his role as an MP. Based on Burke's (1774, p. 81) argumentation, the parliament is not a *'congress of ambassadors'* from different districts, instead, the parliament is a *'deliberative assembly'* of a given nation. With this proclamation, Burke justified the possibility of resisting the voters (as cited in Andeweg, 2014, p. 268). On this basis, theoretical literature on political representation has inter-alia two well-known approaches, namely the delegate and trustee model, which focuses on the *style of representation* (Madison et al., 1787; Pitkin, 1967). These two represents the relationship between voters and representatives.

In the trustee model, voters see representatives as "leaders". Representatives got elected, because voters trust that they will know what the best for them is, even if voters do not even know themselves. Burke's work as an MP manifests the trustee model.

Conversely, the delegate model sees representatives as "listeners", where representatives should do everything according to the preferences of voters. Derived from this, the delegate model implies that voters have an explicit list of preferences, which can easily be tracked by the representatives (Barker & Carman, 2012).

For decades, party identification was the main concept in research on political behavior, especially in the American political scene. Party identification played an essential role in clarifying vote choice and the influence of partisan elites (Bartels, 2002; A. Campbell et al.,

1980; Huddy et al., 2015; Lavine et al., 2012). As time passed, rethinking of party identification started. Studies shed a light on the importance of different social dimensions, which significantly influence the classic party-based identification of voters. The effect of sharing some defining characteristic with candidates is referred to as the affinity effect in political studies) and is often referenced when studying the effect of candidate gender, age and/or race (Dolan, 2008; Sanbonmatsu, 2003; Sevi, 2021) on voting preferences. Affinity effect can be measured when voters are more prone to vote for candidates who they share a given characteristic with. Such social dimensions can be for instance the voters' race, gender, ethnicity, which resonate with Pitkin's *Descriptive Representation*. As such, gender affinity occurs when women are more prone to vote for female candidates than men or when young people prefer to vote for candidates closer to their age. Recent results show that social identity plays a crucial role in shaping voters' political decisions, thus their voting behavior (Charness et al., 2007; Chen & Li, 2009; Duell & Valasek, 2019), resulting citizens to vote for in-group candidates (Bassi et al., 2011).

Hillary Clinton's 2008 election campaign (Simien & Hampson, 2017) is an excellent example for gaining a comprehensive understanding on the shift from party identification towards social identity in politics. Besides, her run for the office shows the emerging new approaches regarding the concept of political representation, which will be presented in the subchapter *'2.5. The dynamic process approach of representation'* of my work.

To gain a better understanding on social identity, we need to dive into the knowledge of political psychology. The expression used by Paolino (1995) – 'in-group favoritism' – matches the terminology used by psychologists. The expression "in-group" is rooted deeply in the basics of social psychology, where this binary distinction serves as a basis for understanding the dynamics between different groups. 'We' constitute the 'in-group', and 'they' are the 'out-group'. 'We' are women, while 'they' are men. 'We' are protecting the environment, while 'they' seem to do not care at all about our world. This binary system can be captured in many other ways in our everyday lives. It is vital to highlight that one person can be, and indeed is a member of several different groups. One can identify themselves as someone who: (1) lives in the capital, (2) is single, (3) works in a white-collar position with a classic 9-5 schedule, (4) has a dog, and (5) holds liberal political values. These are five different group memberships of a theoretical person. This list could be extended with many more details, but these five categories already give us a quite detailed description of this citizen. All these characteristics help this person to define themselves in front of others, and this list also helps us to correctly position

this person in different social dimensions. It is essential to underline that these group memberships can differ based on their embeddedness in one's personality.

Group membership means the weakest link, as this refers to an objective inclusion in a group, although it does not necessarily mean an internalized sense of membership. Group membership is when one is a member of a library or is a registered member of a political party. One may have registered with a political party because of a family tradition or because the given party's views broadly align with the citizen's views, but in this case, there is no activity or strong feelings towards the specific party. The term *group identification* overcomes this obstacle, and it implies an internalized sense of group membership, which is completely subjective. Group identification is for example actively connection to a movement, like environmentalism. Members not only support the movement in silence, but they also actively partake in it through attending rallies and participating in discussions. *Social identity* means the next level in this hierarchy, where the group membership is incorporated into the self-concept (Huddy, 2013, p. 738-739). Only this incorporation is necessary but not sufficient condition – besides the knowledge of this membership, there has to be an emotional significance and value regarding this membership to get a social identity (Tajfel, 1981). Social identity appears if a voter explicitly identifies themselves as a conservative or liberal. In this case, one is not only a party member, but also their worldview and social interactions are influenced. Social identities may lack political content – for example in the case of vegetarians, but if they have distinct political outlook, they become *political identity*. Some social identities, like being a Democrat in the U.S. or being a Christian Democrat in Germany are political (Huddy, 2013). Political identity serves as the base for the evolution of group-based political cohesion (Huddy, 2013). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between these concepts. Incorporating these theories into my work is essential for a better understanding of the topic of good representation, besides it enriches the literature of political science and electoral behavior with political psychology.



Figure 1. Group membership, group identification, social identity, and political identity (author's own)

Group-based political cohesion can be formed in many ways, based on various group membership, potential group identification and resulting social identities. As a result, literature offers various theoretical approaches to explain the phenomenon (Self-Categorization Theory, Cognitive Mobilization Theory).

As in political representation the term 'symbolic' has a significant role, so does it in relation to social identity. Social Identity Theory (in short: SIT) is the embodiment of the symbolic approach of social and political identity. The theory underlines the value of symbolic concerns, like a group's social position as a fundamental element to the development of group cohesion (Huddy, 2013). Based on SIT, the members' main aim is to differentiate themselves positively from other members of the society – who are not part of the given group, thus reaching a positive social identity (Huddy, 2013; Turner et al., 1987). Simien and Hampson (2017) applied this logic projected to the formerly presented example from the US means the following: in the case of the Latinas, their social identity based on their gender was stronger than their social identity based on their race. This expounds their voting choice, as voting for the female candidate – Clinton – strengthens their positive social identity. In the case of the African American women, they voted for Obama, because their social identity based on their race was the stronger one. Voting for Obama – thus his victory – resulted in their empowered positive social identity

(Simien & Hampson, 2017, p. 111). Let it be any type of social identity, the pattern is the same – voters prefer someone, who is similar to them, someone who they share particular characteristics, identities with.

Scholars name this phenomenon differently in the field of political science. Some call it "gender affinity" (Simien & Hampson, 2017, p.93), while others call it "affective preference" (Rosenthal, 1995, p. 599), "baseline gender preference" (Sanbonmatsu, 2002, p.20), or "in-group favoritism" (Paolino, 1995, p.309). The term used by Paolino (1995) – "in-group preference" stems from the knowledge of social psychology. Interestingly, ethnocentrism serves as a basis for this phenomenon. The preference of one's own ethnic group has a long history in human behavior thus scholars in the 20th century conducted various ethnographic and experimental research on this topic (Sidanius & Kurzban, 2013). The "minimal groups experiments" brough a significant breakthrough in the research of social identity (Tajfel, 1978).

In Tajfel's experiments, participants were randomly divided into two groups, often on the basis of insignificant criteria such as painting preference – Kandinsky or Klee – or coin toss results. Participants were aware of their own group membership, but they did not have any information regarding other participants' group membership, besides they had no prior contact with each other.

In the experimental phase, participants had to distribute cash prizes between themselves and other group members. The instructions provided by the leader of the experiment were clean and simple – "Give two different amounts of money to the 44th member of the Klee group and the 77th member of the Kandinsky group". Tajfel and his colleagues (1978) observed that participants tended to give more rewards to members of their own group, even when the groups were set up on a completely random basis. This suggested that the knowledge of group membership alone is sufficient to distinguish between "them" and "us" groups, and that this distinction often favors one's own group, even if there is no real basis for the preference.

The results of these experiments have shown that in-group favoritism goes beyond the frame of ethnicities, cultures and nations (Sidanius & Kurzban, 2013), as citizens can quickly and strongly develop preferences even to groups to which they are attached by formerly insignificant characteristics.

The expressions presented above – "gender affinity", "affective preference", "baseline gender preference", and "in-group favoritism" – can be seen as synonymous in this work, as they manifest in the same way, namely that – for instance – women voters are more likely to vote

for women candidates. Simien and Hampson (2017) examine women's "gender affinity" in a separated way, where women are seen as a diverse group, based on race, ethnicity, and age. Contrarily, other scholars in previous works (Atkeson, 2003; Lawless, 2004) treat women as a monolithic, homogenic group, where the only differences can be based on partisanship and ideology.

Based on empirical evidence, treating women as a diverse group means a step forward in political representation research. The results show that there is a certain societal group – namely the Latinas –, who expressed the highest level of pride in Hillary Clinton's candidacy in the 2008 elections. Derived from their societal position – they are leaders in state, they have a significant influence in their social network. This fact underlines the importance of including different identities in empirical research. The case of African American women is also a great example for this. African American women's identity is connected to a complex historical background and a special set of conditions of race and gender. The final result of the competition between Clinton and Obama shows us that African American women prioritize their race over gender when it comes to a decision (Simien, 2009). This suggests that viewing women voters as a homogenic group does not always work the best, as the assessment of representatives, thus the concept of good representation is depending on many individual factors, like social identification and the prioritization of its different elements, such as gender, race or age which can determine how connections based on affinity play out in elections.

2.4. Substantive representation

The formerly presented descriptive approach to representation lays the ground for the substantive approach of representation. Whereas scientists formerly emphasized the person – asking *"Who can best represent the voters?"* – the substantive approach shifts the focus to the output.

The *Substantive Representation* in Pitkin's (1967) approach focuses on the representatives' actions and outputs. According to her, substantive representation is "acting in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" (p. 209). Within the framework of Substantive representation, some scholars focus on the political agenda. This view evaluates how well the representatives' actions match with the preferences and interests of the voters. The General Data Protection Regulation (in short: GDPR) in the European Union and the European Economic Area serves as an example for *Substantive Representation*, where EU policymakers acted in a way that serves the privacy rights and interests of EU citizens. Another example can

be seen in MPs raising parliamentary questions and participating in parliamentary voting on the issue of the minority language use.

Interestingly, these findings are completely in line with another significant work regarding women's political representation. Based on previous research, one needs to take into consideration, whether women as a social group have generally valid political characteristics, or their social group can be separated depending on any special interests or beliefs they may have (Sapiro, 1981). Women as a social group can be seen as homogenic in the political sphere from two perspectives. First, if one can presume that they have certain political, social, or economic issues, which are entirely other than those issues of other groups. Second, according to Sapiro (1981), women do have distinct, exact opinions on the solution of political issues. These possible ways go in the same direction – if any of them is true, one can state that women as a group share opinions or interests, which can be represented. These are the so called "representable interests" (Sapiro, 1981). Although women as a social group can be considered as homogenic in the *political sphere*, this does not invalidate the findings, which indicate their heterogeneity in the social sphere, in other words, in our everyday lives (see Celis & Childs, 2020) or that they can have more, competing identities such as race (see above).

Starting from the end of the 20th century, scientists identified several new types of representation. Within the typology Jane Mansbridge (2003) created, there is *'Promissory representation', 'Anticipatory representation', 'Surrogate representation'* and *'Gyroscopic representation'*. This latter model not only strongly differs from the other new forms of representation, but it is also – at least to some extent – incompatible with anticipatory representation. This model provides an operation, in which citizens select representatives who can be expected to act in ways the citizens approve without external incentives. In other words, representatives are like gyroscopes, rotating towards certain built-in goals. This model can take different forms, but one feature remains constant, namely that representatives will reflect on their own opinions and interests, when it comes to making a decision. They look for guidance because the aim is to get a *contextually derived understanding* of interest. According to this model, voters can make a decision based on the narrowest type – for instance based on the representative's dedication to a single issue; or voters can decide based on the broadest version – for instance a person of integrity, who is committed to the public good (Mansbridge, 2003). Integrity is often painted as a matter of 'standing for something', in the sense that the person of integrity refuses to 'trade action on their own views too cheaply for gain, status, reward, approval, or for the escape from penalties, loss of status, disapproval [and so on]' (Calhoun,

1995, p. 6). While a "good type/representative" has 3 main characteristics that go beyond outputs and processes: (1) they have similar policy preferences as the voter; (2) who is honest and principled; (3) who is sufficiently skilled (Fearon, 1999). These criteria are intriguing and worth of further research, however in this work I am only engaged in the last characteristic, the skills. This resonates well with the presence of experts in legislative processes, which is included in the research. The first criterion only implicitly appears in my research, although the second criterion falls outside of this work's scope.

The *'Surrogate representation'* in Mansbridge's (2003) work refers to instances where the representative has no electoral relationship with voters because they live in another district. The essence of this case is that there is not only any adequate way of accountability between the representative and the surrogate constituent, but also there is not any power relation between the two parties – the constituent and the representative (Mansbridge, 2003). Contrarily to this, previous findings put an emphasis not only on the representation of local interest, but also on the local embeddedness of MPs (Ilonszki, 2012).

The focus on responsiveness has opened its own strand in academic research. Closely following Pitkin's (1967) formerly presented idea on the substantive representation entails an element of responsiveness, Celis suggests that "Responsiveness turns what representatives do into substantive representation of the demos" (2012, p. 524). Literature on voter behavior often addresses this question in terms of policy representation and public responsiveness. The concept of substantive representation is supported by the knowledge of voter behavior through the model of 'opinion representation' (Wlezien & Soroka, 2007, p. 800). The idea suggests that policies result, in some way, from public preferences. In this approach, scholars emphasize the output, which can be assessed in a legislative setting by how MPs took upon putting issues and problems on the political agenda. In practice this can be captured by the number of parliamentary question and bills introduced (Höhmann, 2020; Mügge et al., 2019; Saalfeld & Bischof, 2013).

Theories of political psychology refine the approach to substantive representation. There is a huge temptation to simplify social identity by reducing it to categories like race or gender and consider women as one political group. This approach is misleading as women are a rather diverse group which can manifest in many ways, not only, for example in terms of their commitment to environmental protection, but also in their positions on issues like abortion or childcare. Derived from this difference of viewpoints, scholars state that *"women's disagreement is considered constructive; women's interests are identified through debate"*

(Celis & Childs, 2020, p. 25). This intriguing thought implies that women will favor representatives, who actively listen or partake in these debates. These thoughts lead us to next crucial theoretical section of my dissertation.

2.5. The dynamic process approach of representation

The concepts of *Locality* and *Pitkin's four views of representation* have established our understanding of political representation. As new – formerly unknown – issues and situations have emerged, theories of representation have continued to change and develop. More complex approaches have begun to unfold in recent decades. Scholars exceeded the original question of "Who can represent us in the best way possible?" as various other viewpoints have emerged. The prevailing question has shifted to "How can we be represented in the best way possible?". The formerly applied static approach has been challenged by a more dynamic approach.

The term 'dynamic representation' is not new in the context of representation theory. I am not the first to suggest that representation can be best described as dynamic. The expression is difficult to grasp, as it is widely overused in the literature – not only by representation theories, but also in voter behavior studies. As Sartori points out, "the larger the world, the more we have resorted to conceptual stretching, or conceptual straining, i.e., to vague, amorphous conceptualizations" (Sartori, 1970, p. 1034). That is also the case with the 'dynamic representation'.

To avoid any potential imprecision, first I present the origins of dynamic representation, which are rooted in the literature of voter behavior, and then I discuss my approach to it. As Wlezien and Soroka (2007) pointed out, the term 'dynamic representation' can be traced back to the end of the 20th century. Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson suggested that "public opinion moves meaningfully over time, that government officials sense this movement, and that — for a mixed set of motives — those officials alter their behavior in response to the sensed movement. This is dynamic representation, a simple idea and an old one" (Stimson et al., 1995, p. 543). In other words, classic voter behavior literature links the dynamic representation to the responsiveness of political actors. Representation theories have incorporated this idea. Dalton and his colleagues suggest that "rather than a discrete, point-in-time choice, democracy is based on a process of ongoing, dynamic representation that occurs through a comparison of the past and the future across repeated elections" (Dalton et al., 2012, p. 22). This idea can be linked to Mansbridge's (2003) concept of 'Promissory representation'. Through their significant work focusing on women's representation, Celis and Childs proposes that "representation is better

regarded as a more interactive process" (Celis & Childs, 2020, p. 87). Although the terminology they use differs from the classic term of 'dynamic representation', the essence remains the same.

All these definitions differ, yet they share a common element: each highlights the importance of context. This indicates that representation is not a static phenomenon but is actively changing. In the work of Dalton and his colleagues (2012), the timeliness of representation contributes to its dynamic nature. In my work, the changes in contextual information lead to the dynamic characteristic of representation. This does not mean that I dismiss the timeliness of representation, rather, I emphasize context over time.

To answer this new question – "How can we be represented in the best way possible?" –, the concept of *Descriptive representation* has been extended by the emergence of *Self-representation*, which puts an emphasis on the importance of direct participation and self-advocacy instead of relying on agents or delegates in the representational processes. Again citing the literature on women's representation, Williams articulates that "it is not enough that women communicate their perspectives to men; a full respect for women's agency, and a full protection of their interests, requires that they act on their own behalf" (Williams, 1998, p. 119). Building on this premise, representatives merely mirroring particular visible characteristics – such as gender, race, and ethnicity – is not sufficient for proper representation of citizens' opinions and interests.

Our ways of thinking about political representation theories are rapidly evolving. As a result, we are now able to address the topic of representation in a more complex and nuanced sense, considering not only the basic characteristics of representatives, but also the specific situations, contexts, institutional systems, actors and available knowledge. This comprehensive approach captures nearly every aspect of representation, indicating a crucial shift in the discipline. Whereas scientists formerly took snapshots at specific points in time for analysis, today they focus on the dynamic process regarding representation. They consider not only political parties and their candidates, but they also examine the situations and the institutional frameworks thoroughly and pay special attention to changes that occur amongst other factors.

Anne Phillips (1995) continued exploring political representation and took a step back with exposing issues concerning how well voters' preferences and beliefs are mirrored. In some of the formerly introduced theories – for example in the case of the *delegate model* and the *promissory representation*, one may assume that voters have clear and explicit opinions and preferences, which are completely transparent (Saward, 2008). The '*politics of ideas'* builds on

these opinions and preferences. This approach focuses on the composition of legislative assemblies, which should completely reflect all voters' opinions, ideas and preferences (Phillips, 1995). Phillips (1995) argues that given opinions and preferences can be supported by people with different backgrounds – for example the interest of a given geographic location can be represented not only by someone, who lives there, but also by someone, who only used to live in that specific area, as we have seen it in the case of the surrogate representation model (Mansbridge, 2003). Or another example by Phillips is that the interests of mothers with young children can also be represented by males without a child (Phillips, 1994). The *'politics of ideas'* puts emphasis on the output – it does not matter who speaks for a specific constituency or for a specific group of people as long as they do it effectively.

With the changing world and changing challenges, the theory of *'politics of ideas'* faced some difficulties. According to many feminists, *'politics of ideas'* failed to overcome the issues of political exclusion. As Phillips (1995) points out in her research, male-dominated parliaments differentiate between the interests of male and female citizens, while not giving them equal attention (as cited in Baaz & Lilja, 2014, p. 9). These critiques induced the promotion of the concept of *'politics of presence'*. It is essential to highlight that these two approaches – *'politics of ideas'* and *'politics of presence'* – are not opposite by any means, they are more like complementing each other. Modern democracies not only fail to present political equality but also they do advocate overrepresenting of political elites within political spaces (Baaz & Lilja, 2014). This is the weak spot of modern representative democracies and the theory of *'politics of presence'* offers a solution to it. Its premise is that subaltern groups should also be represented in politics. This means that legislative assemblies need to mirror significant, distinct identity categories. These identity categories hold diverse opinions and interests and only a certain model of representation is able to handle these opinions and interests appropriately – a model, which strongly builds on the presence of these subaltern groups, in other words, these minority social groups (Baaz & Lilja, 2014; Phillips, 2000). With this, we return to a certain aspect of political representation, namely to characteristics and resemblance. Based on previous findings (Phillips, 1995, 2000), fair representation means balanced representation in accordance with certain characteristics like gender, race or ethnicity. This idea can be seen as parallel with the descriptive representation (Dovi, 2018; Pitkin, 1967) and the resemblance model (Arowolo, 2015). Although they may seem similar, their essence is differing. While in the case of descriptive representation and the resemblance model we focus on *'How one chooses his/her*

representative?', in the case of *'politics of presence'* we put emphasis on the process itself – we concentrate on the operation and recruitment of legislative assemblies.

This process-based approach also marks a pivotal moment in the present work. Looking back at the previously presented theories in the field of representation theories, the main consequence is that is Hanna Pitkin's (1967) work is inevitable and fundamental in this area. Majority of scholars build on her theories and ideas. Phillips (1995), Lawless (2004) and Simien (2009) contributed to a shift in the field by customizing political representation ideas according to the present political context. The same applies to Michael Saward (2006). Saward (2006) provides us a completely renewed approach, with three key background assumptions:

(1) " (…) we must understand representation not as a relationship between constituents and representatives at particular moments, but as a process in which the relationship between citizens and representatives continues over time" (Saward, 2006; Thompson, 1988: 136).
(2) Representation as a process focuses on the action of making claims to be representative and then to vie those claims.
(3) 'Constituents' and 'representatives' do not need to be members of certain electoral districts and elected members of the parliament or any councils. According to Saward (2006), this approach only applies to narrow political science customs.

The first two points are the most crucial from the perspective of my work. Although the third assumption is also intriguing, my current research operates in the 'classic' constituent-voter scenario, so derived from this, that point will have the least relevance in this chapter.

Political representation as a dynamic process, instead of a static connection between voter and representative – this is one main key to my work. My research aims to capture the process of evaluating representatives and its influencing factors. My premise is that the rationale voters use to evaluate representatives changes based on the context and the type of issue at hand.

The practice of making claims is also a novelty in political representation theories. The prior theories operated more like in a 'one-way street', where political issues are given by narratives of political actors and political parties. Voters are only expected to respond to these stimuli. This can be seen as a top-down logic in political representation, where the ones with political power rule the political sphere. Contrarily to this, Saward (2006) suggest a 'two-way street'. In this sense, claims could be made not only by representatives, but also by voters – which can also be seen as a bottom-up logic. The author's reasoning behind this is that representation is

about "something in the making rather than something achieved or completed" (Saward, 2006, p. 185). The claim could be anything, coming from anyone. Someone my claim to represent someone else's opinions, while another person may claim the needs of a geographical area. At this point, it is important to declare that normally any claim is subject to discussion, after which it can be accepted, rejected or ignored on any level (Saward, 2006).

Albeit representative claims can be extremely different from one another, there is a universal formula for them on an abstract level, with 5 key components (Saward, 2006):

(1) Maker – the person who proclaims the given claim
(2) Subject – this varies, it can be the person itself, or a certain social group or party, or a symbol
(3) Object – the concept or the idea of the real thing
(4) Referent – the real thing itself in the claim
(5) Audience – to whom the claim pertains, who can accept or reject the claim.

The Subject-Object-Referent triad may be deceptive. In order to avoid any potential misconceptions, I do present a conventional example for a representative claim. Let us suppose that a member of the parliament (M) offers an expert's knowledge (S) as the solution of a threatening environmental issue (O) with respect to the potentially affected voters living in the same geographical are (R) to the voters and media.

This example is related to a question in my research, as the topic of environmental issues appears in the questionnaire, although in another aspect. The detailed demonstration of the questions will be taking place in the *'3. Research design and method'* chapter.

This approach of political representation has been used by many scholars not only in the field of political sciences, but also in the of gender studies. When thinking about women representing women in this approach, the following model arises: women representatives (M) offer themselves (S), to represent the opinions and interests of women (O) that is connected to certain women in the society (R), and this chain is offered to not only women in the society, but also maybe for other members of the society as well (A) (Celis & Childs, 2018; Ilonszki & Vajda, 2019).

Following the way of these 5 key components, one main question arises – what is a maker without an audience? This implies that a maker's effort is needed for a representative claim to be made. Without a claim, there is no relationship of representation. The subject and object

themselves are necessary but not sufficient to form a relationship between the representative and the voters. Actions and – from that – performance is also needed from the representative – or the candidate (Saward, 2017). Actions and performance can manifest in many ways – for example representatives can consult with their voters, or with experts about dubious issues. In my research I do offer different forms of representative actions for the respondents, one of them lacks any type of discussion and suggests that the representative should follow the party's policy instead of breaking the party unity (see Papp, 2021) regarding a given topic. Although this option seems to be contrary to Saward's standpoint, originating from the general political context and characteristics of Hungary, respondents may favor this option over the other ones, where dialogue between voters and representatives is displayed.

Summarizing the previously presented literature and their concepts, we can see the changes of how political scientists approach political representation. As Pitkin (1967) is considered as a pioneer of the field, Mansbridge (1999, 2003) and Saward (2006) can be considered as innovators. Their works incorporate and present the significance of the *'creative' acts* regarding political representation (Celis et al., 2008). The model of the *anticipatory representation* is a great example in this sense. In this approach of *anticipatory representation*, political representatives do not operate with already existing interests, which are provided by the voters. Rather they actively construct the voters' interests, by pursuing to fulfil their future interests and opinions (Celis et al., 2008).

This process of construction leads us to Saward's (2006) work. As Mansbridge (1999, 2003) does, Saward also explicitly puts an emphasis on creating 'representative claims'. He clearly denies the concept of already existing interests and opinions, which are simply brought in the context of political representation. Instead, Saward proposes the concept of claim making (Celis et al., 2008).

Saward's alteration of the concept of political representation results in four main perks (Celis et al., 2008):

(1) It includes new actors – for instance experts, businessmen, NGOs – in the concept of political representation, aside the elected the officials, who are 'traditionally' one of the main actors of representation
(2) It exposes the vulnerability of claims, as they can be easily rejected or accepted
(3) This model leads us to the significance of context, by considering political representation as a performance

(4) It sheds a light on the characteristics of the constituency and its interests – for example their stability.

In my work, the first and third points are particularly crucial. Celis et al. emphasize that "representation is, at least in part, a performance of claim making" (Celis et al., 2008, p. 106). Thus, discourses are essential for appropriate representation, as discourses are the means through which people can be represented. Besides, discourse can create and shape the context. Mansbridge's (2003) 'Gyroscopic representation' also highlights the importance of the context, as it helps representatives to get a better understanding on the preferences and opinions of their constituents.

As I am examining the dynamic process of representation through vignette research, I render experts as relevant actors in political representation, while providing exact, explicit context – which changes from vignette to vignette – for the respondents. In the light of these circumstances, I attempt to elucidate the dynamic nature of political representation from the perspective of voters, emphasizing the vital aspects of evaluating political representatives' performance. The fact that my research is based on one-time survey means that the time component of the dynamic nature of representation cannot be captured here, so it is the changing context that offers an insight into this dynamism.

Building on the previously discussed theories on representation, it becomes apparent that our perceptions of political representation and representatives are influenced by various factors, including context, institutional system, specific situation, actors, and the information available about the case. Considering all these factors we can see that representation unfolds as a dynamic process. Consequently, with my work I will not be able to identify the characteristics of the ideal representative. Instead, it will identify the variables that determine voters' preferences and their evaluations of representatives. Among these variables, some are stable, such as locality, where voters explicitly prefer candidates from their own constituencies. Other variables are defined by context, like in crises, where voter preferences may vary according to the nature of the crisis. Additionally, there are personal variables that can affect how citizens view candidates, including the candidates' personality traits. This type of preference is not based on interests or needs, instead it focuses on personal attachment between citizen and candidate, where various psychological dynamics dominate, like identification.

In this work I aim to identify the factors with the most influential power on voters' evaluation of representatives' performance. If there are any fix factors, which are they?

2.6. Who do we vote for?

When we think about representation and politics, it is inevitable to think about the individuals behind them. Over the last decades, the personalization of politics has gained significant attention, with scholars noting that nowadays' politics is more personalized than ever. The personalization of politics implies that the ones in political positions are more prominent than other political actors, like parliaments or parties (Bøggild et al., 2021; Pedersen & Rahat, 2021). This shift affects not only political practices, but also voter behavior, presenting voters with new challenges, formerly unknown questions. How will they identify the best candidate for office?

What factors influence voters' judgement of a candidate's capability to hold an office? Based on the knowledge of political psychology, social roles mean the baseline. The evolution of mankind resulted in quite well-defined differences between men and women. As centuries ago, men were the ones hunting and working in the public sphere, and women were the ones caring for others and childbearing, distinct social roles started to from. Men formed '*agentic'* traits, while women formed *'communal'* traits (Schneider & Bos, 2019, p. 175-176). Whereas the strict division of manly and womanly jobs have already started to fade, the heritage of the previous centuries still lingers around. Men are (implicitly) expected to work in jobs like mechanics, repairmen, plumber, driver, while women are (implicitly) expected to take jobs like nurse or teacher. This means that the members of the society have exact anticipations regarding one's tasks in life. These are the so-called social roles (Social Role Theory, in short: SRT). These social roles result in gender stereotypes, which "describe, prescribe, and proscribe" men's and women's characteristics and behavior (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Schneider & Bos, 2019, p. 192). These rules and stereotypes go into effect when one gets in office – or aims to get there. Role congruity theory (in short: RCT) emphasizes the importance of the agentic and communal traits. Derived from this, women face obstacles when running for office, because voters expect them to present communal traits, while political positions are strongly linked to agentic traits (Schneider & Bos, 2019).

These traits related to gender can be named differently. Huddy and Capelos call characteristics linked to women 'expressive', while they call traits related to men 'instrumental' (Huddy & Capelos, 2002, p. 31). They "describe the nature of gender stereotypes and document shared expectations of a >>good<< politician in order to explore the interplay between political and gender stereotypes" (Huddy & Capelos, 2002, p. 30). My secondary research question is the same as the core of their question – What are the shared expectations of a 'good

politician/representative'? According to their work, instrumental traits, such as determination, strength and confidence are perceived as more important for political actors than expressive traits (Huddy & Capelos, 2002, pp. 32-33). Huddy and Capelos name "four key dimensions of presidential personality" (Huddy & Capelos, 2002, p. 32), these are 'leadership', 'competence', 'empathy' and 'integrity'. Although it seems like women face complex obstacles when it comes to their run for office, they can decrease voter bias by educating voters about themselves. By sharing information about themselves, they become able to disprove – or at least weaken – the effects of gender stereotypes (Huddy & Capelos, 2002). By transcending gender roles, the qualities of a good representative come to focus on personality and personality traits.

Ha and Lau conducted a research on a US sample, who found that certain personality dimensions influence voters' decisions and also affect the strength of party identification (Ha & Lau, 2015). The effect of candidates' personality traits may be stronger for voters who have weaker party affiliation (Nai et al., 2021). Other research has broadened the focus and examined the personality of political candidates in addition to voters' personality traits. These results have also shown that personality traits affect the evaluation of political candidates and thus who voters vote for (Falcão et al., 2023).

These results enrich the theoretical approaches to representation theory presented here, since from the voters' point of view, the personality and individual personality traits of representatives' function as a heuristic in their decision-making (Falcão et al., 2023), that is the impact of personality traits on political choice should not be ignored, in addition to the models of representation theory presented earlier. The present work is situated at the intersection of the knowledge of three fields – political psychology, representation theory and electoral behavior – and aims to explore how approaches and methods from electoral behavior and political psychology can enrich our knowledge of representation theory. This supplementary research is a pilot project designed to test how well this research question and design would perform in a study with a larger sample size.

Whether voters are looking for a representative like themselves – the affinity, descriptive model – or a representative who is better than they are in certain aspects – the trustee model – the personality traits of politicians play a crucial role in the process.

A popular tool for understanding human personality is the Big Five personality model. One of the main reasons for its popularity is that it is an excellent tool for capturing individual differences while still providing generalizable results. This generalizability applies across time,

gender and ethnicity (Gallagher & Allen, 2014; Kaarbo, 2017). The Big Five model uses 5 scales to capture the complexity of human personality. Although some discrepancies in the naming of the factors have appeared in the past, both internationally and domestically, it is important to highlight that the content of each scale is unanimously accepted by the scientific community. In the Hungarian adaptation of the Big Five, the factors are named: Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability and Openness.

The Extraversion factor assesses the behavior and attitudes of individuals in social situations. People who score high on the scale are considered extraverted, more sociable, talk more, and like to be around people. At the other end of the scale are introverts – they tend to be more introverted, withdrawn, and quiet. Those scoring higher on the Agreeableness scale are more cooperative, altruistic, supportive, and empathetic. People on the opposite side of the dimension, on the other hand, are more cynical and do not shy away from conflict with other people. People scoring higher on the Conscientiousness scale are more organized and flawless in the fulfilment of commitments, and are generally more disciplined, orderly, and forward-looking than their counterparts scoring lower on the scale. People who score lower on this scale are more spontaneous and reckless. The Emotional Stability dimension measures sensitivity to cues and impulses from the environment. People with higher emotional stability are calmer and more patient than people with lower emotional stability. They are more worried and anxious. The Openness dimension measures individuals' openness to new experiences. Open-minded people are more interested in other cultures and are more open to new relationships, ideas, creativity, and innovation. In contrast, less open individuals like established practices and are afraid of new things (G. V. Caprara & Vecchione, 2013; Carver & Scheier, 2006).

Research in political psychology is increasingly focusing on understanding the personality traits of political actors. To achieve this goal, social scientists often use the Big Five personality model. Previous empirical research has found that political candidates excel more in the dimensions of Extraversion, Openness and Emotional Stability compared to voters in terms of their scores (Scott & Medeiros, 2020). For incumbent politicians, the Extraversion, Openness, Emotional Stability, and Conscientiousness factors stand out when comparing results to voters when examining the issue in a US sample (Hanania, 2017). Looking at the same question in an Italian context, we see overlaps – the Italian results also confirm that politicians are more salient on the dimensions of Extraversion and Agreeableness, but there are no significant differences between voters and politicians on the factors of Emotional Stability, Conscientiousness and Openness (G. Caprara et al., 2003). Other studies, which, like a part of present work, also focus

on the personality of the ideal politician, have found that the Conscientiousness scale emerges as the most important and highly rated dimension (Roets & Van Hiel, 2009). Examining the personality of the ideal representative in a German and Austrian sample, it emerged that voters look for politicians who are more extroverted, open, emotionally stable and conscientious than they are, but less agreeable than they are (Aichholzer & Willmann, 2020).

However, most of the previous studies on the topic focus on political leaders (G. V. Caprara et al., 2002, 2006; Dietrich et al., 2012; Joly et al., 2019; Scott & Medeiros, 2020), hence the results of empirical research on the so-called leadership traits. However, it is important to underline that political leaders and political representatives are not necessarily the same – neither in terms of the content of the concepts nor in terms of the persons occupying the positions. The literature has explored the relationship between the two concepts from several angles. Platow's research suggests that it is the representatives who make the particularly good – charismatic – leaders. Empirical results show that a leader can be a true leader – having a vision that he or she can transmit to the larger masses – if he or she is a prototypical representative of the group, i.e. the most typical member of the group (Platow et al., 2006). This provides a consistent empirical result placing the relationship between leadership and representation in a local context. An analysis of the representational role of Danish mayors, it was found that this role can be multifaceted, with Kjaer's study identifying four mayoral representative functions, namely 'representative', 'master of ceremonies', 'local secretary of state' and 'ombudsman'. This list highlights the complexity of the mayoral role and, in turn, reveals two potential types of representation – the 'leadership' and 'legislative' styles (Kjaer, 2015).

2.7. Summarizing the theoretical framework

Literature from different disciplines – representation theories, political psychology, and voter behavior – applies diverse approaches to the concept representation. Despite this diversity, there are some common points that define the four key points of my work.

First, *representation is dynamic*. Voters' expectations are by no means static, instead they change over time and place. Voters may vote for a candidate during the elections who they assume would be the best fit for the office. Conversely, the actions of that representative may result in voters' reevaluation of their own decision. The feedback loop between voters and their representatives is prominent. This involves how representatives adapt to changes in public opinion which can influence voters' future choices. This highlights the responsive nature of

representation. Issues which need be represented can also vary. In other words, as an effect of external actions and changes, voters may change their minds, regarding the person of their representative. These external factors and their effects open the strand for the next key point of my work.

Second, *representation is contextualized*. Voters' preferences, as well as their evaluation of their representatives, depend on the context in which they are situated. Voters may prefer a younger representative in calmer times, while they may prefer an older, presumably more experienced representative in times of crises.

Third, *interests are constructed*. As Reingold and Swers pointed out, "women's interests are socially constructed, politically contested, and empirically contingent, then we can further explore how and why the meaning and significance of women's interests vary across time, space, institutions, groups, and individuals" (Reingold & Swers, 2011, p. 430). It is important to highlight that not only women's interests are socially constructed. Following the terminology of Saward (2006), claims can be made by a variety of actors about a variety of objects.

The fourth key theoretical assumption of my dissertation is that *representation is strongly personalized*. Scholars not only emphasize the processes of politics, but also, they stress the importance of the persons shaping politics.

3. Research design and method

3.1. Research questions and hypotheses

Defining the scope, thus the research questions and hypotheses of my work is a crucial point. As political representation is a complex concept, it offers many potential directions for research. Scholars explore its substantive nature, its process nature, or its outcomes, among many others. In my research I emphasize quality – specifically, voters' satisfaction and their expectations. Firstly, I attempt to understand what factors influence voters' assessment and choice when electing their representatives. Secondly, I aim to gain a deeper insight into voters' expectations of their representatives during turbulent times. Thirdly, as a psychologist, I am interested in outlining the personality traits of the sought-after representative. To contribute to our existing knowledge in a relevant way, I have formulated the following research questions:

(1) What do voters want? What factors influence voters' preferences?

Are preferences linked to descriptive ideals of representation? Does affinity matter?

Are preferences linked to trustee ideals of representation? Does experience matter?

Are these preferences dynamic in their nature? Do they change due to the changing context?

Are voters expectations personalized? Are there expectations explicitly linked to personality types?

(2) What is the personality of the ideal representative like?

To answer the first research question and test the hypothesis related, I conducted a quantitative study using a vignette survey experiment.

The first research question is rather broad thus I narrowed down my focus based on the literature of representation presented in the previous section. To discover voters' preferences, I included the variables of gender, age, locality, family status, parental status, previous political experience and previous elected position. I conceptualized affinity along the lines of locality ($H1_a$), age ($H2_b$), gender ($H3_b$), and formulated my hypotheses accordingly. I conceptualized experience along the lines of age ($H2_a$), political experience ($H5_a$) and previous elected position ($H5_b$). These conceptualizations are therefore overlapping as age plays into both – a complexity that is reflected in how I formulated my hypothesis regarding age ($H2_a$ reflecting the conceptualization of experience, $H2_b$ reflecting the conceptualization of affinity). The conceptualization of gender is more complex: first it can possibly interplay with expectations of gender roles ($H3_a$, $H3_c$) but it also can have affinity affect ($H3_b$). Marital and parental status can also be linked to the gender roles of candidates. Being married and having children may reflect qualities related to caring, being compassionate and multitasking. I conceptualized gender roles with parental and marital status ($H4_a$ and $H4_b$).

$H1_a$: Voters prefer local candidates.

$H1_b$: Locality is the strongest affinity factor.

$H2_a$: Voters prefer older candidates.

$H2_b$: Age is a significant affinity factor.

$H3_a$: Voters prefer male candidates.

$H3_b$: Gender is a significant affinity factor.

$H3_c$: For female candidates, gendered attributes are significant in shaping voters' preferences.

$H4_a$: Voters prefer candidates who are married.

$H4_b$: Voters prefer candidates with children.

$H5_a$: Voters prefer politically experienced candidates.

$H5_b$: Voters prefer candidates with previous elected positions.

In order to see if voters' preferences are dynamic, I decided to formulate a question with a rather drastically changing context: voters were asked about their preferences in the context of crisis where the type of crisis changed. Here, my main hypothesis was to demonstrate the simple fact that voters' expectations are dynamic and change according to crisis type:

H6: Voters' expectations are dynamic and change according to crisis type.

H7: Voters having female representatives tend to prefer the involvement of experts more.

The research conducted also sheds light into voters' preferences about the process of decision-making with focus on how non-elected actors such as experts are viewed but so far not hypotheses is formed in this respect.

For the second research question – "*What is the personality of the ideal representative like?*", I employed a qualitative method, using focus group discussion[1]. The research is at its very pilot phase so it does not offer data that can be used to test any hypothesis, but rather serves as an insight into building better refined research question and retain some methodological insights. Combining these methods helped me to deepen our understating on voters' perceptions of good representation.

3.2. Case selection for the research

Representation in Hungary seems to show a well-polished picture, although behind this lies a more disenchanting reality where weak electoral linkages and a substantial representational deficit are documented (Ilonszki, 1998). Representational deficit means in very simple terms that voters do not feel represented. Given that the democratic system is indeed a representational

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democracy, we can argue that this phenomenon of voters' discontent is a pivotal shortcoming that can weaken the democratic structure itself. This concern is a driving force of my research, thus understanding voters' preferences is also a way of addressing the deficit that occurs. This representational deficit can stem from several causes. Here, understanding voters' preferences and wishes is pivotal. Who do voters want to represent them, ensuring they feel adequately represented? Do they want someone like them, to represent them (affinity effect)? Or do they want someone who possesses certain characteristics, independently from their own attributes? Regardless, public support is crucial for appropriately functioning representational processes and democracy (Ribbhagen, 2013, p. 22).

This leads us to the second essential consideration regarding representation in Hungary. With experts entering the political arena, traditional dynamics began altering. In a technocratic operation, "First, the source of legitimacy of power is superior knowledge and expertise (rather than, say, popular will). Second, political representation follows a >>trustee<< model positing independence from, and unresponsiveness towards, society" (Caramani, 2020, p. 3). Further elaborating this logic, Caramani points out that "Technocracy is thus a type of power, but also a source of legitimacy and a form of representation" (Caramani, 2020, p. 3). Democratic legitimacy is often contrasted with technocratic legitimacy which stems from expertise, knowledge and economic explanations such as efficiency and efficacy. Research on expert governments and policy decision-making has demonstrated that these two types of legitimacy can coexist within political systems. What about Hungary? The presence of experts in the Hungarian government is not unprecedented in recent decades (Galambos, 2023). In areas requiring specialized expertise, it has been common for experts to be appointed to decision-making positions (Ilonszki & Ványi, 2011). The more so as the proportion of experts in Hungarian governments is outstanding in European comparison with neighboring countries (Vittori et al., 2023). As these results focus on experts in official political positions, two questions emerge: (1) How do voters react to experts in the representational process, as a third party? And (2) In which scenarios do voters prefer experts instead of political actors, in the representational process?

To answer these questions in my dissertation, this subchapter is divided into two parts. Firstly, it examines the main characteristics of the Hungarian Parliament, outlining how the Hungarian legislature fits into the descriptive approach of representation theories. Secondly, it reviews Hungarian representation from a process-oriented perspective, focusing on the presence of experts in representation during turbulent times. These steps will facilitate a deeper exploration

of Hungarian voters' preferences, not only towards the individuals representing them, but also towards the actions performed by their representatives.

Looking at the National Assembly in Hungary, one can speculate that voters' preferences tend to converge in one direction: towards incumbent, middle-aged, male representatives of Fidesz. The findings of Ilonszki (1998) are supported even nowadays by empirical data, as the most recent youth studies showed that among the V4 countries young Hungarians are least likely to believe that they are represented well (Bíró-Nagy & Szabó, 2022). We argue that this representative deficit contributes to the fragile nature of Hungarian democracy and thus learning about voters' preferences regarding representation can contribute towards the strengthening of democratic ties and the lessening of democratic discontent (Dahlberg et al., 2015).

Among Central and Eastern European countries, Hungary hosts a rather old-fashioned parliamentary elite: its parliamentary politicians became highly professionalized early on (Cotta & Best, 2000; Ilonszki & Edinger, 2007) meaning that incumbency became a defining feature of its parliamentary elite with a turnover rate being the second lowest among CEE countries (Semenova, 2024). This closed elite preserved and strengthened its highly educated, middle-aged and male character. Comparing the parliamentary elites in different parliamentary cycles from 1990 to 2010, Ilonszki and Schwarcz argued for a homogenization thesis stating that MPs became more similar regarding their age, gender, place of birth and education. Regarding the causes behind these trends, the authors pointed towards party-related explanatory variables "… with the consolidation of the party framework – two big parties and some small parties located in parliament – differences in the composition were mainly due to party size and power positions. This tendency confirms that party changes and the transformation of the party system are often the background to the parliamentary elite differences, and these changes are reflected in party selection and de-selection strategies." (Ilonszki & Schwarcz, 2013, pp. 68-69). Looking beyond parliamentarians in her research on candidates, Papp confirmed the role of parties which tended to place more experienced candidates are placed higher on party lists and preferred men over women although regarding age, younger candidates were placed higher than older ones (Papp, 2017). Both research investigate the Hungarian political landscape before 2010 when the conservative party, Fidesz won with a landslide victory introducing a period of a dominant party system with the same party winning qualified majority in four consecutive elections. While the turnover rate peaked in 2010 with the emergence of new parties and Fidesz introducing new politicians as well, soon the dominant party model solidified the parliamentary elite again along the same lines as before: both in 2018 and 2022 the average age of MPs was

50 and 52 years respectively, men dominated with 13-14% of women present and MPs had around 10 years of parliamentary experience on average (Republikon Intézet, 2022). However, the dominant party model also masked important differences: both in 2018 and 2022 opposition MPs were approximately 10 years younger on average, the percentage of women was more than 20% in their ranks and their parliamentary experience ranged from 4,7 to 5,5 years (Republikon Intézet, 2022). These are striking differences that indicate a turmoil under the rigid surface.

The question still remains: what do voters want? Analyzing elections between 1994-2010 Papp (2018) found that voters seem to punish incumbency and they do not value experience in national political positions either. What voters do value is local attachment although the effects are small thus as Papp describes: „Regardless of the party-centeredness of Eastern European politics, personal characteristics of the candidates can influence electoral performance. Of course, selecting locally attached candidates will not change the power relations between parties." (2018, p. 535).

The evident dominance of party politics both on the supply and demand side of electoral politics prompted me to consider conducting my research in a low-level environment where party influence is deliberately not considered (see more on that below).

Factors influencing voter choice and voters' preference are diverse and thus the empirical research tracking their effects are numerous and vary greatly in their approaches and methods. Some studies emphasize the candidate's gender (Ono & Burden, 2019; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Sapiro, 1981), while others focus on the geographical distance between voters and candidates (Arzheimer & Evans, 2012; Evans et al., 2017; Kal Munis, 2021). Some works examine the effects of age (Eshima & Smith, 2022; Webster & Pierce, 2019) and the candidate's prior experience, whether in business or politics (Adams et al., 2021; Kirkland & Coppock, 2018). These works are based on the results of experimental studies. One shared characteristic of all these works is that they focused on one or two factors at one time, allowing respondents and researchers to take these factors into consideration independently but also limiting their capacity to contextualize answers and examine interactions.

Although the Hungarian parliamentary elite is quite closed, it has been a tumultuous time in recent years for them. First, the primaries organized before the national elections of 2022. "While the primaries organised in 2021 introduced an innovative element into the opposition landscape by inviting voters to participate in the selection of single-member district candidates and the prime ministerial candidate, the resulting alliance, under the leadership of Péter Márki-

Zay, failed to live up to the expectations. Similarly to previous elections, the opposition alliance was not marred with internal divisions, as parties and party leaders fought for dominance, which the newcomer Márki-Zay was unable to overcome" (Várnagy, 2023, p. 216). As Várnagy (2023) points out, the Hungarian political sphere had a newcomer in 2021, which was quite a novelty on this level. Then, in 2024 another new actor appeared on the scene: Péter Magyar. He held different positions during the last decades; in the 2010s Magyar had been working in governmental positions. Then, in 2024, after the scandalous resignation of Katalin Novák (former President of Hungary), and Judit Varga (former Minister of Justice, and former wife of Magyar), Péter Magyar has started his public political presence and career. He presented resistance and something new, something different. His well-constructed activism resulted in a great electoral success in the 2024 Hungarian municipal and European Parliament elections in June 2024. His party his party won the second-highest number of seats in the European Parliament, following the Fidesz-KDNP coalition with 11 and 7 seats, respectively. These results suggest that Hungarian voters and Hungarian politics seems to be open for newcomers. But what do newcomers offer and represent that makes them acceptable? This is the question I aim to answer with this recent survey experiment research. It is important to note that my research does not focus on the aforementioned Hungarian political newcomers (a low-information design) because I wanted to avoid any interference of actual politics with my results.

The process-oriented approach of the Hungarian representation also reveals an interesting picture. Democratic legitimacy is often understood as legitimacy stemming from procedural elements such as voting that connects the represented and the representative through shared political values, beliefs, opinions and interests. Derived from this, the representational process, thus the democratic legitimacy in Hungary is also strongly characterized by the electoral system of the country. Up to 2010, it was observed that "While voters expect the representation of 'the local', their connection with MPs is exceptionally low" (Ilonszki, 2012, p. 180). In 2011, there were significant changes in electoral rules in Hungary. In the current system, there are 199 seats in total in Hungarian Parliament, from which 106 Members of Parliament (in short: MPs) are elected in Single-Member Districts (in short: SMDs), the remaining 93 MPs are elected on a national list. As Papp and Zorigt highlights it, "SMDs create a stronger linkage of accountability by setting clear responsibility for the different (positive and negative) outcomes" (Norris, 2001; Papp & Zorigt, 2018, p. 121). Derived from this strengthened accountability, representatives

aim is to please voters even more, in order to be re-elected in the future. But how can they do that? Does incorporating experts' opinions make a difference?

Experts in governments have a long history. As Vittori et al. present, "Technocratic ministers are members of government cabinets who have never been elected to public office, never had formal ties to any political party and, finally, possess non-party political expertise relevant to their role in government" (Vittori et al., 2023, pp. 867-868). During the times of Italy's and Greece's debt crisis, party politicians "were replaced by 'technocrats' such as Mario Monti and Lucas Papademos. With a background as experts in economics instead of being career politicians, their mandates were to implement fiscal austerity packages that their predecessors had not been able to push through. This type of leadership turnover is meant to bring more 'competent' people into government in times of deep economic crises" (Bäck & Persson, 2018, pp. 57-58).

Hungary is also not exempt from technocratic governments, however the classification of the Bajnai cabinet is not completely unambiguous (Kovarek, 2021). Sitter argues that the cabinet led by Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai can be described as a "a more or less technocratic interim government" (Sitter, 2011, p. 1).

Vittorio et al. have also created the *Technocratic Ministers Dataset* (in short: TMD) which collection consists of 31 European countries (Vittori et al., 2023). Based on this dataset's content, Figure 2 shows the ratio of technocrats in European countries' governments.



Figure 2. Mean Number of Technocratic Ministers Per Government in Europe, 2000–2020. Source: Vittori et al., 2023

As Figure 2 indicates, there are more technocrats in Hungarian governments than in the neighboring countries. Figure 3 shows further data on how the number of experts in the governments has evolved during the terms starting from 1998 to 2018.



Figure 3. Number of technocrats during legislative periods in Hungary (author's own, based on the TMD)

As the figures show, there are a rather good number of experts in the Hungarian government. However, we lack information about voters' preferences regarding experts outside the government. Do voters even want to see experts outside the government in Hungary?

In my dissertation I argue that the two forms of legitimacy – democratic and technocratic legitimacy – not only coexist, but also can be intertwined within the procedural interpretation of representation. Voters might expect their democratically elected representatives to incorporate and even prioritize technocratic approaches in decision making. A good representative also includes the technocratic aspect in the decision-making procedure. A puzzling question about representation is thus when do voters legitimize technocracy over politics and demand their representative to prioritize expertise over particularistic political interests or party platforms? Recent Hungarian results show that Hungarian citizens preferred experts in political decision-making processes during the pandemic (Papp, 2024, manuscript).

3.3. Vignette and conjoint survey experiments

Survey experiments were introduced in the disciplines of marketing research and sociology in the 1970s and in political science, they have gained immense popularity in recent years (Knudsen & Johannesson, 2019; Ono & Burden, 2019) mainly due to their capacity to embrace complexity. The design of conjoint experiments enables us to examine the effects of multiple

influencing factors at once (Hainmueller et al., 2014). In this design, all variables can be manipulated independently and are generated in a different step of the process, which allows us to examine the independent and interactive effects of specific variables (Hainmueller et al., 2014; Ono & Burden, 2019). With conjoint analysis, variables can be manipulated separately, enabling the creation of various types of vignettes without requiring an extremely large sample size during the data gathering phase of the research. Furthermore, conjoint analysis helps reduce the possibility of participants' social desirability bias.

The naming of vignette method refers to very different types of stimuli, used during data collection. In this case, a stimuli can be not only in text format – like in a casual questionnaire survey, but it can also be an images or a video. The point is to create an exact context for respondents (Hughes & Huby, 2004).

Nowadays, in our globalized world, individuals do not have the capacity to properly track every aspect of their daily lives, so they become selective of the sense what they interpret from the world's happenings (Giddens, 1991; Hughes, 1998). Selectivity also applies to the vignette method – with the created context, vignettes provide a 'snapshot' of a situation to respondents. This emerges two significant points. First, vignettes provide respondents space to form a discursive interpretation within the given context. Second, this space ensures a 'non-personal' and 'non-threatening' perspective to consider the issues arising from the vignette (Hughes, 1998).

At this point, it is important to note that this characteristic of the method – the significance of the context –, raises key considerations for analyzing and interpreting results. With a strictly constructed context, it is challenging to collect easily generalizable data (Hughes & Huby, 2002). One key element of the constructed context is what the literature calls low-level environment which in my research manifests as the lack of party identificators. On the one hand low-level environment is favorable for mapping out how voter choice is influenced by the limited set of variables as it simply blocks out other major influences, most and foremost the influence of party candidacy. Thus, many studies dealing with voters' preferences choose not to include party preference (Van Dijk & Van Holsteyn, 2022) or only include it in follow-up surveys (R. Campbell & Cowley, 2014). While the low-information research design can certainly prompt respondents to focus on other heuristics than party affiliation, it has strict limitations regarding generalizability and applicability to in-real life electoral settings, where party cues bear heavily on voters' choices and often mute the effects for other variables (see Kirkland and Coppock, 2018 for the discussion on how candidate characteristics matter in

partisan versus in non-partisan elections). Low-information design also implies a lack of political context that makes it very different from real-life settings and can lead respondents to overemphasize the effect of certain variables: for example, according to Dolan (2014) gender bias is more evident in experimental setting, a result that has been reinforced by study of Cambell and Cowley (2014). While low-level information research design clearly cannot model the context of real-life electoral decision-making, its abstract nature can offer insight into the preferences of voters regarding candidate characteristics without confounding their effects with actual party preferences. That knowledge is an important starting point for mapping out where certain advantages and disadvantages originate from, whether they are inherent to voters or rather are the product of the political context. As a potential counterpart to low-information environment, the phenomenon of 'information leakage' appears. The concept refers to the phenomenon when "respondents infer additional information beyond that which is explicitly cued in the manipulation" (Sher & McKenzie, 2006; cited in Johns & Davies, 2014, p. 770). The possibility of 'information leakage' should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.

Thus, while there is a strictly constructed context, a significant strength of the method is its ability to include more factors and examine multidimensional choices. In this recent research, multidimensionality appears several times – for instance, when considering different models of representation.

As previously indicated, I used vignettes throughout the research. However, it is essential to mention the differences between vignette and conjoint survey experiments. Hainmueller and his colleagues (2015) identify five different experimental designs within vignette and conjoint survey methods.

The first types involve the two types of vignette methods – *single and paired vignette* design. In the single vignette setting, respondents are presented with a short paragraph of text, while in the paired design, they receive two short paragraphs describing various attributes. An example from my questionnaire could be: "Tamás, a 32-years-old politician who has lived in the constituency since his childhood. Tamás is a married man with two children. Before he got elected, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor." Respondents then accept or reject these vignettes, with the option in paired setting to accept or reject each vignette individually (Hainmueller et al., 2015).

The second types include the two types of conjoint settings. In these designs, instead of a nicely formatted paragraph of text, respondents are presented with a table displaying attribute levels.

This design simplifies the comparison of the options for the respondents (Hainmueller et al., 2015, p. 2396). Usually, the first column shows the types of different attributes, while the other column(s) present(s) the value of the given attribute. Table 2 shows how my question would have looked like in a conjoint design. Single conjoint and paired conjoint designs are also closed with a decisive question. Like in the case of the paired vignette design, respondents here also have the opportunity to accept or reject both options (Hainmueller et al., 2015).

	Candidate 1	**Candidate 2**
Sex	Male	Female
Age	32 years old, young	52 years old, middle-aged
Residence	Does not live in their own constituency	Lives in their own constituency
Family status	Single	Married
Children	Has no children	Has two kids
Political experience	Active in national politics	Active in local politics
Previous political position	Held a parliamentary position	Held no elected position

Table 2. Example for paired conjoint design (author's own)

The last potential setting is the paired conjoint analysis with forced choice, which is the most restrictive. In this setting, respondents must choose exclusively. Choosing "Option A" automatically means rejecting "Option B", and vice versa (Hainmueller et al., 2015).

In my research, respondents were presented with candidate profiles – short descriptions of potential candidates. This design is familiar and therefore less complex for citizens, as the act of voting resembles the situation created during the conduct of the research. For example, a more complex survey experiment might assess multicomponent political decision-making. In such a complex research design, various actors can be involved in the evaluation, including policymakers, public administrators, interest groups, voters, experts, the media and/or international actors. With my less complex research design, respondents are less exposed to *survey fatigue* (Bansak et al., 2018, p. 118).

In the present analysis, I applied a hybrid methodological approach to answer my main research question and hypotheses: What do voters want? Who do voters want to represent them? What do voters expect their representatives to do?

In my survey experiment respondents were presented with short paragraphs of text – theoretical candidate profiles or scenarios – in every question. This setup resembles the paired vignette design. However, after presenting the candidates, respondents were forced to choose one of the two possible candidates – like in the case of paired conjoint analysis with forced choice. Resulting a hybrid solution, *paired vignette with forced choice design*. With using paired vignettes, "respondents are implicitly encouraged to compare the two applicants, and this encouragement to compare might increase survey engagement" (Hainmueller et al., 2015, p. 2396).

My study applies a conjoint analysis method mainly because it has the capacity to capture some of the complexity of representation. As noted above voters' choice is often not made along one single dimension or is defined by one driving characteristic but many. Their gender preference can for example collide with their expectations regarding political experience. If they prefer male and experienced politicians, who are they going to choose if there is an unexperienced male and an experienced female politician? Conjoint experiments can deal with those potential interactions by presenting voters small scenarios and/or descriptions allowing for a more considerate answer where the voter has the chance to weight characteristics not only individually but against each other. By offering candidate profiles in which each characteristic is varied separately, we can assess both independent and interactive effects of such variables simultaneously.

3.4. Critiques of the methodology

Although I have identified some of the indisputable advantages survey experiments have in the previous subchapter of my dissertation, it is essential to also address their limitations. As I have already emphasized, the generalizability of survey experiment results is a key weakness of the method. In other words, the external validity of the vignette method might be questionable. However, there are more potential flaws of survey experiments which need to be addressed. As Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto point out, "such experiments fundamentally lack external validity and do not accurately capture real-world decision-making" (Hainmueller et al., 2015, p. 2395). The field of psychology – not only political or social psychology – has been aware of the influencing force of different questionnaires and question types for decades, with a focus especially on self-report questions. Respondents' reactions and evaluations can easily be altered by the questions themselves – their wording, context, and format matter (Schwarz, 1999, p. 93). Respondents are exposed to various types of biases, for example social desirability bias (Hainmueller et al., 2015), when the respondents' aim is to choose 'the correct' answer,

which they think is the socially acceptable and desired option. In my first vignette, a socially desirable option may be the hypothetical candidate with former political experience on a national level. These biases can lead to a difference between survey responses and real-life choices (Hainmueller et al., 2015).

To test out the validity and reliability of different survey experiment methods, Hainmueller and his colleagues conducted a complex research in Switzerland (Hainmueller et al., 2015). In that setting, they were able to compare the results of the five types of survey experiment methods – single conjoint, single vignette, paired conjoint, paired vignette and paired conjoint with forced choice – with data resembling voters' real-life choices. Results of the paired conjoint analysis were the closest to Swiss people's choices. Paired conjoint with forced choice also performed well, nevertheless its logic is an outlier as it is strongly differing from the operation of real-life referendums. Paired vignette setting shows great results compared to the benchmark and the other two settings (Hainmueller et al., 2015). In general, paired designs perform better than single designs, which can be attributed to the engagement of respondents throughout the course of the experiment. Participants may be more motivated when they are asked to assess two profiles at once, so the level of satisficing can remain relatively low (Hainmueller et al., 2015).

Survey satisficing occurs when respondents "adapt by using cognitive shortcuts which can degrade response quality" (Krosnick, 1999; cited in Bansak et al., 2018, p. 113). The phenomenon can occur in experimental settings where respondents are asked to evaluate multiple profiles one after another. Simply put when respondents repeat the same task multiple times during the survey experiment. Based on the literature, in case of conjoint design, it is a common practice to ask participants to execute the same task repeatedly. A traditional approach of conjoint design is where respondents receive not only a few possible descriptions, but also all of the possible combinations (Bansak et al., 2018, p. 113). In my research, applying this approach during the data collection phase would have meant well over 100 tasks for one respondent. Instead of this traditional approach, I presented each task in my survey experiment only once to the respondents; there was no repetition during the form completion. This setting differs from the one favored by researchers, who often suggest providing respondents with more tasks, "so as to maximize their statistical power" (Bansak et al., 2018, p. 114). Consequently, having each respondent complete multiple tasks in a survey can greatly increase the number of evaluations without the need to recruit additional respondents. A conjoint survey experiment conducted in Hungary by Papp and Nkansah (2023) serves a great example for this concept. With their research setting, they received 3888 profile evaluations from only 324 respondents

(Papp & Nkansah, 2023). Presenting respondents with the same tasks consecutively within a survey experiment can enhance their familiarity with this unique, and relatively novel research setting. Classic surveys, which are widespread, are already familiar to many people in terms of their logic. However, survey experiments can introduce a new kind of stimulus and challenge for respondents, who may first need to familiarize themselves with the process. This can be particularly true for conjoint survey experiments, which present the different attribute levels in a tabular format. In contrast, vignettes may be easier for respondents to understand due to their more narrative, readable nature. This was the rationale behind my decision to use a vignette survey experiment instead of a conjoint survey experiment.

Creating survey experiments is a complex process. Researchers are advised to follow certain guidelines when formulating conjoint surveys and vignettes. The following non-exhaustive list presents some of these recommendations (Bryan, 2002):

(1) Attribute levels should be clearly defined without using ranges. For example, when presenting a theoretical candidate to respondents, indicate their exact age, like 55 years old, rather than stating that "The candidate is between 50 and 60 years old".
(2) Attributes of the survey experiment should be independent. If attributes are not exclusive, meaning they potentially have overlapping in their meaning, results can be distorted as attributes can be "double counted" (Bryan, 2002, p. 1). In the case of my survey experiment, attributes' independency would be compromised if one of my vignettes included this sentence: "Roland, a 48 years old, middle-aged politician who was born in the constituency and has lived there since then". The underlined expressions – 48 years old and middle-aged – are close in meaning, their simultaneous presence in the vignette can significantly affect voters' choices, thus the results of the survey experiment.
(3) "Levels within each attribute should be mutually exclusive" (Bryan, 2002, p. 2). This means that respondents can only choose one level per attribute at a time. In my survey experiment, this suggestion was implemented as respondents did not have the chance to simultaneously choose the younger and the older theoretical candidate when they completed the survey experiment questionnaire.

The first and third points were implemented in the research; however, the second point is a critical one. The lessons learned from the research shed light on the importance of applying independent attributes in a survey research experiment. These will be presented in the

subchapter *'5.4. Methodological limitations of the second vignette'* of this recent dissertation, which will be elaborated in the final version.

As in survey experiments – not only in conjoint, but also in vignette research – respondents face a list of different attributes. There is a possibility that respondents' final decision is influenced by a factor which otherwise would have only a minor effect on voters' choice in a real-life setting (Gal, 2022). In my research, participants were presented with numerous different attributes that may not even appear during elections. For example, information about candidates' previous political experience is not always easily accessible. In my research, I presented the theoretical candidates' former experience in every case along with a list of other information about them. There is a possibility that respondents, seeing that a particular candidate gained political experience prior, so they chose the experienced one over the other. This might differ from a real-life election outcome, where voters could choose a candidate who ran a better a campaign, regardless their previous political experience.

The complex weaknesses presented in this subchapter influence the interpretation of my results.

3.5. The first vignette

In this recent survey experiment, in the case of the first vignette, I presented each respondent with 2 of the candidate profiles. After the profiles, I asked the respondents the following question: "Based on the brief description provided below, which representative do you think would be best suited to represent you?". This question mimics the process of a real-life election. In each candidate profile, I manipulated 7 different variables. Six of these could take on two distinct values, while one variable could have three values in the profile description. A candidate profile looked like as the following one: "Tamás, a 32-years-old politician who has lived in the constituency since his childhood. Tamás is a married man with two children. Before he got elected, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor." The underlined expressions indicate the variables, which can have 2 or 3 different values. This leads us to a $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3$ arrangement with 192 possible profiles. This design consists of 7 attributes with a total of 15 levels.

These attributes are instrumental in conceptualizing voters' expectations towards their representatives (see the discussion on research questions and hypothesis). Specifically, I conceptualized the supposed affinity effect, which I linked to the biological sex and age of the theoretical candidates. The concept of locality which I understand as a type of affinity is operationalized through the third variable. Gender roles are conceptualized through marital and

parental status with the 4th and 5th attributes. The last two attributes conceptualize political experience and are incorporated to examine the trustee model of political representation. Together, these variables help us to get a better understanding on voters' expectations.

Biological sex has been greatly studied, especially in connection to women's representation. In order to look into discrimination of women based on their sex, in my vignettes, the theoretical candidate can be either a male or female. While biological sex in itself can potentially be an explanatory variable, the concept of gender roles can further enhance our understanding of the expectations and preferences of voters in relation to men and women. In my research I grasped the family aspect of gender roles by including variables about family and parental status and the career aspect of gender roles by including variables about political experience. In interaction with biological sex, these variables contribute to the conceptualization of gender roles although they also offer insights into voters' preferences as independent variables (see below).

Age seems to be another factor often examined, as it can reflect on the candidate's experience and potentially professional status. Typically, more senior candidates are perceived as more ideal for the position, whereas their younger counterparts are seen less experienced, thus less competent (Stockemer & Sundström, 2018). Age can also be analyzed in relation to the representation of younger generations. The values in my vignettes are as follows: the candidate is 32-years-old, or 52-years-old. They are neither very young in their teens, nor very old in their seventies.

Locality has been a focal question of representation and empirical data show that even in situations, where voters have same amount of information about both the local and non-local candidate, they tend to choose the candidate with local roots (Campbell et al., 2019; Campbell & Cowley, 2014). Defining locality is tricky. Some researchers define it by the birthplace of candidates, others relate it to residence. Both approaches can vary in taking either SMD boundaries as defined by the electoral law, or administrative settlement boundaries into consideration. I decided to focus on the candidate's residence, which allows for more flexibility. This focus emphasizes whether the candidate lives in the same SMD as the survey participant. The values I designed are as follows: the candidate either lives in the same SMD or does not.

Marital status also plays an important role in representation studies. Marital status embodies the traditional family structures and roles. Based on former empirical evidence, married candidates are more favored than unmarried candidates (Teele et al., 2018). To examine the

effects of marital status in my research, I designed the vignettes with variables specified as follows: the candidate is either married or single.

Parental status has gained momentum on its own right, not only in relation to father- and motherhood. Like marital status, a candidate's parental status also represents the traditional family roles. This analogy is supported by empirical results as well. Voters prefer candidates with children over childfree candidates (Campbell & Cowley, 2018; Teele et al., 2018). To examine the effects of parental status, respondents had the opportunity to choose between the following options: a candidate with two children, or a candidate without children.

The penultimate variable of my research addresses whether the candidate is active at the local or national level in politics, reflecting different areas of activity. Thus, I designed the values as follows: the candidate is active either at the local or national level.

My last variable reflects the specific political position the candidate may held previously during their career. Different positions can indicate different levels of embeddedness and network sizes. To assess the effects of these positions, respondents were given three potential options to choose from: the candidate held the mayor's position, a position in Parliament, or no political position at all. Table 3 presents the attributes and their potential levels of the first vignette of my research.

Variable	Values of the variables
Sex	Male
	Female
Age	32 years old, young
	52 years old, middle-aged
Residence	Lives in their own constituency
	Does not live in their own constituency
Family status	Married
	Single
Children	Has two kids
	Has no children
Political experience	Active in national politics
	Active in local politics
Previous political position	Held the position of mayor
	Held a parliamentary position
	Held no elected position

Table 3. All the set of characteristics used in the first question/vignette (author's own)

As the vignette and its variables indicate, the first question of my survey experiment focuses on the supposed affinity effect and the descriptive nature of representation. The main question is: *What do voters want?* To answer this, I conceptualized affinity in different approaches, through different variables, such as the theoretical candidates' sex, age, and locality. The question is: *Does affinity matter when it comes to electing their representatives?* From a different angle, I conceptualized political experience through the last two variables, which help me capture the supposed presence of the trustee model in contemporary Hungarian representation.

3.6. The second vignette

The second vignette of my research experiment, as presented in my dissertation, aimed to investigate the role of experts in the representational process. Unlike the first vignette, which focused on the individuals representing voters, this one concentrated on the process of representation itself. In this case I also presented respondents a pair of vignettes – two

hypothetical scenarios about specific crisis situations. After the scenarios, I asked the participants the following question: "In a crisis situation, it may be necessary to reassess decision-making criteria. In your opinion, in an economic/social/environmental crisis, which is the best approach for representatives?". In each candidate profile, I manipulated 3 different variables. The first of these variables could take on 2 distinct values, the second one on 3, and the third one 4 different values. A hypothetical story looked like as the following one: "Katalin pointed out that in an economic crisis, the interests of the voters are particularly important. In a crisis, the interests of the people come first.". The underlined expressions indicate the variables, with the last two underlined expressions together forming the third variable. This leads us to a $2 \times 3 \times 4$ arrangement with 24 possible scenarios. This design consists of 3 attributes with a total of 9 levels.

The attributes of the second vignette slightly overlap with the first vignette; however, the operationalization differs. In this case, candidates' biological sex operationalizes the Role Congruency Theory. The concept of crisis is operationalized through different types of crises, indicating different scenarios and their impact. Lastly, I operationalized specific models of representation through different groups' interests. Together, these variables enhance our understanding of the process nature of political representation.

Similar to the first vignette, the biological sex of the theoretical candidate in the representational process was also the first variable in this case. Although the proportions of men and women in the population is roughly the same, there are more males in political and leader positions. This phenomenon can and must be investigated from both the supply side – women's interest in holding political positions – and the demand side – voters' preferences in politics (Kantorowicz-Reznichenko et al., 2023, p. 5). As I have already pointed out in the subchapter *'2.6. Who do we vote for?'* of this work, distinct characteristics, behavioral patterns, and roles are associated with men and women. These characteristics lead to voters' beliefs that male and female politicians possess different skill sets and competencies. The research of Johnson and Thomson (2023) focuses on female leaders during the Covid-19 pandemic. They suggest that "Women show a natural tendency for transformational leadership which means they have the ability to lead with empathy and integrity and inspire followers to act selflessly for the greater good. These are the very traits that are appropriately suited for leadership roles during crises. This ability to understand followers' needs at a deeper level and act accordingly explains actions that female transformational leaders have made" (Johnson & Thomson, 2023, pp. 2461-2462). These attributes can also be linked to the RCT (see also *'2.6. Who do we vote for?'* subchapter

of this work). Although the authors emphasize women's role in business in the first place, they also highlight that "women political leaders play an equally important role and should not be ignored. Women in both sectors are faced with similar challenges when jockeying for leadership positions, and many political bureaucracies often mirror the structures of large businesses. Therefore, the impact that leaders like Margaret Thatcher, Angela Merkel, and Jacinda Ardern have during times of crisis supports this analysis of women leaders in business during these tumultuous times" (Johnson & Thomson, 2023, p. 2462). In order to gain a better understanding of Hungarian voters' beliefs about male and female politicians during times of crisis, in my vignettes, the theoretical candidate can be either a male or female.

Different types of crises are a part of our everyday lives. Crises can manifest in many different forms, such as extreme weather conditions, financial crisis, health crises, like a pandemic, or environmental crises. Any type of crises occurs, it has and will have an impact on the course of politics. Stemming from the previous paragraph, male politicians are perceived as more competent in military and labor issues, and they are considered more effective at handling demonstrations and diplomatic situations. Conversely, female politicians are seen as more competent in areas concerning education, poverty, and health policy issues (Alexander & Andersen, 1993; Dolan, 2010; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Kantorowicz-Reznichenko et al., 2023; Sanbonmatsu & Dolan, 2009). Literature also offers a binary distinction for different types of issues, namely 'hard' and 'easy' or 'soft' issues. The former refers to topics, which are more complex and expect professionals to strategic planning, while the latter less complex, but at the same time they hold more symbolic power in politics due to their cultural and/or moral foundations (Bertsou, 2022; Carmines & Stimson, 1980). Questions regarding policing, security, military, and environment are considered as 'hard issues', whereas questions regarding immigration, arts and culture, and the LGBTQ rights are considered as 'easy issues' (Bertsou, 2022; Blee, 2020; Hawley, 2013; Krimmel et al., 2016). This distinction draws solely upon the foundation and complexity of the given topic. But scholars evolved this logic further with incorporating gender interests. On one hand 'soft issues' are connected to women, in line with leftist, egalitarian and globalist policy views and standpoints. On the other hand 'hard issues' are associated with men, in line with a more rightist, anti-egalitarian and nationalist attitudes (Blee, 2020). In my research, I am focusing on two hard and one soft issue. Economic crisis and environmental concerns are considered as 'hard issues' (Frangonikolopoulos, 2014), which serve as an example of a core political dimension, thus they are strongly connected to realm of different political actors, like representatives and parties. Social crises can be considered as an

example of the 'easy issues'. Unfortunately, these types of crises are not unknown for us. In the recent decades, we have witnessed for example the global financial crisis (GFC) between 2008 and 2012 (Elliott & Stead, 2018), and the Greek debt crisis (Capelos & Exadaktylos, 2015), which serve as an example for economic crises. The Syrian refugee crisis can be considered as social crises from the last years (Talani, 2020). Looking back a bit further in time, the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 (Abbott, 2016) and the quite recent European heat waves of the last years (Buonocore & Pettoello-Mantovani, 2023) can be considered as environmental cries. To assess the effects of the different types of crises, respondents were presented with these three hypothetical scenarios: economic, social and environmental crises.

Lastly, I incorporated the interests and opinions of various actors into this vignette of my survey experiment. The concept of representative democracy emphasizes the interests and opinions of the citizens, with representatives aiming to aggregate and articulate the interests of their constituents (see *'2.2. Locality'* and *'2.3. Descriptive representation'* subchapters). Although this approach holds significance in the field of political representation theories, modern challenges require modern solutions. A major event of recent years, the Covid-19 pandemic, posed some formerly unprecedented challenges to countries worldwide. The pandemic has been described as "the epitome of how some contemporary problems challenge the capacity of national party governments to implement successful policies" (Lavezzolo et al., 2022, p. 1124). To address these challenges, experts have increasingly entered the political arena, supplementing or even bypassing traditional party governments. Experts in political decision-making processes are not a new phenomenon; however they have gained significant popularity in the last few years, partially due to the Covid-19 pandemic (Lavezzolo et al., 2022). Their presence in the political arena altered the traditional representational processes, as experts come from outside of the political sphere. Previous research from Spain indicates that the pandemic has significantly increased public support for technocratic governance, where experts are preferred over politicians for crisis management. It is important to note, however, that the research also demonstrates a significant framing effect, meaning that the way the pandemic is framed – either solely as a public health crisis or as including economic dimensions – strongly influences voters' choice (Lavezzolo et al., 2022). One important takeaway here is that in my research all scenarios alluded to a crisis situation, thus the answers can only be interpreted in that context. However, the changing type of crisis is suitable for offering a drastically different context to see if it causes a shift and thus to test if representational preferences shift as a

consequence. It is not suitable however to examine if experts (or man vs women for that matter) are preferred in other situations.

Contrary to experts' recent rise, public opinion is at the heart of representation theories for centuries, as the trustee model of representation shows that. Relationship between public opinion and public policy is an essential subject in political science. Researchers emphasize the "the importance of 'responsive rule' – the correspondence between citizens' preferences and government actions – in democratic governance" (Soroka & Wlezien, 2004, p. 531; see also Pitkin, 1967). The concept of policy representation shows us "whether and how policy follows public preferences" (Soroka & Wlezien, 2004, p. 531).

Lastly, party preferences also appeared in this particular vignette of my survey experiment. The Hungarian parliament is traditionally characterized by strong party discipline, which means that in the representational process, party opinions and interests are often prioritized over those of citizens (Szente, 2018). Party identification and affiliation is discussed in detail in the voter behavior literature, however these are not reflected in the process of representation. To examine the influence of different opinions, respondents were given the option to choose between the following: voters' interests, experts' considerations, public opinion, and party program.

Table 4 presents the characteristics used in the second vignette.

Variable	Values of the variables
Sex	Male
	Female
Type of crisis	Economic crisis
	Social crisis
	Environmental crisis
Important considerations, interests	Voters' interests (Promissory representation)
	Experts' considerations (External aspects)
	Public opinion (Trustee)
	Party program

Table 4. All the set of characteristics used in the second question/vignette (author's own)

In contrast to the first vignette, the second vignette of my survey experiment focuses on the process approach of representation, emphasizing voters' perceptions off different actors in the process while also considering the role of various types of crises.

The compiled survey experiment does not claim that the public interest, the expertise and the interests of the electorate are mutually exclusive, but if they are not in line, there must be a priority, which is why I formulated the question the way I did, asking respondents about "the best approach for representatives?".

The types of crises presented in this subchapter are not by any means separable, neither are they mutually exclusive. As many researches point out, different types of crises can be present simultaneously (Alkiviadou, 2018; Hacker, 2015; Loorbach et al., 2016). Recognizing this overlap, I put the emphasis on the primary narrative framework rather than isolating individual crises. For instance, while the 2009 crises primarily impacted finance, it also had severe social repercussions as well. Similarly, heat waves are primarily environmental but have notable effects on agriculture. In preparing my survey experiment research, I deliberately excluded the Covid pandemic, or any connected public health crises. First, it is close in time; second, many great research has been conducted on it during recent years (Kantorowicz-Reznichenko et al., 2023; Lavezzolo et al., 2022; Papp & Nkansah, 2023).

Another essential aspect of my work is the framing effect. As the work of Lavezzolo and his colleagues (2022) indicates, how the events are framed has a powerful effect on how voters

perceive, thus assess a given situation. My aim was to see how voters react when they receive information only based on a broad narrative. Certain narratives can be framed many ways; for example, the Covid-19 pandemic can be framed as a public health crisis, and at the same time it also can be framed as a social crisis. However, in my survey experiment I put the emphasis on a broad narrative to assess the general reaction to the presented information. Future experiments may explore more nuanced frames and question wording to better understand how different frames and narratives affect voters' choices regarding types of crises.

3.7. Attributes of the quantitative study sample

After receiving four vignettes during the survey experiment, respondents were asked six additional questions. Five of these questions targeted basic demographic attributes of the participants, these are: sex, age, region, type of settlement, and educational background, with responses selected from a drop-down list. Respondents were obligated to choose between 'male' and 'female', in case of their biological sex. The age options ranged from 18 and 69 years. The regional options corresponded to Hungary's seven regions. Settlement type was categorized as Budapest (the capital), city, or village. Educational background was divided into three levels: basic, secondary, and higher educational background. These questions and answer options allowed me to conduct a survey experiment that yielded a sample representative of the Hungarian population in terms of age, sex, region, type of settlement, and educational background.

The sixth and last question was designed to measure the respondents' general political knowledge by asking for the name of their current parliamentary representative. For this question, I used an open-ended question, allowing participants to freely name (or do not name) their representative.

As the last question yielded interesting answers, I present a summarized extract of the results in Table 5. As the research was conducted anonymously, I was unable to verify whether respondents provided correct answers this question. Consequently, I arbitrarily created three categories: (1) respondents who wrote the name of a current MP; (2) respondents who either did not answer or wrote "Do not know" or expressed the same sentiment in a different form; (3) respondents who gave a negative or dismissive answer.

Who is your representative in Parliament?					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Knows	591	49,3	49,3	49,3
	Does not know/ Does not answer	556	46,3	46,3	95,6
	Negative	53	4,4	4,4	100,0
	Total	1200	100,0	100,0	

Table 5. Answers for the last question

3.8. Data collection

A 12-month long period beginning in March 2021 was dedicated to preparing the research. In 2022, I conducted a pilot survey experiment on a non-representative sample to test whether the planned survey questions are able to capture effectively voters' perceptions of the concept of representation and representatives. As the preliminary results and feedback approved the research design, I could move forward with the process. A Hungarian polling agency executed the main data gathering. The conjoint survey experiment was conducted in November 2022. I used a questionnaire-based method of individual querying in an online setting. The sample size comprised 1200 respondents, representative of the Hungarian population with respect to age, sex, region, type of settlement, and educational background. This approach provided a broad and inclusive data collection which is reflective of the basic demographic aspects of Hungary.

3.9. Representativeness of the quantitative study sample

The sample of my survey experiment study is representative of the Hungarian population in terms of age, sex, region, type of settlement, and educational background. Table 6 provides the detailed data on the composition of my research sample.

		Frequency	Percent
Sex	Male	584	48,7 %
	Female	616	51,3 %
Age	18-29 years	253	21,6 %
	30-39 years	271	22,6 %
	40-49 years	226	18,8 %
	50-59 years	247	20,6 %
	60-69 years	202	16,8 %
Educational background	Basic education	568	47,3 %
	Secondary education	406	33,8 %
	Higher education	227	18,9 %
Type of settlement	Budapest	215	17,9 %
	City	626	52,2 %
	Village	359	29,9 %
Region	Central Hungary (Közép-Magyarország)	362	30,1 %
	Northern Hungary (Észak-Magyarország)	141	11,7 %
	Northern Great Plain (Észak-Alföld)	177	14,8 %
	Southern Great Plain (Dél-Alföld)	156	13,0 %
	Southern Transdanubia (Dél-Dunántúl)	112	9,4 %
	Central Transdanubia (Közép-Dunántúl)	132	11,0 %
	Western Transdanubia (Nyugat-Dunántúl)	121	10,0 %

Table 6. The composition of the research sample (author's own)

3.10. The focus group discussion

To explore my secondary research question, I employed the qualitative method of focus group discussions. The focus group method is a very flexible research tool, used in both political science and psychology, among other fields. A focus group typically consists of a small group of individuals who are convened for the purpose of discussing and providing feedback on a specific, pre-defined topic. Focus group research allows qualitative data to be collected by facilitating open discussion and debate between participants. It is important to see that this tool can not only answer research questions but can also reveal approaches and ideas that no one had thought of before. Other advantages of focus groups are that they are a flexible and dynamic method and guarantee results in a short time (Babbie, 2013; Krueger, 1988).

In the field of political science, focus groups are often used to gain a deeper understanding of public opinion and political behavior, as Clinton, for example, regularly used the focus group tool to test policy ideas and plans (Morris, 1999; Newman, 1999). By bringing together participants with different perspectives, researchers can explore the reasons behind particular political attitudes and beliefs. The focus group methodology allows the exploration of complex issues, for example, it is also a useful tool for investigating what voters think the ideal political representative should be. Open-ended questions allow for a deeper insight and understanding of voters' thinking and logic. Focus group research provides valuable insights into the factors that influence political choice and can provide information for developing effective policy strategies (Halperin & Heath, 2020; Savigny, 2007).

The focus group process typically consists of several steps. First, the research question must be identified, which then forms the basis for the discussion. Next comes the recruitment of participants – this is done along pre-defined criteria relevant to the topic. It is important to ensure an appropriate homogeneity-heterogeneity ratio. Adequate homogeneity guarantees a safe and comfortable environment for all, while heterogeneity ensures that different perspectives and experiences are represented in the discussion (Vicsek, 2006). The discussion is facilitated by a moderator, ensuring that all participants have an equal opportunity to share their thoughts and opinions. The moderator encourages active participation by asking open-ended questions.

The research process of the focus group discussion on which this study is based consisted of two phases: a pilot discussion in December 2023 and a main event in January 2024. Five

participants took part in both discussions. For the recruitment of the participants, I used the convenience sampling method for both discussions.

The pilot discussion in the first phase aimed to test and refine the methodology. This preparatory phase allowed me to further refine the basic aspects of recruiting participants for the talks, as well as the way in which the session was conducted, and the questions raised. The members of the pilot group were a very homogeneous group in socio-economic terms, but the session nevertheless provided an insight into the effectiveness of the methodology. At the same time, it was an indication of the inadequate homogeneity-heterogeneity ratio. Based on the valuable methodological experiences and lessons learned from the pilot discussion, I refined the methodology for the main event. During the second discussion, I paid particular attention to the appropriate heterogeneity of the group to ensure representation of groups from different socio-economic backgrounds. This diversity allowed me to gain a more comprehensive and deeper insight into the potential answers to the research question.

The engagement and activity of participants was outstanding on both occasions, resulting in a lively discussion among the members, which provided me with a rich and diverse set of data. I later analyzed the notes of the discussions in depth to understand the participants' perspectives and opinions on the issues raised.

The focus group discussions were structured in three blocks. At the beginning of the two sessions, I explained the framework to the participants - I assured them of anonymity and the aggregate use of the data. In this way I established an atmosphere of trust. In the first block, I asked participants to draw a picture, so this round served as an "icebreaker". After drawing the ideal representative, I asked the participants to present the figure they had drawn and tell me about it. In the second and main stage, we moved on to the identification of the ideal political representative. To do this, I asked each participant to describe the 5 most important qualities of the ideal representative. I then explained the structure and content of the Big Five personality model to the group and placed the attributes they had written down on a whiteboard, while each participant explained to the group what he or she had attributed to the word or phrase. Placing these attributes was always agreed by the group. This methodology enabled the exploration of the relationships between the attributes written down by the members and the nature of this relationship. During the pilot focus group discussion in December 2023, the attributes were placed first and only then were the group members given information about the structure and content of the Big Five model. This logic was adjusted for the next session based on the information and lessons learned during the pilot group. The flexibility of the focus group

method allowed for the presentation of different opinions and points of view, as well as for discussion. And in the final, concluding block, the participants used barometers to visualize the structure of their ideal representative's personality - also based on the Big Five model.

4. Data analysis

4.1. Methods of data analysis

To analyze the results of my vignette survey experiment, I used several different software programs. For basic operations and analyses, such as querying frequencies and creating charts, I used Microsoft Excel and SPSS. For the Average Marginal Component Effect (in short: AMCE) and ACIE (Average Component Interaction Effects) analyses, I used the R statistical software package and Python. AMCE captures the average effect of changing one attribute level, while all the other attributes remain the same. In my research, AMCE shows for example how the evaluation of a candidate changes depending on the change of their biological sex or age. Contrarily, ACIE measures the effect of one attribute while also taking into account other attributes' effects. In my research, ACIE shows for example how voters evaluate married candidates who have children, depending on their biological sex.

4.2. Results of the first vignette

The characteristics of theoretical candidates may differently affect voters' choices, depending on the voters' own characteristics. My research aims to identify how respondents with different attributes perceive and potentially advantage or disadvantage candidates based on various characteristics. The analysis of the first vignette yields intriguing results. I will present these in the order of the variables' appearance in the vignettes. I include summarizing tables for the statistical results only for variables where there are more than five statistically significant relationships between voters' attributes and theoretical candidates' characteristics for a better overview. In other cases, the statistical results will be presented in the main text.

The biological sex of the candidates influences the decisions of respondents across all examined aspects. Voters between the ages of 18-29 and 40-49 tend to favor male candidates over their female counterparts. Every other age group in my research tends to support female candidates, although only in the case of voters aged 60-69 years does this preference show a significant difference towards female candidates; the estimated effect on voter preference is -0.1271, with a standard error of 0.0522, a z-value of 2.4309, and a p-value of 0.0150. Regardless of their level of education, respondents generally show clear support for female candidates; however, those with only basic education demonstrate a more significant preference for female

candidates; the estimated effect on voter preference is 0.08988, with a standard error of 0.0322, a z-value of 2.7887, and a p-value of 0.0052. Respondents from the Central- and Western Transdanubia region show a preference for male candidates, while respondents from the other regions of Hungary tend to support female candidates. Only participants from the Northern region of the country show a significant difference towards female candidates; the estimated effect on voter preference is 0.1168 with a standard error of 0.0532, a z-value of 2.1953, and a p-value of 0.0281. Respondents' type of settlement shows very similar results – participants from Budapest, cities, or villages tend to favor female candidates over their male counterparts. The difference is significant among respondents living in villages; the estimated effect on voter preference is 0.0837 with a standard error of 0.0368, a z-value of 2.2707, and a p-value of 0.0231. Respondents' biological sex also plays an important role, as female voters in my sample demonstrate a significant preference for female candidates; the estimated effect on voter preference is 0.0826 with a standard error of 0.0275, a z-value of 2.9983, and a p-value of 0.0027. Figure 4 shows the detailed results. Although their results are not statistically significant, male respondents in my sample also show a preference towards female candidates compared to male candidates.



Figure 4. Female candidate advantage/disadvantage

Candidates' age strongly divide respondents' standpoints. Respondents between the ages of 18-49 significantly disadvantage the theoretical 52-year-old candidate. In case of participants between the ages of 18 and 29 years, the estimated effect on voter preference is -0.1489 with a

standard error of 0.0480, and a z-value of -3.0973. This result is statistically significant (p-value of 0.0019), suggesting that the 52-years-old theoretical candidate has a notable disfavor among the youngest Hungarian voters. In case of participants between the ages of 30 and 39 years, the estimated effect on voter preference is -0.1047 with a standard error of 0.0451, a z-value of -2.3213, and a p-value of 0.0202. Meanwhile, respondents between the ages of 50 and 69 years show a strong support towards the older, 52-year-old candidate. Regardless of their level of education, respondents show a general support towards the younger, 32-year-old candidate, although survey experiment participants with higher education qualification present significantly stronger support towards them; the estimated effect on voter preference is 0.0850 with a standard error of 0.0414, a z-value of -2.0503, and a p-value of 0.0403. Only respondents from the Northern and the Southern Transdanubia region present an advantage for the 52-year-old candidate, and none of the results show a significant difference. Respondents' living in villages support the 52-year-old candidate, while participants from Budapest and different cities demonstrate a preference towards the 32-year-old candidate; in the case of the latter – respondents living in cities – this difference is statistically significant; the estimated effect on voter preference is -0.0930 with a standard error of 0.0299, a z-value of -3.1030, and a p-value of 0.0019. Both male and female survey experiment participants show a preference for the younger, 32-year-old candidate, although the difference is only significant among male respondents; the estimated effect on voter preference is -0.0326 with a standard error of 0.0326, a z-value of -2.0142, and a p-value of 0.0439. Figure 5 provides the detailed results.



Figure 5. 52-years-old candidate advantage/disadvantage

As I have emphasized the importance of locality in the '*2.2. Locality – roots of representation'* chapter of my dissertation, the empirical data of my research also distinctly supports this idea. Survey experiment participants in each potential attribute group advantage local candidates over non-local candidates. Only in the case of respondents from the Southern Great Plain region are the results non-significant, however they also show a tendency towards disadvantaging non-local candidates. Detailed results can be found in Figure 6 and Table 7.



Figure 6. Non-local candidate advantage/disadvantage

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	p value	Significance
Sex	Male	-0,20017317	0,030809805	-6,497060763	8,19E-11	***
	Female	-0,19103	0,025898554	-7,376087675	1,63E-13	***
Age	18-29 years	-0,10954035	0,047430265	-2,309503283	0,02091567	*
	30-39 years	-0,14743125	0,042352242	-3,481073075	0,000499409	***
	40-49 years	-0,20102287	0,042875081	-4,6885712	2,75E-06	***
	50-59 years	-0,22309576	0,041349718	-5,395339167	6,84E-08	***
	60-69 years	-0,29977239	0,048321536	-6,203701627	5,52E-10	***
Educational background	Basic education	-0,1996657	0,030485193	-6,549596096	5,77E-11	***
	Secondary education	-0,16990285	0,035026512	-4,85069286	1,23E-06	***
	Higher education	-0,22329038	0,040220416	-5,551667575	2,83E-08	***
Type of settlement	Budapest	-0,20947494	0,048236012	-4,342708471	1,41E-05	***
	City	-0,18465858	0,027432285	-6,731432658	1,68E-11	***
	Village	-0,20268429	0,037247671	-5,441529341	5,28E-08	***
Region	Central Hungary	-0,19690406	0,038990543	-5,050046525	4,42E-07	***
	Northern Hungary	-0,29177671	0,051228708	-5,695570294	1,23E-08	***
	Northern Great Plain	-0,21152644	0,053501507	-3,953653873	7,70E-05	***
	Southern Great Plain	-0,08235521	0,05719983	-1,439780658	0,149929465	
	Southern Transdanubia	-0,19370386	0,065087099	-2,976071447	0,002919668	**
	Central Transdanubia	-0,14952744	0,052912275	-2,825949976	0,004714063	**
	Western Transdanubia	-0,219026	0,070724717	-3,096880544	0,001955687	**

Table 7. Detailed results of non-local candidate advantage/disadvantage

Candidates' marital status is a part of the operationalization of gender, as it is connected to gender roles and the stereotypes attached to them. My research results show that respondents between the ages of 18-29 years tend to advantage the single candidate, while every other age group show a preference for the married candidate; survey experiment participants aged 30-39 years show a significant difference; the estimated effect on voter preference is 0.1009 with a standard error of 0.0453, a z-value of 2.2259, and a p-value of 0.0260. Respondents with secondary educational backgrounds present a slight disadvantage for married candidates, while respondents with every other educational background prefer married candidates over single candidates. Based on regional division, respondents from the Southern Great Plain and the Central region of Hungary advantage the single hypothetical candidate, while survey

experiment participants from every other region of the country support the married candidate. Respondents from Budapest in my research prefer the single candidate, while respondents from cities and villages support the married candidate; participants from villages show a significant difference; the estimated effect on voter preference is 0.0858 with a standard error of 0.0383, a z-value of 2.2420, and a p-value of 0.0249. Male respondents advantage the single candidate in opposition to female respondents, who support the married candidate, although in these cases there are no statistically significant results. Figure 7 presents the detailed results.



Figure 7. Married candidate advantage/disadvantage

Having children or not is also connected to the operationalization of gender, like candidates' marital status. Results of my research reveal a more diverse landscape in this regard. Regardless of their age, respondents generally prefer the candidate with two children over the candidate with no children. Notably, the differences are statistically significant only among participants aged 30-39 and 50-59. Respondents from these age groups show a pronounced preference for the candidate with two children. Survey experiment participants with higher educational backgrounds show a preference for the candidate with no children, however respondents with basic, and secondary education show a statistically significant difference, as they show a strong preference for the candidate with 2 children. Geographically analyzed, only respondents from the Southern Transdanubia region prefer the candidate with no children. Participants from every other region in Hungary favor the candidate with 2 children; however, the differences are statistically significant only in the following regions: Northern Hungary, Northern Great Plain,

Central Hungary, and Western Transdanubia. Those of partaking in my research and living in Budapest demonstrate an advantage for the candidate with no children, while respondents living in cities or villages show a significant preference for the candidate with 2 children. Female and male respondents in my experiment both support the candidate with 2 children; however, only female respondents show a statistically significant difference. Detailed outcomes can be found in Figure 8 and Table 8.



Figure 8. Candidate with 2 children advantage/disadvantage

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	p value	Significance
Sex	Male	0,03046268	0,03219695	0,946135668	0,344079393	
	Female	0,15415831	0,028399961	5,428116974	5,70E-08	***
Age	18-29 years	0,04992577	0,052593004	0,949285427	0,342475463	
	30-39 years	0,11734835	0,043385679	2,704771633	0,006835136	**
	40-49 years	0,08529511	0,047853782	1,782411003	0,074682233	
	50-59 years	0,1618091	0,044200287	3,660815554	0,000251414	***
	60-69 years	0,03895928	0,050953849	0,764599293	0,444510191	
Educational background	Basic education	0,09799882	0,032615	3,00471626	0,002658287	**
	Secondary education	0,15575909	0,037606065	4,141860892	3,44E-05	***
	Higher education	-0,02029502	0,041732448	-0,486312737	0,62674545	
Type of settlement	Budapest	-0,01907992	0,052777367	-0,361517063	0,717712952	
	City	0,10255895	0,029622095	3,462245118	0,000535689	***
	Village	0,1599323	0,038361913	4,169038682	3,06E-05	***
Region	Central Hungary	0,09465111	0,042621728	2,220724286	0,026369642	*
	Northern Hungary	0,16370265	0,058158837	2,814751066	0,004881503	**
	Northern Great Plain	0,120479	0,049984108	2,410346075	0,015937395	*
	Southern Great Plain	0,05657468	0,05818565	0,972313232	0,330894743	
	Southern Transdanubia	-0,03739186	0,066774373	-0,559973219	0,575497705	
	Central Transdanubia	0,09390808	0,05924083	1,585191899	0,112922741	
	Western Transdanubia	0,16700693	0,072166967	2,314174201	0,020658169	*

Table 8. Detailed results of candidate with 2 children advantage/disadvantage (author's own)

Candidates' previous political experience does not seem to be a key influencing factor in voters' choice. In general, respondents of my survey experiment research favor national and local political experience as well. Participants aged 30-49 show a stronger support for the candidate with local political background, although only respondents between the ages 30-39 years show a statistically significant difference; the estimated effect on voter preference is -0.1151 with a standard error of 0.0446, a z-value of -2.5787, and a p-value of 0.0099. Respondents with basic educational backgrounds advantage the candidate with local political experience, while participants with secondary and higher educational backgrounds advantage the candidate with national political experience. Regional position also divides respondents' preferences. While participants from the Northern and Central Transdanubia region prefer the candidate with local political experience, respondents from the other regions of the country prefer the candidate with political experience gained on the national level. Survey participants who live in Budapest tend

to support the candidate with local political experience, while respondents living in cities or villages show a preference for the candidate with national political experience. Female participants in my research support the candidate with national political experience, and male participants tend to support the candidate with local political experience. Figure 9 presents the detailed results.



Figure 9. Candidate with national-level experience advantage/disadvantage

The variable of *Previous political position* is the only one in my research which has three potential attribute levels. My youngest respondents aged 18-29 tend to disadvantage the candidate who previously held the position of mayor. Every other age group advantage the candidate with such background; however, only respondents between the ages 30-39 and 60-69 show a statistically significant difference. Participants with each educational background support the candidate who previously held the position of mayor, and the difference is statistically significant in case of respondents with basic and secondary education. Geographically analyzed, only respondents from the Southern Great Plain and Western Transdanubia regions disadvantage the candidate who previously was a mayor. Participants from the Central and the Central Transdanubia region of Hungary show a statistically significant support for the candidate with political experience gained as a mayor. Respondents living in Budapest and other cities also show a statistically significant preference for the

candidate who has previously held the position of mayor. Both male and female survey experiment participants show a statistically significant preference for candidate with previously gained mayor experience. As demonstrated, the political position of mayor creates a diverse landscape among my survey experiment respondents. The parliamentarian position results in a more homogeneous outlook. Only respondents aged 40-49 years and those from the Central Transdanubia region show a statistically significant preference for the candidate who has previously held a parliamentary position. While the majority of my respondents favor the candidate with such a political background, there are specific respondent attributes that increase the likelihood of disadvantaging them. Respondents likely to disadvantage these candidates include those aged 50-59 years, those with a higher educational background, and those living in the Southern Great Plain, Northern, or Western Transdanubia regions of Hungary. Figures 10-11, and Tables 9-10 present the detailed outcomes of this analysis.



Figure 10. Candidate with experience as mayor advantage/disadvantage

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	p value	Significance
Sex	Male	0,11184661	0,040432299	2,766268865	0,005670176	**
	Female	0,0717767	0,033121521	2,167071456	0,030229406	*
Age	18-29 years	-0,05375997	0,062199397	-0,864316572	0,387414009	
	30-39 years	0,11277556	0,052513945	2,147535501	0,031750674	*
	40-49 years	0,06866699	0,053049468	1,294395457	0,195528859	
	50-59 years	0,09749327	0,053040815	1,838080201	0,066050588	
	60-69 years	0,24601144	0,065820137	3,73763186	0,000185762	***
Educational background	Basic education	0,08717125	0,04154455	2,098259476	0,03588223	*
	Secondary education	0,10307975	0,040765599	2,528596529	0,011451959	*
	Higher education	0,08043315	0,050746271	1,585006078	0,112964953	
Type of settlement	Budapest	0,16509853	0,062351451	2,647869964	0,008100068	**
	City	0,09587015	0,035672081	2,687540145	0,007198045	**
	Village	0,04387708	0,045960445	0,954670505	0,33974435	
Region	Central Hungary	0,15906064	0,047340265	3,359944057	0,000779583	***
	Northern Hungary	0,08077717	0,068933399	1,17181472	0,241271452	
	Northern Great Plain	0,01212224	0,067573202	0,179394151	0,857628223	
	Southern Great Plain	-0,03730129	0,070575083	-0,528533448	0,597129138	
	Southern Transdanubia	0,17929151	0,094419142	1,898889479	0,057579009	
	Central Transdanubia	0,16621125	0,071822352	2,314199498	0,020656782	*
	Western Transdanubia	-0,00779999	0,086457409	-0,090217699	0,92811422	

Table 9. Detailed results of candidate with experience as mayor advantage/disadvantage (author's own)



Figure 11. Candidate with parliamentarian advantage/disadvantage

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	p value	Significance
Sex	Male	0,0380376	0,038884405	0,978222558	0,327964262	
	Female	0,06332366	0,035401778	1,788714071	0,073660876	
Age	18-29 years	0,03171682	0,059507985	0,532984233	0,594044494	
	30-39 years	0,08077125	0,057687864	1,400142841	0,161470548	
	40-49 years	0,11056561	0,054225284	2,039004696	0,041449559	*
	50-59 years	-0,01618452	0,055241796	-0,292975938	0,769540544	
	60-69 years	0,04229347	0,067921834	0,622678573	0,533495766	
Educational background	Basic education	0,06258263	0,040877	1,530998702	0,125769713	
	Secondary education	0,08196728	0,044704774	1,83352409	0,066724669	
	Higher education	-0,02831647	0,049757352	-0,569091224	0,569294234	
Type of settlement	Budapest	0,04109454	0,063336495	0,648828748	0,516449074	
	City	0,05513637	0,035695779	1,544618715	0,122438517	
	Village	0,06206861	0,04747146	1,30749326	0,191045242	
Region	Central Hungary	0,04701284	0,049021909	0,959016956	0,337550203	
	Northern Hungary	-0,01071078	0,069017036	-0,155190328	0,876671273	
	Northern Great Plain	0,05160631	0,066464851	0,776445079	0,437486236	
	Southern Great Plain	-0,03953443	0,067856775	-0,582615778	0,560151982	
	Southern Transdanubia	0,14641793	0,089655773	1,633112131	0,102445416	
	Central Transdanubia	0,14945749	0,072884482	2,050607775	0,040305159	*
	Western Transdanubia	-0,00556207	0,087642298	-0,063463249	0,949397623	

Table 10. Detailed results of candidate with experience with parliamentarian experience advantage/disadvantage (author's own)

These results present how the characteristics of theoretical candidates may differently affect voters' choices, depending on the voters' own attributes. As there are 5 different attributes for respondents with a total 20 potential values and 7 different characteristics for theoretical candidates with a total of 21 potential values, I have created a summarizing table which shows the cases where there is a statistically significant relationship between respondents' attributes and theoretical candidates' characteristics. These results can be seen in Table 11.

Candidate characteristics / Respondent attributes		Sex	Age	Locality	Marital status	Parental status	Political experience	Previous political position		
		Female	32-year-old	Local	Married	2 children	Local	Mayor	Parliamentarian	None
Age	18-29 years old		+	+						
	30-39 years old		+	+	+	+	+	+		
	40-49 years old		+	+					+	
	50-59 years old			+		+				
	60-69 years old	+		+				+		
Education	Basic education	+		+		+		+		
	Secondary education			+		+		+		
	Higher education		+	+						
Region	Southern Great Plain									
	Southern Transdanubia			+						
	Northern	+		+		+				
	Northern Great Plain			+		+				
	Central			+		+		+		
	Central Transdanubia			+				+	+	
	Western Transdanubia			+		+				
Settlement	Budapest			+				+		
	City		+	+		+		+		
	Village	+		+	+	+				
Sex	Female	+		+		+		+		
	Male		+	+				+		

Table 11. An overview of the results for the first vignette (author's own)

The results presented in Table 5 highlights the importance of particular candidate characteristics. Upon examining the summarizing table, the effect of locality, parental status and previous political position stands out. In order to get a better understanding on the effects of candidate characteristics on voters' choice, we need to examine the aggregated results of the first vignette. These results can be seen in Figure 12.



Figure 12. The aggregated results of the first vignette

Looking at Figure 12 presenting the results of the AMCE model, we can see that Hungarian voters in general prefer younger political candidates over those in their 50s. Theoretical candidates' parental status is the second most important variable that has a statistically significant effect on voters' choice. Hungarian voters show a preference towards candidates

who have children. Being active in national politics or in local politics does not make a statistically significant difference when it comes to voters' preferences, however there is a slight inclination towards candidates who are involved in politics on a local level. Theoretical candidates' locality has an outstanding effect on voters' preferences. In line with our expectations, this is the most important variable, as non-local candidates are severely punished. Being married as a candidate improves the chances of being preferred by voters, although the difference between single and married candidates is not statistically significant. Having experience as a mayor is also a key variable that has a significant effect since it probably strengthens the image of a local politician who has been in the business of providing for its constituency. Of course, political experience in itself is valuable according to the trusteeship approach which deems competent and experienced politicians as desirable. Candidates' biological sex also seems to be an essential influencing factor of electoral preference. Hungarian voters appear to prefer female candidates over their male counterparts.

Regarding the combined effect of theoretical candidates' sex, marital and parental status, intriguing results can be captured. Being married and being female; being married and having two children; being a married female candidate with two children – in these scenarios candidates do not face any statistically significant advantage or disadvantage. However, being a female with two children, and running for office, has a statistically significant negative effect on candidate evaluation. The ACIE results are presented in Table 12.

Attributes	Levels	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	p value	Significance
Marital_status : Sex	Married : Female	0.027598485	0.043848173	0.629410154	0.529080572	
Children : Sex	2 : Female	-0.089856158	0.042447316	-2.116886677	0.034269467	*
Children : Marital_status	2 : Married	-0.00669391	0.043096859	-0.155322465	0.876567106	
Children : Marital_status : Sex	2 : Married : Female	0.076735502	0.085984854	0.892430452	0.372162255	

Table 12. Effects of gendered attributes (author's own)

An examination of the results from a broad perspective indicates that localism is at the heart of preferences in my data, while other characteristics appear to have little impact on voters' decision. The potential explanatory factors behind these phenomena will be presented in the *'5.1. Discussion and interpretation of the first vignette results'* subchapter of my dissertation.

4.3. Results of the second vignette (To be elaborated in the final version)

The survey experiment conducted included a vignette about the preferences of respondents about the political decision-making process within the framework of different types of crises specified as economic crisis, social crisis and environmental crisis. The preliminary results point toward the acceptance of technocratic viewpoints even when explicitly contrasted with voters' particularistic interests. The detailed results, the discussion and the interpretation of the second vignette will be elaborated in the final version of my dissertation.

4.4. Results of the focus group discussion

The premise of the research is that the characteristics associated with the ideal representative overlap with the characteristics of political leaders. During the focus groups, the political representative was not conceptualized as a political leader, i.e., the instructions given during the interviews were related to the political representatives, the ideal political representative. This approach was used to seek answers to my research question, *"What is the personality of the ideal political representative like?"*. It is important to underline that the focus group in December was aimed at testing the methodology, so in this section of the study I will focus primarily on the results of the focus group discussion in January.

The representatives drawn in the first block were presented in a variety of ways by the participants. Interesting adjectives and attributes already emerged in this block, for example, the following phrases, among others, appeared in this group: 'caring for others', 'proactive', "planner and implementer', 'servant', 'representative of all', 'persuasive', 'visionary'. It can be seen that already in this section, results are in line with the literature (cf. Aichholzer & Willmann, 2020; Mondak, 1995).

From the perspective of the present study, the second, main block of the focus group is really informative. In this block, both the December and January groups had 5×5, or 25, characteristics of output. In the following I focus on the results of the January focus group.

Participants attached two items to the *Extraversion* dimension - "good communicator" and "communicative". In addition to a general interpretation of the terms, the addition that "good communication skills" implies that the ideal representative is the best possible communicator of information appeared. Both adjectives were placed by the group at the extraversion end of the scale (Hanania, 2017; Scott & Medeiros, 2020).

Four indicators were derived for the *Agreeableness* scale. In examining the meaning of the adjective "cooperative", it was highlighted that in this case, group participants also associated

a sense of intrigue with the concept - the group's interpretation was that the ideal representative is uncompromising, helping others if they help him or her. In the case of "good lobbyist", it also appeared that the ideal representative is not opportunistic. The adjective "opinion leader" triggered a lively discussion in the group. Participants highlighted two important aspects of this quality - on the one hand, that there is no subordination to the opinions of other representatives and, on the other hand, that this concept also implies that the ideal representative is able to lead his/her own opinion and that of the community he/she represents. The latter is an excellent link with the trustee model of representation. The fourth indicator on the Agreeableness scale is "autonomous". Here, it was added that the ideal representative has his or her own ideas and does not only follow the guidelines of his or her party - this also shows links with the free mandate (role) conception of representation theory. These four adjectives are located in the middle of the scale, with only the adjective "cooperative" being closer to the positive, friendly end of the scale (cf. Aichholzer & Willmann, 2020).

As a result of the focus group discussion, the *Conscientiousness* scale emerged as the most prominent (Roets & Van Hiel, 2009). In this dimension, seven indicators were placed as a result of the participants' agreement. This is where the adjective "being concise" was placed, which in this case, based on the participants' definitions, could be interpreted as a kind of result-oriented work. The group linked the adjective "practical" to this, which implies, among other things, that the ideal representative is organized, has an overview of the whole process and works effectively to implement the plans outlined. Building on this, the third adjective of the dimension is that the ideal representative "has a vision". Here, the discussants referred not only to vision, but also to the fact that a good representative is a visionary who is aware of the weight and consequences of his or her decisions. The other three attributes associated with the scale converge well with each other, as they focus on the ideal representative's knowledge - "knowledgeable (of issues, people)", "prepared, informed", "thirst for knowledge". The diversity of potential interpretations and approaches emerged in this case as well, as while one participant highlighted that a good representative is aware of their own competences, another participant shifted the focus outside and highlighted that the ideal representative strives to expand their objective knowledge, thus developing a kind of comprehensive competence in world affairs.

The seventh trait, linked to the *Conscientiousness* scale, takes us into the Emotional Stability dimension - the intersection of the two sets is the trait of "perseverance". This is defined by the group as implying that the ideal representative will persevere, whether in a decision or in their

community. These seven traits are also at the positive end of the scales, i.e. the conscientious and emotionally stable endpoints. Approached from the representation theory side, this trait can be linked to the free mandate model, where the representative makes autonomous decisions, even against the preference of the electorate.

For the last dimension of the Big Five model, *Openness*, the group unanimously highlighted that the ideal representative is "open" (G. Caprara et al., 2003; Scott & Medeiros, 2020). This was the case for four out of the five participants. In the participants' understanding, this implies both openness to change and to people's opinions, resulting in a willingness to innovate, and also that the ideal representative encourages others to be open, influencing their community. This factor also included the adjective "malleable", which participants defined in a similar way to the previous one. It can be seen that during the discussion, participants inserted 18 adjectives into one of the Big Five factors.

The remaining 7 adjectives were separated from the above scales. The "outliers" included "honest", "authentic", "passionate", "accepting", as well as "speaking skills (rhetoric)" and "plain language". It is important to highlight that the focus group participants associated the adjective 'passion' with charismatic personality, which is a common feature in studies on the personality of political leaders (Metz & Plesz, 2023; Platow et al., 2006; Shamir, 1994; Sy et al., 2018). The adjective 'accepting' was associated with acceptance of all social minorities. Furthermore, participants agreed that the adjective 'authentic' is a kind of superordinate value that transcends all other attributes. The aggregated results of the second block of the survey are illustrated in Table 13.

Honest Authentic Speaking skills (rhetoric), plain language Passionate Accepting						
Extraverted	Good communicator Communicative					**Introverted**
Agreeable		Cooperative	Good lobbyist Opinion leader Autonomous			**Hostile**
Conscientious	Being concise Practical Has a vision Prepared Informed					**Spontaneous**
Conscientious + Emotionally Stable	Perseverance					**Spontaneous + Neurotic**
Emotionally Stable						**Neurotic**
Open	Open Malleable					**Closed**

Table 13. Extract from the focus group results (author's own)

During the presentation and definition of each adjective, the participants in the discussion explained why they think the given adjective is important in the work of the ideal representative. Among these were traits for which it was clear that they reflected the affinity of the participant (Dolan, 2008; Sevi, 2021) – for example, 'receptive'. However, for other attributes and skills, what emerged was that voters attribute qualities to the ideal representative that they themselves do not possess, or if they do, not to the extent that they would expect the representative to possess. This approach - the free mandate model of political representation (Ilonszki, 2011; Sebők, 2014) – emerged, for example, in the case of the adjectives 'rhetorical skill', 'prepared' and 'informed'.

To conclude the focus group, participants displayed the personality structure of the ideal representative on barometers. These individual results converge well with the results shown in Table 7 in terms of the location of the centroids.

5. Discussion and limitations

5.1. Discussion and interpretation of the first vignette results

In this subchapter of my dissertation, I am going to discuss and present potential interpretation for the results of the first vignette in my survey experiment. Unlike the *'4.2. Results of the first vignette'* subchapter, the presentation in this section of my work is not based on the position of the variables in the vignette, but on their significance as indicated by the results. Based on these results, I can confirm five hypotheses of my work.

As indicated by my results, voters primarily prefer their representative to be local, which can be interpreted as a form of affinity effect. Other candidate characteristics do not indicate such a strong effect on voters' choice. These results confirm my $H1_a$ and $H1_b$ hypotheses.

Locality in itself already signals for a territorial affinity namely that of living in the same geographical place. Clearly preferring local candidates is motivated strategically as these candidates are more inclined to represent local interest and increase spending locally (Childs & Cowley, 2011; Nyholt, 2024). Furthermore living in the same place can indicate shared experiences and depending on the community can also mean shared values and identities (Schulte-Cloos & Bauer, 2023). The strong connection can originate from how representation has been conceptualized and implemented, since historically most representative democracies have some type of geographically defined constituency. The data suggests that territorial embeddedness still has meaning in Hungary and Childs and Cowley's (2011) call for the politics of local presence applies arguing that "*the underlying assumption for descriptive representation*

of the locality is that such representatives will be a better representative than someone from the outside. This is because they will have a better understanding of the needs of the area and its people and/or because they will have more invested in the area, and thus be keener to see it succeed than a candidate who comes form the outside" (p. 8).

The importance of localism can not only be grasped from the descriptive approach but the trusteeship approach as well, since in terms of political experience localism is highly valued as well.

Localism clearly wins over the usual suspects of affinity variables as the overall effects of age and sex are rather limited compared to locality. Based on the regression analysis, older candidates are at a disadvantage compared to younger ones in most of the respondents' age groups. This indicates that my $H2_a$ hypothesis has not been confirmed. However, participant between the ages of 50 and 69 years show a strong support towards the older theoretical candidate, which also signals for the affinity effect. Derived from this, my $H2_b$ hypothesis can be considered as partially confirmed. The complexity of this phenomenon is extremely interesting. The question arises: Why is the affinity effect is only observed in the 50-69 age group? Could this be a generational phenomenon rather than an affinity effect of age? It would mean that the preferences are shifting: while age used to signal experience and/or earned trust from the voter side, younger generations do not interpret age the same way anymore.

With the effects of both variables – sex and age – being statistically significant, we can deduct that Hungarian voters do not seem to punish female and/or young candidates. The regression analysis also indicates that female candidates are preferred over male candidates. Stemming from this, it can be concluded that my $H3_a$ and $H3_b$ hypotheses have not been confirmed, as male and female respondents also prefer female candidates over their male counterparts. Conversely, hypothesis $H3_c$ has been confirmed by my results, as female candidates who have two children are disadvantaged, however this negative effect vanishes when female candidates having two children are married. These results may suggest that Hungarian voters prefer traditional family roles and models. Or do they connect the marital and parental status to traits and qualities like caring, and being compassionate?

While expressing preference for young and female candidates, voters also seem to value when candidates have children over not having children. This preference does not seem to go along with a preference for being married as marital status has a positive but limited effect and thus cannot be directly interpreted as a highly valued traditional family trait. These results clearly

support my $H4_a$ and $H4_b$ hypotheses. It seems that having children is a valuable asset in itself which reinforces the findings of Campbell and Cowley (2018) that politicians with children tended to have higher voters' evaluations. In these cases, I was unable to examine the supposed affinity effect due to the lack of information regarding the marital and parental status of survey experiment respondents. This can be considered as a weakness of my work, which will be further elaborated on in the *'6. Conclusion'* chapter of my dissertation, since this shortcoming is not only related to the first vignette, but to the survey experiment as a whole, and its correction could help to improve the quality and delivery of future research.

Considering that localism is indeed triumphant with local experiences being valued and parental status has a significant effect we need to look deeper into how voters relate to underrepresented groups namely women and young politicians. Gender is clearly a complex concept that encompasses variables besides sex, one notable being parenthood. Are women more prone to face expectations of having children and thus enter into what Teele (2018) call a double bind? Voters' conceptions of gender roles can also affect their expectations of political experience: are female candidates expected to have more experience to show for their capability? For age the interaction of variable should also be tested to discover potential tension in having expectations towards candidates that do not adhere to their age: are young politicians punished for not having experience? Are they expected to be married with kids?

From the perspective of previous political position, it is visible that Hungarian voters prefer candidates who previously held the position of mayor. In other words, Hungarian voters value local political experience and experience gained as a mayor the most. These results unambiguously support my $H5_a$ and $H5_b$ hypotheses.

In summary, besides valuing a candidate who is local and have prior experience as a mayor, respondents show a preference for younger, female candidates, and those with children. Although these characteristics together do not align with traditional family values – since there was no indicated preference for married candidates in the first rounds of analyses – they signal something intriguing. Being a female is associated with *'communal'* traits (Schneider & Bos, 2019). These traits are linked to professions encompassing caring for others. Similarly, having children can be interpreted as indicative of nurturing and providing for others. These thoughts can be linked back to Childs and Cowley's (2011) argumentation regarding local representatives. Do Hungarian voters desire a representative who cares for them, not only in terms of their interests, but also in terms of their overall wellbeing? Or is there something else at play? Looking at the current composition of the Hungarian Parliament, where younger,

female representatives are not overly prominent, it prompts the question: Do voters wish for something new, something different from the usual? Does this mean Hungarian voters are looking for a change? Or using the knowledge of political psychology, they preferences can be explained by social identity theory? Perhaps the Hungarian electorate would like to distance themselves from the current MPs by protesting against their current characteristics (thus designating them as the out-group) and simultaneously create a new body of MPs (thus designating a new in-group)? While these questions remain unanswered by my research, they can appoint the direction for future research.

5.2. Methodological limitations of the first vignette

Although the results of the first vignette are intriguing, there are important lessons to be learned from the formulation of the vignette and conduct of the research. Mainly the choice of variables and the specification of the attribute levels is informative for potential future research.

Regarding gender, I only included male and female potential candidates into the first vignette. Literature puts an emphasis on gender rights in the last decades (Squires, 2008; Waylen, 2010). They do this mainly by focusing on political processes like the process of representation. However, transgender political actors have also appeared on the scene during the last years. For example, Jamie Wallis, who is an MP of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. In future research, including "transgender" as another attribute level could be a compelling addition depending on the surveyed population.

In case of age, I specified non-extreme attribute levels. The public political sphere is open in Hungary for anyone over the age of 18 years. The average of MPs in Hungary in 2018 and 2022 was 50 and 52 years respectively. However, both in 2018 and 2022 opposition MPs in the Hungarian Parliament were approximately 10 years younger on average (Republikon Intézet, 2022). Although the significant differences between Hungary and the US, empirical results from the latter quite converge to the Hungarian numbers, as in the US, "the average member of the House is 58 years at the time of their election" (Stockemer et al., 2023, p. 1). As these numbers are the average age of MPs in these countries, including older hypothetical candidates into a future survey experiment would be beneficial. At the same time, examining the effect of age of much younger hypothetical candidates on voters' choice and assessment would be an invaluable addendum to future research.

Locality has been proven as a key influencing factor of voter choice. However, in my survey experiment I specified the concerning attribute level only based on the place of residence. In

next research, the change of its conceptualization could mean a step forward. Instead of, or next to place of residence, place of birth would be an interesting development of the survey experiment. Including both of these may not be the best choice, as this logic was contradictory to the guidelines of formulating attribute levels.

Marital and parental status were also kept simple in this recent survey experiment. In addition to the "married" and "single" options for the theoretical candidate, it could be useful to include the "divorced" option in future research. Empirical research conducted in Japan indicate puzzling results, as "Japanese voters exhibited no preference regarding candidates' marital status or number of children, for female or male candidates. Respondents even seemed to cut females some slack for the special challenges they face balancing family and career, taking away fewer points from women than for men if they were divorced" (Kage et al., 2019, p. 295). Regarding the number of children, in my research I excluded theoretical candidates with large families. Although the definition of 'large family' varies across countries and cultures, in Hungary, families raising three or more children are considered as 'large families. In future research, including hypothetical candidates with three or more children would be beneficial to further nuance voters' assessment of representative candidates.

Previous political experience of theoretical candidates also seems to be a key influencing factor of voters' evaluation. Concerning on the level on which the hypothetical candidates gained their experience has been proved as less significant as the exact position they held. I only included parliamentary position and the position of mayor. Future research may include options, like member of the city council, or position in the European Parliament.

As presented, the levels of the attributes can be enhanced in future research. This survey experiment and its results indicate that the chosen methodology is able to appropriately capture the factors which influence voters' evaluation and choice of candidates. Besides, another potential way for further developing this research could be including other candidate characteristics into the survey, such as their educational background, or their ethnic background.

5.3. Discussion and interpretation of the second vignette results (To be elaborated in the final version)

5.4. Methodological limitations of the second vignette (To be elaborated in the final version)

5.5. Discussion and interpretation of the focus group discussion

The present study is situated at the interface of electoral behavior, political psychology and representation theory, where the focus of the study is on the personality traits of political representatives and the preferences of voters. A comparison of the conceptualization of political representation and leadership revealed that while political leaders are often singled out for their assertive, charismatic and decision-making abilities (Platow et al., 2006), political representatives focus on understanding voter preferences, fostering community relations and advocacy. In political theories of representation, the role of representatives is to reflect the interests and will of the electorate (Baaz & Lilja, 2014; Phillips, 2000), in contrast, the role of political leaders is broader. This includes both managing decision-making processes and shaping policy directions. In this context, the study of the personality and personality traits of representatives plays an important role in assessing the effectiveness of political representation and voter satisfaction.

The application of the Big Five model in political science research allows us to analyze in detail the personality and individual personality traits of political representatives, thus understanding how these traits influence voter behaviour and the relationship between representatives and their constituents. Based on the results of the focus group research on which this study is based, it can be concluded that among the Big Five personality dimensions of political representation, Conscientiousness and Openness are of paramount importance, as rated by the interviewees.

The research sheds light on the interconnection between voter behavior, political psychology and political representation theory, and opens up new perspectives for further research on political representation. The results show that voters seek similarities with political candidates - descriptive representation, affinity effects (Dolan, 2008; Sevi, 2021) but they also value personality traits that go beyond their own competences - the (role) perception of representation as a free mandate (Ilonszki, 2011). The results indicate that political representation is not only based on political and party platforms, but also on the personality traits of candidates, which provides a new perspective for understanding the relationship between political representation and voter behavior and contributes to the further development of theories of representation. A deeper understanding of the personalities of political representatives and leaders can facilitate a more effective analysis and evaluation of political systems and processes.

A future research direction could be to study other social groups and different political contexts in order to gain a deeper understanding of the interconnection between voter behavior, political

psychology and theories of representation. In addition, it is important to further analyze the similarities and differences between political representation and political leadership in order to gain a more detailed picture of the different roles and functions of political actors in political systems. The results of the research presented in this paper will contribute to a deeper understanding of the theory and practice of political representation.

5.6. Methodological limitations of the focus group discussion

Conducting the focus group discussions in December 2023 and January 2024, allowed me to experience the method's benefits, as presented in the literature. During the first interview in December, I identified weaknesses in the methodology and the designed script. When planning and organizing the pilot group, I did not put appropriate emphasis on ensuring a correct homogeneity-heterogeneity ratio (Vicsek, 2006). The participants formed a rather homogeneous group, which facilitated a safe and comfortable environment; however, this homogeneity led to a strong convergence in participants' perspectives and opinions. Alongside interviewees' recruitment, the designed script indicated some flaws. During the second part of the first focus group discussion back in December, I arbitrarily placed the attributes on the whiteboard, and only then did I explain to the participants the structure and dimensions of the Big Five personality model. This procedure complicated the dialogue among the participants, and it also made the focus group discussion more time-consuming. I applied these two important lessons to further develop the methodology for the January conversation. By incorporating these, I was able to organize a meeting where participants felt comfortable and free to share their thoughts with the rest of the group. The members were engaged in the discussion and actively contributed to giving me valuable insights into their ideas for the ideal representative.

It is crucial to highlight that the focus group discussions in this research is neither internally nor externally valid, and generalizing their results to the Hungarian population as a whole may be misleading.

This qualitative research was conducted under the "New National Excellence Program", where resources were limited in terms of time and finances. Despite these constraints, the focus group discussions provided invaluable data. However, it is the methodological insights that I consider as the greatest achievements of this research. As a psychologist, I was focusing on two questions: '*Does the Big Five capture representation?'* and '*Are rigorous, standardized psychological tests applicable in such a research context?'*. To answer these, I combined the

focus group methodology with a standardized psychological measurement tool, namely the Big Five personality model. As the results indicate, there was only a partial success with the Big Five model. It failed to fully capture all participants' inputs (see the *'4.4. Results of the focus group discussion'* subchapter for "outlier" values). Nevertheless, my findings also demonstrate that psychological tools and measurement instruments have their place in political science research. Moving forward, my goal is to delve deeper into the intersection of the two disciplines, thus enriching our understanding of political science events and their impact on voters.

6. Conclusion

In my dissertation, I made an attempt to explore the dynamics of voter preferences in the context of political representation, using a vignette survey experiment and focus group discussions. I aimed to enrich our understanding on how different candidate characteristics influence voter decisions, clarifying the relationship between voters' expectations and the qualities of political actors. Using these methods, I found that the first and most important factor, which influences voters' choice is the locality of the candidate. Theoretical candidates' biological sex, age, parental status and previous political position also have a moderate effect on voters' choice. Regarding representatives' personality traits, *Conscientiousness* and *Openness* are of paramount importance, as rated by my interviewees who participated in the focus group discussions. Through these analyses, my research has not only highlighted significant voters biases towards certain candidate characteristics, but also has contributed to a deeper understanding of the affinity effect (descriptive aspect of representation), and the process approach of representation.

The conducted quantitative research implies future research directions. With this current analysis, we got a better understanding of voters' preferences. It is clear that voters prefer women in representative position. The question emerges: What do voters expect female representatives to do? The same logic applies to the other variables of the research – What do voters expect from younger representatives? Or from representatives with children? We see voters' descriptive vision regarding legislature, as a next step we need to examine the representative process more thoroughly. Regarding the preliminary results of the second vignette, it became clear that Hungarian voters show a preference towards experts in the representational process in times of crises. These results strongly converge to the results of Papp (2024). What are the further implications of these results? Is there anything else, voters might expect experts other than crisis management? These puzzling questions reveal new gaps in our current knowledge about representation.

My findings show a convergence with existing theories, not only in the field of representation, but also in the fields of political psychology and voter behavior. The results of the first vignette and the focus group discussion, besides the preliminary results of the second vignette indicate that several models of representation can be present simultaneously in voters' choices. In some cases, they prefer a representative who is like them – locality, affinity effect regarding age. In other cases, respondents show a tendency for the trustee model – experts in special circumstances, or representatives' rhetorical skills. These results can alter our approach to representation, as it became apparent that representational models are not exclusive to each other.

The outcomes of the first vignette are essential also from the perspective of political psychology. Social identity can be formed based on various factors, for example locality, gender, marital and parental status, or even on political positions. Stemming from the results of my research, it may seem like that the Hungarian electorate is turning away from the current MPs. My results point in a completely different direction, both in terms of the age and gender of the current MPs. This can signal another form of social identity with current representatives bodying the out-group, and voters and their desires bodying the in-group. These propositions and the research questions induced by them can also form the directions for future research.

The preliminary results of the second vignette forecast intriguing additions to our current knowledge about voter behavior regarding the dynamic nature of representation.

The limitations within each vignette can be resolved by applying a different conceptualization and operationalization. Within the same methodological universe, the theoretical approach, conceptualization and operationalization, on which the current work is based, can be further developed. The implementation of all these developments can further contribute to our understanding of political representation in the future. But the inherent limitations of the chosen methodology cannot be resolved within the methodology, namely the method's weak external validity (see *'3.4. Critiques of the methodology'* subchapter). While this disadvantage of the tool has already been elaborated on, I need to emphasize the great internal validity of the survey experiment method. As Babbi (2013) points it out, "internal validity refers to the possibility that the conclusions drawn from experimental results may not accurately reflect what has gone on in the experiment itself. The threat of internal validity is present whenever anything other than the experimental stimulus can affect the dependent variable" (Babbie, 2013, pp. 280-281). During constructing and wording my experiment and its questions, I paid close attention to

avoid the possibility of triggering something current and relevant for respondents. Stemming from this, the internal validity of my survey experiment research can be considered great.

To overcome the general methodological limitations, in my work I attempted to combine two methodologies: the vignette survey experiment and the focus group discussion. However, it is important to acknowledge that the exact elaboration of this integration remains to be done. My aim is to take further steps towards successfully combining theoretical and methodological knowledge from different disciplines in my future research.

Generally, both of my applied methods – vignette survey experiment and focus group discussion – has been proved to be an appropriate choice. The vignette survey experiment helped me to reveal voters' preferences and their decision-making processes in detail. Not only did the vignettes point out voters' preferences in general, but also it shed light on how these effects of the characteristics change depending on voters' attributes. This methodological approach allowed me to present a deeper understanding of subtle influences in political behavior. Given the lessons learned through my research, future studies can further develop and nuance their research design. They can do so by incorporating more social-demographic questions about respondents. As I consciously left out questions about marital and parental status of participants – aiming having a shorter survey experiment – I was unable to measure the supposed affinity effect in every aspect of my research. This shortcoming needs to be addressed in the future, in order to understand the motives behind voters' choices even better. Combining quantitative and qualitative research methods has been proved to be an effective approach for examining voters' choices and preferences. The representative sample of the quantitative research made it possible to generalize my results of my first vignette to the Hungarian voters, as this particular vignette did not contain any special attributes which may have triggered respondents during completing the task. However, the generalizability of the second vignette's results is not possible, as its wording, therefore its research context is strongly influenced and directed towards specific circumstances. Nevertheless, its results are invaluable for mapping out voters' perceptions of the process of representation.

The results of this current study hold significant value for various political actors – not only for representatives, but also for political strategists, and parties, for example. Using these results, they can organize and optimize their appeal to voters. By understanding the directions and effects of certain candidate characteristics, political campaigns can be targeted more precisely, thus political actors can convey their messages more effectively. From the perspective of the Hungarian electorate, studies like this are important. Asking such questions about their political

representation may trigger thoughts which could have otherwise remain hidden. As citizens entitled to vote, partaking in elections is one of our most important rights and obligations. Elections mean the time and place for articulating our wishes and desires. To make responsible choices, it is important to know the options. Perhaps even more importantly, we need to know what is really important to us as citizens. What makes us feel that we are well represented, in the right way? There can be significant individual differences between voters in this regard. The field of psychology generally emphasizes the importance of individual differences. Political psychology is therefore a valuable complement to theories of political representation and voter behavior. I believe that it would be beneficial for future studies to connect these disciplines in order to gain a holistic understanding of the objectives and behavior of voters.

This research journey has been challenging and insightful simultaneously. As this research mean the most complex academic projects in my career so far, I have gained a lot of valuable knowledge and experience over the years completing them. Designing a vignette survey experiment and organizing and moderating two focus group discussions was a joyful experience, as I could build on my psychological knowledge in both cases. It is great seeing these two disciplines intertwining and complementing each other. Through this research I got reinforced in my belief that it is insightful to combine my psychological training with my political science knowledge.

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Appendix

D1. Please state your gender!

Required

- ⊙ 1. Male
- ⊙ 2. Female

D2. Please state your current age!

Required

1. .....

D3. What is your highest level of education?

Required

- ⊙ 1. Max. 8 classes primary school
- ⊙ 2. Technical school, vocational school
- ⊙ 3. Secondary school
- ⊙ 4. College, university

D4. Your place of residence by type of settlement:

Required

- ⊙ 1. Budapest
- ⊙ 2. County seat
- ⊙ 3. City
- ⊙ 4. Village

D5. Your place of residence by county:

Required

- ⊙ 1. Bács-Kiskun county
- ⊙ 2. Baranya county
- ⊙ 3. Békés county
- ⊙ 4. Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county
- ⊙ 5. Budapest
- ⊙ 6. Csongrád-Csanád county
- ⊙ 7. Fejér county
- ⊙ 8. Győr-Moson-Sopron county
- ⊙ 9. Hajdú-Bihar county
- ⊙ 10. Heves county
- ⊙ 11. Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county
- ⊙ 12. Komárom-Esztergom county
- ⊙ 13. Nógrád county
- ⊙ 14. Pest county
- ⊙ 15. Somogy county
- ⊙ 16. Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county
- ⊙ 17. Tolna county
- ⊙ 18. Vas county
- ⊙ 19. Veszprém county
- ⊙ 20. Zala county

K1. Based on the brief description below, which MEP do you think would be best suited to represent you?

Required

- ⊙ 1. Tamás is a 32-years-old young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held the position of mayor.
- ⊙ 2. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- ⊙ 3. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- ⊙ 4. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. He was active in local politics before his election and has also held the position of mayor.
- ⊙ 5. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- ⊙ 6. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- ⊙ 7. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held the position of mayor.
- ⊙ 8. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- ⊙ 9. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election he was active in national politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- ⊙ 10. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. He was active in local politics before his election and has also held a mayoral position.
- ⊙ 11. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- ⊙ 12. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- ⊙ 13. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.

- 14. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 15. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. He was active in national politics before his election, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 16. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 17. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 18. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 19. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held the position of mayor.
- 20. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. He is single and has no children. Before his election he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 21. is a 32-years-old young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. He was active in national politics before his election, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 22. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 23. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 24. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician living in his constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 25. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and also held a mayoral position.
- 26. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 27 Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. He was active in national politics before his election, although he did not hold an elected position.

- 28. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held a mayoral position.
- 29. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. He was active in local politics before his election and has also held a parliamentary position.
- 30. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 31. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.
- 32. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 33. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. He was active in national politics before his election, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 34. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 35. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 36. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 37. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and also held a mayoral position.
- 38. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 39. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. He was active in national politics before his election, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 40. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 41. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.

- 42. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 43. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. He is single and has no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.
- 44. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 45. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. He was active in national politics before his election, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 46. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 47. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 48. Tamás is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 49. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.
- 50. Tamás is a 52-years-old middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 51. Tamás is a 52-years-old middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. He was active in national politics before his election, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 52. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 53. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 54. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 55. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and also held a mayoral position.

- 56. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 57. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 58. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is married with no children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 59. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 60. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 61. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and also held the position of mayor.
- 62. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 63. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician, who lives in his constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. He was active in national politics before his election, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 64. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 65. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 66. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 67. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and also held a mayoral position.
- 68. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 69. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. He was active in national politics before his election, although he did not hold an elected position.

- 70. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in his constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 71. Tamás is 52 years old, middle-aged politician and lives in his constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 72. Tamás is 52 years old, middle-aged politician, who lives in his constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 73. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Prior to his election, he was active in national politics and also held the position of mayor.
- 74. Tamás is 52 years old, a middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 75. Tamás is 52 years old, a middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 76. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 77. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 78. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with two children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 79. Tamás is 52 years old, a middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.
- 80. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 81. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 82. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 83. Tamás is 52 years old, a middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.

- 84. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is a family man with no children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 85. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and also held a mayoral position.
- 86. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 87. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election, he was active in national politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 88. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Prior to his election, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 89. Tamás is 52 years old, a middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 90. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has two children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 91. Tamás is 52 years old, a middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and also held a mayoral position.
- 92. Tamás is 52 years old, a middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 93. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election, he was active in national politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 94. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election, he was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 95. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election he was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 96. Tamás is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in his own constituency. Tamás is single and has no children. Before his election he was active in local politics, although he did not hold an elected position.
- 97. Eszter, 32, young politician, living in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.

- 98. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 99. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. She was active in national politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 100. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. She was active in local politics before her election and has also held a mayoral position.
- 101. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 102. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. She was active in local politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 103. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with no children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held the position of mayor.
- 104. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Esther is a family woman with no children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 105. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Esther is a family woman with no children. She was active in national politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 106. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with no children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 107. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with no children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 108. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with no children. She was active in local politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 109. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. Prior to her election, she was active in national politics and also held a mayoral position.
- 110. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 111. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. She was active in national politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.

- 112. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. She was active in local politics before her election and has also held a mayoral position.
- 113. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 114. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. She was active in local politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 115. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.
- 116. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 117. Eszter is 32 years old, a young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. She was active in national politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 118. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 119. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 120. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Before her election she was active in local politics, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 121. Eszter is a 32-years-old young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Prior to her election, she was active in national politics and held the position of mayor.
- 122. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 123. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 124. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Prior to her election, she was active in local politics and also held a mayoral position.
- 125. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.

- 126. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election she was active in local politics, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 127. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with no children. Prior to her election, she was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.
- 128. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman, no children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 129. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman, no children. Before her election she was active in national politics, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 130. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman, no children. Before being elected, she was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 131. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with no children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 132. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with no children. She was active in local politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 133. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. Prior to her election, she was active in national politics and also held a mayoral position.
- 134. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 135. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. She was active in national politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 136. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a mayoral position.
- 137. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 138. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. She was active in local politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 139. Eszter is a 32-years-old young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held the position of mayor.

- 140. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 141. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. She was active in national politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 142. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 143. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 144. Eszter is a 32-years-old, young politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. She was active in local politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 145. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.
- 146. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 147. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician living in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 148. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Prior to her election, she was active in local politics and also held a mayoral position.
- 149. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 150. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician living in her constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election she was active in local politics, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 151. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in her constituency. Eszter is married with no children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.
- 152. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in her constituency. Eszter is married with no children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 153. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician living in her constituency. Eszter is married with no children. She was active in national politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.

- 154. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in her constituency. Eszter is married with no children. Prior to her election, she was active in local politics and also held a mayoral position.
- 155. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in her constituency. Eszter is married with no children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 156. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician living in her constituency. Eszter is married with no children. She was active in local politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 157. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in her constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.
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- 162. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. She was active in local politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 163. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who lives in her constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Prior to her election, she was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.
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- 165. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. She was active in national politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 166. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held the position of mayor.
- 167. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.

- 168. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician living in her constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. She was active in local politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.
- 169. Eszter is 52, a middle-aged politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Prior to her election, she was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.
- 170. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 171. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics, although she did not hold an elected position.
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- 175. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with no children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a mayoral position.
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- 178. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman, no children. Prior to her election, she was active in local politics and held a mayoral position.
- 179. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with no children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 180. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is a family woman with no children. Before her election she was active in local politics, although she did not hold an elected position.
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- 182. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 183. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. Before her election, she was active in national politics, although she did not hold an elected position.
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- 185. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has two children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
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- 191. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. Before her election, she was active in local politics and held a parliamentary position.
- 192. Eszter is a 52-years-old, middle-aged politician who does not live in her own constituency. Eszter is single and has no children. She was active in local politics before her election, although she did not hold an elected position.

K3b. In a crisis situation, it may be necessary to reassess decision-making criteria.
In your opinion, what is the best representative approach in the case of <CRISIS 1>?

Required

- ⊙ 1. Katalin says that in an economic crisis, the interests of the electorate are particularly important. In a crisis, the interests of the people come first.
- ⊙ 2. Katalin believes that in an economic crisis, the expert perspective is particularly important. In a crisis situation, professionalism is paramount.
- ⊙ 3. Katalin believes that in an economic crisis, the people's perspective is particularly important. In a crisis situation, the public interest is paramount.
- ⊙ 4. Katalin believes that in an economic crisis, a united party platform is particularly important. In a crisis situation, party discipline takes precedence.
- ⊙ 5. Katalin believes that in a social crisis, the interests of the electorate are particularly important. In a crisis, the interests of the people are paramount.
- ⊙ 6. Katalin believes that in a social crisis, the expert perspective is particularly important. In a crisis situation, professionalism is paramount.
- ⊙ 7. Katalin believes that in a social crisis situation, the people as a whole are particularly important. In a crisis situation, the public interest is paramount.
- ⊙ 8. Katalin believes that in a social crisis, a united party platform is particularly important. In a crisis situation, party discipline takes precedence.
- ⊙ 9. Katalin believes that in an environmental crisis, the interests of the electorate are particularly important. In a crisis situation, the interests of the people are paramount.
- ⊙ 10. Katalin believes that in an environmental crisis, expert considerations are particularly important. In a crisis situation, professionalism is paramount.
- ⊙ 11. Katalin believes that in an environmental crisis, the people as a whole are particularly important. In a crisis situation, the public interest is paramount.
- ⊙ 12. Katalin believes that in an environmental crisis, a united party platform is particularly important. In a crisis situation, party discipline takes precedence.
- ⊙ 13. In an economic crisis, the interests of the electorate are particularly important. In a crisis situation, the interests of the people are paramount.
- ⊙ 14. In an economic crisis, Kálmán believes that the expert perspective is particularly important. In a crisis situation, professionalism is paramount.
- ⊙ 15. In an economic crisis, Kálmán believes that the people's perspective is particularly important. In a crisis situation, the public interest is paramount.
- ⊙ 16. In an economic crisis, Kálmán believes that a united party platform is particularly important. In a crisis situation, party discipline takes precedence.
- ⊙ 17. In a social crisis, Kálmán believes that the interests of the electorate are particularly important. In a crisis situation, the interests of the people are paramount.
- ⊙ 18. According to Kálmán, in a social crisis situation, expert considerations are particularly important. In a crisis situation, professionalism is paramount.
- ⊙ 19. According to Kálmán, in a social crisis situation, the people as a whole are particularly important. In a crisis situation, the public interest is paramount.

- ⊙ 20. In a social crisis, Kálmán believes that a united party platform is particularly important. In a crisis situation, party discipline is paramount.
- ⊙ 21. In an environmental crisis, Kálmán believes that the interests of the electorate are particularly important. In a crisis situation, the interests of the people are paramount.
- ⊙ 22. According to Kálmán, in an environmental crisis situation, expert considerations are particularly important. In a crisis situation, professionalism is paramount.
- ⊙ 23. In an environmental crisis, Kálmán believes that the people as a whole are of particular importance. In a crisis situation, the public interest is paramount.
- ⊙ 24. In an environmental crisis, Kálmán believes that a united party platform is particularly important. In a crisis situation, party discipline takes precedence.

D6. Who is your representative in Parliament?

Required

1. .....